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CHAPTER 1 
 
PALLIATIVE SEDATION, PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH,  
AND AN INCONSISTENCY ARGUMENT 
 
 
Contemporary Scene 
 
 Currently in the United States, Oregon, Washington, and Montana stand 
alone in legalizing some form of physician-assisted suicide (PAS). While these 
represent a relatively small number of states, according to one prominent 
proponent and advocate of PAS it “will probably soon become legal on a state-
by-state basis, culturally tolerated, and openly practiced.”1 It appears there will 
be ongoing and increased pressure for other states to follow suit so that those 
who are terminally ill can exercise the full scope of their autonomy and “die with 
dignity” through PAS.  Further, some would say that if suicide, or less pejoratively 
self-killing, can be justified in some settings then voluntary active euthanasia 
ought to be justifiable in some cases as well.2 That is, if these patients deem it a 
fit end to their lives given their unique circumstances and specific personal life 
journeys.  
A growing number of medical and health care professionals, many moral 
philosophers, several theologians and clergy from various traditions, and 
                                                
1 Margaret Pabst Battin, “Is a Physician Ever Obligated to Help a Patient Die?” Ending 
Life: Ethics and the Way We Die (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 88. 
 
2 Michael Tooley, “In Defense of Voluntary Active Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide,” 
Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, edited by Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath 
Wellman (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005) 161-178. 
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ordinary citizens support the view that PAS and voluntary active euthanasia 
(VAE) should be a legitimate, and in some cases a morally obligatory, palliative 
care option that should be provided for patients at the end of their lives under 
carefully prescribed circumstances. 3  For examples, Margaret Battin, a 
philosopher and ethicist, and Timothy Quill, a medical doctor, in their affirmation 
of this point write, “Relief of suffering—and with it the freedom to face dying as 
one wishes—must be available to suffering patients now” [emphasis added].4  
One can provide further examples from religious thinkers in reference to 
the aforementioned point.  The Episcopal Bishop, John Shelby Spong comes “at 
the issues of assisted suicide, active euthanasia, and the freedom to die with 
dignity from a specifically religious position.”5   Not only does he think these 
should be legal practices but also that they “should be acclaimed as both 
moral and ethical—a human right, if you will.”  He has committed to “work 
through ecclesiastical processes of [his] church and all the forces of organized 
                                                
3 This point is substantiated in a recent volume compiled on the topic. See Timothy E. 
Quill and Margaret P. Battin, eds. Physician-Assisted Dying: The Case for Palliative Care & 
Patient Choice (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2004). 
 
4 Ibid., 2. Further interaction with philosophers and medical professionals are in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
5 John Shelby Spong, “A Death to Be Welcomed, Not an Enemy to be Defeated,” 
Physician-Assisted Dying: The Case for Palliative Care & Patient Choice, edited by Timothy E. 
Quill and Margaret P. Battin (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2004) 150. 
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religion to change [the] consciousness” of various communities concerning the 
issue.6  
Or consider the stance of Gerrit G. de Kruijf, a theologian from the 
University of Leiden, who takes the ethical issue of euthanasia as a test case for 
applying his preferred approach to public theology. While he is a bit more 
tempered in his conclusion than Spong concerning patient autonomy, de Kruijf 
thinks that autonomy has to be relativized and cannot be absolute in a health 
care context. He, nevertheless, would advocate for a law that provides judicial 
tests that can account for a doctor’s decision to be involved in euthanasia or 
PAS. He thinks “because killing can never be a normal act of medical care, but 
only a paradoxical one, it should always be accounted for in order to protect 
patients from unauthorized decisions by doctors.”7  The primary concern for de 
Kruijf is to provide safeguards for patients in physician decision-making regarding 
euthanasia. Clearly, these thinkers and many others see this issue as one of 
patients’ rights or of physicians’ moral obligation or some combination of both.  
There are many other professionals who are also members of the various 
groups mentioned above, alternatively, who see trends towards legalizing PAS 
and VAE as not upholding the inherent dignity of human beings, nor the inherent 
                                                
6 Ibid., 160. 
 
7 Gerrit G. de Kruijf, “The Challenge of a Public Theology,” Theology Between Church, 
University, and Society, Studies in Theology and Religion, Volume 6, edited by Martien E. 
Brinkman, Nico F. M. Schreurs, Henrik M. Vroom, and Conrad J. Wethmar (The Netherlands: 
Royal Van Gorcum, 2003) 148. 
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honor of the medical profession. This stance is in contradistinction to that which 
is often claimed by proponents of PAS and VAE. Instead, opponents of PAS and 
VAE see this as actually undermining patient “dignity” by violating the “sanctity 
of human life” and perhaps even dissolving the integrity of the healing art of 
medicine.  
For example, Leon Kass, a medical doctor and bioethicist, sees “the 
sanctity of life” and “human dignity” as compatible notions that when rightly 
understood are mutually reinforcing. He writes: 
In the current debates about euthanasia, we are often told that these 
notions pull in opposite directions. Upholding death with dignity might 
mean taking actions that would seem to deny the sanctity of life. 
Conversely, unswervingly upholding the sanctity of life might mean 
denying to some a dignified death. This implied opposition is, for many of 
us, very disquieting. The dilemmas themselves are bad enough. Much 
worse is it to contemplate that human dignity and sanctity might be 
opposed, and that we may be forced to choose between them.8 
 
Kass is highlighting the tension that many feel who simultaneously are opposed 
to PAS and VAE, but also who are not proponents of any form of vitalism, which 
seeks to preserve bodily functioning and “life” at all costs regardless of 
circumstances. Where the lines are to be drawn is not very clear in many 
situations.  
                                                
8 Leon R. Kass, “Death with Dignity and the Sanctity of Life,” Last Rights? Assisted 
Suicide and Euthanasia Debated, edited by Michael M. Uhlmann (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1998) 202. 
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Many proponents of PAS and VAE think allowing these practices as 
legitimate end-of-life options for medical professionals and patients to utilize can 
ease the tension by not having to make distinctions where it may be the case 
that none can be made. Further, many of those who oppose PAS and VAE 
would affirm that patients ought to be enabled to exercise their autonomy in a 
health care context, but would point out that autonomy in medical decisions, as 
is the case in a liberal political democracy, has its limits. And PAS and VAE, its 
opponents suggest, are such expressions of autonomy that extend beyond 
morally legitimate medical and legal boundaries. The position of Arthur Dyck, an 
ethicist of Harvard University’s School of Public Health, is illustrative of this point. 
An individual’s life is to be protected as having incalculable worth. Being 
hopelessly ill or fatally wounded or being one for whom life has in various 
ways become a burden does not qualify, that is, does not reduce the law’s 
interest in preserving life. This interest is not diminished in any way by the 
medical condition and the wishes of the one whose life is at stake.9 
 
The primary issue at stake for others is the intrinsic honor of the medical 
profession. As Sissela Bok has noted, “Anyone raising the question of physician-
assisted suicide among a group of doctors comes to recognize their conflicted 
response….When it comes to singling out their own profession to carry out a 
practice of assisted suicide, both proponents and opponents share a sense of 
                                                
9Arthur Dyck, Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities: The Moral Bonds of Community 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005) 265. 
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worried unease.”10 It is this notion that will become more central in the work 
presented here.  
 
Continued Debate 
As indicated in the section above, informed thinkers disagree concerning 
the appropriateness or lack thereof of PAS and VAE. Interestingly, divergence of 
judgment is had by those within the medical profession, within the same 
academic disciplines, say, philosophy, and within singular religious traditions 
such as Christianity. So it does not appear that difference surrounding this issue is 
simply a question of Weltanschauung or worldview. Much ethical and political 
debate will continue to go forth in various contexts concerning the 
appropriateness of PAS and VAE as being legitimate practices in the medical 
profession. 
To be sure, many of those persons working in the fields of palliative 
medicine, pain management, and hospice care who may oppose PAS and VAE 
do struggle with determining when some currently accepted medical practices 
such as withholding and withdrawing life sustaining treatments and deep 
sedation of patients to unconsciousness at the end of life cross into these areas 
that they have traditionally considered beyond the scope, morally speaking, of 
                                                
10 Gerald Dworkin, R. G. Frey, and Sissela Bok, Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted 
Suicide: For and Against (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 133-134. 
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proper professional healthcare. They recognize that while death may be an 
event, dying is a process with many uncertainties. And so discerning fine 
distinctions in some of these matters often prove difficult though not impossible. 
Many working in end-of-life care and who also engage in ethical 
reflections in this area maintain that things may not be as straightforward as 
some who participate in the contemporary philosophical debates suggest. This is 
true for those on all sides of the issue.  Kenneth Vaux astutely observes that “in 
the ethics of dying, absolutist principles must always be chastened by mercy.”11 
Of course, this should not be thought to endorse a claim that a plea for merciful 
motive is an excuse to direct intentional homicide.12  The issues surrounding 
euthanasia still need to be vigorously sorted as to the range of what counts as 
morally permissible palliative care options for patients at the end of life.  
Regardless, health care professionals engaged in palliative care have 
responsibilities to do everything possible within ethical, professional, and legal 
boundaries to medically treat and care for their patients. Therefore, reflecting 
                                                
11 Kenneth L. Vaux, “Debbie’s Dying: Mercy Killing and the Good Death,” Euthanasia: 
The Moral Issues, edited by Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum (New York: Prometheus 
Books, 1989) 31. 
 
12 Willard Gaylin, Leon R. Kass, Edmund Pellegrino, and Mark Siegler, “Doctors Must 
Not Kill,” Euthanasia: The Moral Issues, edited by Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum 
(New York: Prometheus Books, 1989) 25. 
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on these issues not only empirically, but also conceptually is essential for end-of-
life medical ethics.13 
 
A Widely Embraced Alternative?  
One complex ethical issue in end-of-life palliative care is the use of 
palliative/terminal sedation to manage otherwise uncontrollable pain and 
symptoms. Palliative/terminal sedation is thought to be an advance in palliative 
care that has alleviated the need for PAS and VAE to be implemented in those 
circumstances where many proponents may deem these latter procedures as 
being ethically and medically preferred. A very broad understanding of 
palliative/terminal sedation is: aggressive symptom control through the use of 
sedation even to the point of deep unconsciousness if needed in terminally or 
otherwise gravely ill patients who are in the dying process. This process is widely 
embraced in law and accepted by numerous professional health care 
organizations such as The Hospice and Palliative Nurses Association, the National 
Hospice and Palliative Care Organization, the American Academy of Hospice 
and Palliative Medicine, and the American Medical Association among others. 
It is important to mention here that what each of these organizations have in 
common is that they approve of palliative/terminal sedation as being a 
                                                
13 The reference here to empirical reflection has to do with the clinical realities of what 
actually is taking place with respect to the implementation of certain palliative care options that 
are invoked at the end of life in a health care context.  
  
9 
legitimate practice and form of palliative care while rejecting euthanasia and 
PAS. 
 
An “Inconsistency Argument” 
However, many philosophers and medical ethicists have challenged the 
claim that palliative/terminal sedation is the kind of advance that has excluded 
the need for PAS and VAE to be options for patients at the end of life. There is 
some question as to whether this procedure is sufficiently distinct in a morally 
relevant way from PAS or VAE. Some claim that there is no real moral distinction 
between the two practices of palliative/terminal sedation and euthanasia. In 
other words, palliative/terminal sedation simply reduces to “slow euthanasia” or 
as also described “euthanasia in disguise.” If so, the implications are clear. PAS 
and VAE should be legal and legitimate end-of-life treatment options for 
patients along with palliative/terminal sedation. If not, then palliative sedation 
should be prohibited as well.  
The general thrust here can be summarized in the following argument that 
claims to show the inconsistency when one assumes that palliative/terminal 
sedation is morally permissible whereas VAE and PAS remain morally 
problematic in a health care setting. This is, of course, despite the fact that PAS 
has been legalized in a few states. Let’s call this the “Inconsistency Argument.”  
It begins with the following assumptions: 
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1) For any two practices, X and Y, if there are no morally relevant 
differences between X and Y, then if Y is morally impermissible, X is 
morally impermissible. 
 
2) There are no morally relevant differences between palliative/terminal 
sedation and PAS/VAE. 
 
From 1) and 2), it follows that: 
 
3) If PAS/VAE are morally impermissible, palliative/terminal sedation is 
morally impermissible. 
 
Next, we assume that: 
 
4) PAS/VAE are morally impermissible. 
 
5) Therefore, palliative/terminal sedation is morally impermissible. 
 
In other words, it is impossible, given the truth of 1) and 2), to believe that 
PAS/VAE is morally impermissible, while at the same time believing that 
palliative/terminal sedation is morally permissible.  So one who opposes PAS and 
VAE on ethical, philosophical, professional, and/or religious grounds should also 
oppose palliative/terminal sedation. The problem is, of course, that many 
medical professional organizations, as noted above, and legal scholars 
acknowledge the legitimacy of palliative/terminal sedation while rejecting PAS 
and VAE. This, to say the least, would be awkward for those who hold this view if 
the “Inconsistency Argument” is cogent.  This issue is not only important for 
health care professionals, but also for ethicists, counselors, social workers, 
chaplains of various stripes, and others, who may be asked to assist and support 
patients and their families concerning end-of-life treatment options.  
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Broad Responses to the “Inconsistency Argument” 
As should be clear, there are four primary stances to the conclusion of the 
“Inconsistency Argument” given that it is valid (its conclusion is true if its premises 
are). First, one could accept the conclusion and advocate that both sets of 
practices should be prohibited as options for medical care at the end-of-life. This 
seems to be the position of Howard M. Durcharme, a philosopher at the 
University of Akron. He challenges the application of what he calls permanent 
terminal sedation as advocated in an earlier policy draft on this issue from the 
National Hospice and Palliative Care Organization. He writes: 
The prima facie ethic on PTS [permanent total sedation] is this: If and 
when it is ethically wrong to kill an individual by PAS or euthanasia, so too 
it is wrong to end an individual’s conscious, personal life by PTS. Given that 
PAS and euthanasia are ethically wrong, it follows that PTS is ethically 
wrong. For the same reasons that one ought not to choose suicide or 
euthanasia, one ought not to choose PTS. For the same reason that a 
physician ought not to do PAS or euthanasia, a physician ought not to do 
PTS.14 
 
There are many details that Durcharme raises in his objections to 
palliative/terminal sedation that are specific to the particular conception which 
he is considering.  
Perhaps there are other ways of approaching the issue of 
palliative/terminal sedation that are not subject to some of the exact criticisms 
                                                
14 Robert J. Kingsbury and Howard M. Durcharme, “The Debate Over 
Total/Terminal/Palliative Sedation”;  http://www.cbhd.org/resources/endoflife/kingsbury-
durcharme_2002-01-24_print.htm. Accessed 11/04/2008. 
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he raises in the essay referenced. Moreover, it may be the case that Durcharme 
would not have the same ethical stance toward these alternative conceptions 
of palliative/terminal sedation. Nevertheless, at this stage of our discussion, he 
stands as an example of one who would embrace the “Inconsistency 
Argument,” generally speaking, and that both practices should be prohibited as 
options for palliative care at the end-of-life. 
Second, some may decide to accept premises 1) and 2) yet reject 
premise 4), thus allowing them to also reject the conclusion of the argument. So 
instead of rejecting both practices, they would argue, alternatively, that current 
understandings of the moral impermissibility of PAS and VAE by its opponents are 
wrongheaded. So given the moral permissibility of palliative/terminal sedation, 
one should also embrace PAS and VAE as legitimate treatment options for 
patients at the end of life. To quote Margaret P. Battin again,  
It’s not that palliative sedation/sedation to unconsciousness is wrong. It 
can be practiced hypocritically…. Because there is so much anxiety that 
it might be confused with euthanasia, the features that it shares with 
euthanasia are obscured or sanitized. …The implausible effort to draw a 
completely bright line between continuous terminal sedation and 
euthanasia makes the practice of terminal sedation both more 
dangerous and more dishonest than it should be—and makes what can 
be a decent and humane practice morally problematic.15 
 
Another able proponent of this second stance is Dan W. Brock.  He writes: 
                                                
15 Margaret P. Battin, “Terminal Sedation: Pulling the Sheet over Our Eyes” Hastings 
Center Report 38, no. 5 (2008): 30. 
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[T]erminal sedation…and physician-assisted suicide each have complex 
sets of advantages and disadvantages. For each practice, particular 
advantages and disadvantages may be more or less important with a 
specific patient seeking a hastened death. No one of these practices has 
a clearly superior balance of advantages over disadvantages in all cases. 
This implies that physician-assisted suicide should not be prohibited 
while…terminal sedation [is] permitted.16  
 
The third stance one can take with the “Inconsistency Argument” is again 
to deny that this is a sound argument for the conclusion because it rests on a 
false premise, as is the case with the second stance. Here, though, one would 
reject the argument for the conclusion not by rejecting premise 4) as in the 
previous approach. Instead, she would reject premise 2) by arguing that there 
are morally relevant distinguishing factors between palliative/terminal sedation 
and PAS/VAE.  Or she could argue that palliative/terminal sedation and 
PAS/VAE are morally incommensurable, that is to say, not comparable in moral 
terms, so that it is improper to categorize the practices together.  
If the line of reasoning reflected in the third stance can be shown correct 
in some way, then it thereby indicates that one does not necessarily need to 
accept that both of these practices morally stand or fall together in a health 
care context in order to be consistent in advocating for palliative/terminal 
sedation while opposing PAS and VAE. Of course, this claim for consistency is on 
the assumption that an individual may have some legitimate reasons for thinking 
                                                
16 Dan W. Brock, “Physician Assisted Suicide as a Last-Resort Option at the End of 
Life,” Physician-Assisted Dying: The Case for Palliative Care and Patient Choice, eds. Timothy 
E. Quill and Margaret P. Battin (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2004) 135. 
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PAS and VAE are morally impermissible to begin with. But further, that palliative 
sedation is not subject to the same ethical criticisms that are used in the 
condemnation of PAS and VAE. As spelled out below, I argue for a nuanced 
version of this third stance to the “Inconsistency Argument.”   
A fourth stance to the “Inconsistency Argument” could be to maintain 
that PAS and VAE actually are to be preferred over palliative/terminal sedation 
in a medical context given the goals of palliative care. One who takes this 
approach would deny the conclusion in 5) by rejecting both 2) and 4) of the 
“Inconsistency Argument.” The fourth stance differs from the third in that its 
proponents think that 4) is false. In other words, there are good reasons to think 
that PAS/VAE are morally permissible, according to this view. This fourth position 
is similar to the third stance in that it also rejects 2). The two sets of practices 
under discussion are not morally equivalent. An advocate of this view could 
proceed by making a case that PAS and VAE have some ethical and medical 
advantages over palliative/terminal sedation given the goals of end of life 
palliative care. Some may even maintain that PAS and VAE should be 
embraced while palliative/terminal sedation should be rejected.   
A counter-argument of this sort can be formulated in the following 
manner. Let X= PAS/VAE, Y=palliative/terminal sedation, and Z=effective 
palliative care.   
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6) For any two groups of morally permissible actions X and Y, if X is more 
beneficial than Y in accomplishing goal, Z, at which X and Y are 
aimed, then X is to be morally preferred over Y. 
 
7) If PAS and VAE are more beneficial than palliative/terminal sedation in 
accomplishing effective palliative care, then PAS and VAE are to be 
preferred over palliative/terminal sedation. 
 
Let us assume: 
8) PAS and VAE are morally permissible. 
9)  PAS and VAE are more beneficial than palliative/terminal sedation in 
accomplishing effective palliative care. 
 
Then it follows that: 
10) Therefore, PAS and VAE are to be morally preferred over 
palliative/terminal sedation. 
 
Premises 8) and 9) are key here. To be sure, the standard arguments for 
the moral permissibility of PAS and VAE would be marshaled to substantiate 
premise 8).  There appear to be, at the very least, a couple ways to support the 
claim made in premise 9). First, if there is data to suggest that palliative/terminal 
sedation may unnecessarily prolong the dying process, then a proponent of this 
fourth stance may well argue that palliative/terminal sedation is no 
improvement from the morally problematic vitalism, which advocates 
maintaining the biological functioning of patients despite their medical 
condition. To be sure, this is a situation that many medical professionals and 
ordinary citizens seek to avoid.   
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Another way a proponent could argue for the moral superiority of PAS 
and VAE over against palliative/terminal sedation is to make a distinction 
between a human being’s biological life and biographical life. The argument 
would suggest that when someone is sedated to unconsciousness at the end of 
life that her biographical life has ended while her biological life nevertheless 
remains. But, as the advocate of this view might contend, it is the biographical 
life of the human beings that is of ethical importance when it comes to care for 
them at the end of life. If one’s biographical life is gone, then this is tantamount 
to the person’s being gone regardless of whether the physical body still 
functions to some degree. In that case, employing palliative/terminal sedation 
unnecessarily prolongs the dying process, uses more human and economic 
resources that are already scarce, and exacerbates many of the problems that 
plague the health care system for human beings who have lost personhood.  
 
Research Aim of the Project 
To reiterate, the point being made by the “Inconsistency Argument” as 
formulated above is that given palliative/terminal sedation is not clearly superior 
to PAS and VAE—on the assumption that there are no morally relevant 
differences between the two sets of practices—both sets of practices, then, 
should either be included in the scope of palliative care options or they should 
be excluded as such for patients at the end of life. This is because they are 
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either both morally permissible or both morally impermissible. For health care 
professionals, medical ethicists, moral philosophers, and theologians to think 
otherwise is inconsistent.  
This dissertation will seek to address the “Inconsistency Argument” from the 
perspectives of the second and third stances as described above.  The project is 
a philosophical one that seeks to deal with issues of consistency and 
conceptualization, while incorporating relevant empirical data. This latter 
aspect is important not only because of the interdisciplinary nature of 
contemporary bioethics, but also given that many moral judgments often hinge 
on non-moral facts. Concerning the former issues of consistency and 
conceptualization, the primary question of this dissertation is to determine 
whether or not medical professionals and others invested in this area are 
ethically consistent if they reject PAS and VAE while embracing the practice of 
palliative/terminal sedation. So this project is to be considered a work in applied 
analytic bioethics. 
I do not seek here to settle the ethical issue of whether or not PAS and 
VAE are morally permissible under any or every circumstances whatsoever. In 
the years to come, there is not much doubt this issue will continue to be hotly 
debated in liberal political democracies around the world and in health care 
systems that have been influenced by a predominantly Hippocratic and 
Western approach to medicine. Nor am I necessarily seeking any prescriptions 
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for public policy on this matter even though some of the issues regarding how 
the law views PAS, VAE, and palliative/terminal sedation do emerge in my 
discussion. Instead, my attempt is a more modest one. It is simply to explore the 
consistency of practice and thinking for those who are opposed to PAS and VAE 
yet embrace palliative/terminal sedation when both are carefully 
circumscribed. 
 
Chapter Overview of the Thesis  
The first four chapters (including this one) provide the milieu for the 
problem as understood by many medical ethicists and health care professionals 
who focus on end-of-life care.  After highlighting the rigors of crafting definitions 
for some of the central terms used in this work (chapter two) and outlining what I 
consider the more interesting arguments against PAS and VAE and some 
responses and counter-responses to these (chapter three), I provide specific 
reasons that some thinkers have given to substantiate the general 
“Inconsistency Argument” (chapter four). In the fifth chapter, I introduce and 
examine a response to the generic “Inconsistency Argument” that I think fails as 
an attempted “Wedge Argument.” From there, in the final chapter, I aim to 
offer another form of a “Wedge Argument,” what I consider a more defensible 
one, that suggests there are both empirical and conceptual reasons for 
maintaining that there are morally relevant differences between PAS/VAE and 
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palliative/terminal sedation for those who have some reasons to think the former 
is ethically problematic as articulated in chapter three. Therefore, those who are 
morally and professionally opposed to PAS and VAE for certain reasons are not 
necessarily being inconsistent in their support of palliative/terminal sedation as a 
legitimate treatment at the end-of-life when it is carefully defined, understood, 
and practiced.  
In what follows, I sketch the content and contribution that each of these 
chapters makes to accomplishing the task of this work as described thus far.  
Chapter two, “The Nature of Physician-Assisted Death in a Health Care Context” 
crafts important definitions, justification of particular language use, and key 
concepts that must be established at the outset of any discussion concerning 
the ethical issues surrounding certain end-of-life medical decisions.  Chapter 
three, “A Survey of Some Arguments Against Physician-Assisted Death” provides 
some reasons given in favor of premise 4) of the “Inconsistency Argument.” In 
that chapter I identify those arguments that seem best to cohere with the 
definitions developed in chapter two. These two chapters (two and three) set 
the backdrop to better examine the claims of the “Inconsistency Argument.” 
Specifically, to provide a framework for determining if the arguments and 
reasons for resisting PAS and VAE count equally against those who wish to 
advocate for palliative/terminal sedation over against PAS and VAE. Many of 
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the central distinctions that historically permeate the euthanasia debate are 
essential in evaluating the justification proffered for palliative/terminal sedation.  
In chapter four, “The Challenge of Inconsistency Arguments for 
Palliative/Terminal Sedation,” I provide specific examples of philosophers who 
seem to make arguments that support the basic thrust of the “Inconsistency 
Argument” in their written scholarship. The philosophical bioethicists Margaret P. 
Battin from the University of Utah and Dan W. Brock at Harvard University 
Medical School were chosen based on their academic output in the field of 
bioethics and their influential contributions to moving this discussion forward. 
Both have been exposed to and have worked as bioethicists in clinical settings 
as well as academic institutions. Therefore their philosophical analysis is shaped 
by the application of these practices in the medical professional context. I set 
forth their arguments for the claim that PAS and VAE should be palliative care 
options available to patients at the end of life just as palliative/terminal sedation 
is. All of this lends support to premise 2) of the “Inconsistency Argument.”  
In chapter five, “An Indefensible Wedge Argument,” I begin by pursuing 
the line of reasoning provided by Torbjörn  Tännsjö of Stockholm University, who 
suggests that terminal sedation provides an alternative to euthanasia and 
PAS/PAD. He suggests: 
My argument rests on the observation that while the sedation of the 
patient may mean that the patient is actively killed (by complications 
related to, and caused by, the sedation), the death of the patient is not, 
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in that case, intended by the doctor but merely foreseen. So this is 
different from euthanasia. As for the withdrawal of artificial nourishment 
and hydration of the patient, the intention may certainly be to hasten 
death, I submit. However, since the means of doing so are passive rather 
than active this is once again different from euthanasia.17 
 
I argue that Professor Tännsjö has not sufficiently delineated the practice 
of terminal sedation in a morally relevant way that does not fall prey to the 
charge that it is a type of euthanasia, as euthanasia is understood by a large 
group of medical ethicists and practitioners. Further, I claim that aspects of his 
conceptual analysis are problematic and that he fails to take into consideration 
important empirical data in attempting to defend his position. It seems to be 
that Professor Tännsjö does not provide a suitable alternative to euthanasia for 
those who find the practice problematic nor does he provide an adequate 
response to the general thrust of the “Inconsistency Argument.”  
In the sixth and final chapter, “Toward a More Defensible Wedge 
Argument,” I attempt to distinguish the practices of PAS and VAE on the one 
hand and palliative sedation, my preferred nomenclature for reasons stated in 
that chapter, on the other. Moreover, I suggest that the manner in which some 
philosophers have described terminal/palliative sedation should be of concern 
to those who are opposed to PAS and VAE. It would seem that their descriptions 
and characteristics are “too close for comfort” for opponents of PAS and VAE. 
                                                
17 Torbjörn  Tännsjö, “Introduction,” Terminal Sedation: Euthanasia in Disguise? edited 
by Torbjörn  Tännsjö (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004) xvi. 
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So if medical ethicists and practitioners were to embrace palliative sedation 
without also embracing euthanasia on these philosophers’ accounts of 
palliative sedation and euthanasia, they would seem to be inconsistent. 
I argue that one problem with the “Inconsistency Argument” is that there 
is some ambiguity on the various understandings of when palliative sedation is 
warranted at the end of life during the dying process. Many discussants are 
often talking past one another by using the same terms but employing very 
different meanings and connotations. There I tackle the controversial issue of 
definition and competing conceptions of the practice in the literature. I set out 
to provide and commend a more nuanced description of palliative sedation 
that is more or less accepted by a number of professional organizations. It is 
important that this re-conceptualization be consistent with many organizations’ 
opposition to PAS and VAE. Based on this understanding and application of 
palliative sedation, I am not inclined to accept premise 2. That is, as it is often 
understood by proponents of inconsistency styled arguments. The 
conceptualization I offer seeks to take into account the relevant clinical 
indications that aptly describe when the procedure is appropriate. It is also one 
that does not reduce to “slow euthanasia.”  
Furthermore, I introduce and attempt to defend what I understand to be 
the morally relevant distinguishing features of the two practices. A host of 
questions need to be addressed such as: How, if at all, is evidence that suggests 
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the appropriate use of sedation at the end of life does not directly hasten death 
matter for this discussion? What about withholding artificial feeding and 
hydration while using sedation for long periods of time? Do clinical intentions 
matter in moral assessment of these issues? What role, if any, does the relevant 
empirical data help with the difficult discussion of clinical intentions? What place 
does the controversial notion of double-effect have in the conversation? 
 
One More Distinction and an Overall Conclusion  
In the literature on this subject many often craft the conversation around 
the claim that palliative sedation is an alternative to PAS/VAE by showing how 
the former is morally distinct from the latter. In my understanding, however, there 
seem to be two concerns at work that generate two different questions, such 
that each question may yield different answers. They are: 1) Does palliative 
sedation suffer from the same perceived wrong-making properties of PAS/VAE 
for those who are opposed to these latter practices? And 2) is the kind of 
palliative sedation developed in Chapter 6, namely proportionate palliative 
sedation, a suitable alternative to PAS/VAE?  
As mentioned above, I answer the first question negatively based on the 
nuanced understanding of palliative sedation developed in Chapter 6. The 
answer to the second question, it seems, is not merely about whether palliative 
sedation should be seen as a compromise or an alternative between the 
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extremes of intolerable suffering resulting from a physiological base, on the one 
hand, and PAS/VAE, on the other. It seems that it is difficult to attempt an 
answer to this question in isolation from the agents (including both medical 
professionals and patients) involved and the context in which it is being 
considered. An answer to this second question cannot adequately be given 
without identifying for whom and for what reasons it is seen to be a compromise 
or an alternative.  
It seems that on the account developed in the last chapter of this work 
that what I call proportionate palliative sedation is a suitable alternative to PAS 
and VAE in addressing the suffering that originates from intractable pain (i.e. 
pain that is resistant to relief) and refractory symptoms (i.e. symptoms that are 
not responsive to standard treatments). For this group, the compromise is that 
patients do not need to be left in a state of excruciating pain and refractory 
symptoms that result in suffering with no medical recourse.  However, for those 
patients who fear overall loss of control at the end of life even though pain is 
sufficiently managed, or want to primarily die on their own terms, proportionate 
palliative sedation, it would appear, may not be an apt compromise or 
legitimate alternative.  
Nevertheless, I conclude that on a more nuanced understanding of 
palliative sedation, namely that of proportionate palliative sedation, there is no 
inconsistency on the part of medical ethicists or practitioners who affirm 
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palliative sedation while being opposed to PAS and VAE for particular reasons. 
And this is the case even if some find it an unsuitable alternative for their 
particular circumstances. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE NATURE OF PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH IN A HEALTH CARE CONTEXT 
 
Introduction  
 The contents of this chapter identify some of the theoretical issues that go 
into the difficult task of defining terms in this debate. I seek to put forward 
definitions of physician-assisted suicide and various forms of euthanasia that 
while admittedly not universal, should not be thought idiosyncratic either. Along 
the way, I provide some justification for the nuanced understandings of these 
terms that are developed. These definitions can be said to enjoy broad 
acceptance from those with varying perspectives on the morality of the issue.   
From these conceptual resources, I then provide some reasons for why 
‘physician-assisted death’ (PAD) is to be understood as an umbrella term that 
includes both voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide for this 
project. In sum, it is these two practices that much of the contemporary debate 
centers on when being compared to other kinds of medical procedures at the 
end of life (e.g. palliative sedation). I conclude the chapter by highlighting some 
perceived benefits and burdens for the understanding of PAD on offer. All of this 
is in service of identifying the key issues that seem to capture the essence of the 
debate so that one has a clearer basis from which to evaluate the practices 
that would fall under the scope of the term. 
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The Kind of Definition Needed for this Debate 
Anyone acquainted with the debate realizes that the question of defining 
“euthanasia” in many ways has proven difficult. John Finnis has rightly observed, 
“The term ‘euthanasia’ has no generally accepted and philosophically 
warranted core of meaning.”1 I want to suggest that much of the disagreement 
that surrounds the conversations regarding the moral permissibility or 
impermissibility of PAD often centers on the use of terms where there is either no 
clear agreement or lack of clarity concerning terminology use.  I think this is the 
case even with informed parties on this issue.   
John Keown makes these points more forcefully when he writes, “The 
euthanasia debate is riddled with confusion and misunderstanding. Much of the 
confusion derives from a failure of participants in the debate to define their 
terms.” 2  He goes on to provide examples of how the resultant confusion 
surrounding euthanasia is expressed in the broader contemporary context when 
he writes: 
[I]f an opinion pollster asks people whether they support ‘euthanasia’, and 
the pollster understands the word to mean one thing (such as giving 
patients a lethal injection) while the people polled think it means another 
(such as withdrawing a life-prolonging treatment which the patient has 
                                                
1 John Finnis, “A Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia,” Euthanasia Examined: 
Ethical, Clinical, and Legal Perspectives, edited by John Keown (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 23.  
 
2 John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics, and Public Policy: An Argument Against Legalisation 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 7. 
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asked be withdrawn because it is too burdensome), the results of the poll 
will be worthless. Similarly, if two people are discussing whether 
‘euthanasia’ should be decriminalised and they understand the word to 
mean quite different things, their discussion is likely to be fruitless and 
frustrating.3 
 
Of course, Keown is describing and expressing frustration over classic cases of 
equivocation.  Therefore, in order to minimize these unwelcome states of affairs, 
attention is needed in crafting a definition to be used in a specific context for 
the purpose of appreciating the relevant points of contention in the discussion.   
To be sure, the claim here is not that our being clear on definitions will 
necessarily solve the issue. Instead it is that having a better grasp of the 
meanings of words in a given discourse affects not only the understanding of 
the claims being made but also the evaluation of the arguments in which the 
terms are used. So even if there remains no clear agreement regarding the 
conclusion of the arguments, there can at least be clarity on the use of certain 
terms, which in turn should minimize the potential of disputants simply arguing 
passed one another.  A further benefit for the purposes of this work is that a 
clearer sense of what is meant by the terms can aid in evaluating whether or 
not one is consistent with respect to ethical judgments regarding other practices 
associated with end-of-life medical care. 
                                                
3 Ibid., 9-10.  
 
  
29 
Many discussions of this topic begin with an etymological analysis of the 
word ‘euthanasia’ which simply means “good death” or “gentle death.”  If this 
were all the discussion turned on, there would not be the kind of fervent debate 
on the issue. One would be hard pressed to deny someone a good or gentle 
death. Of course, this general description based on etymology is not what is 
under such scrutiny. The issues involved with crafting a definition of PAD are 
more complex than this. What is needed is a definition that is robust enough to 
serve as a basis from which rigorous moral reflection on the practices of PAD 
can take place without begging the question.  
The approach taken here can be described as an attempt to provide an 
intensional definition of PAD that is both precising and theoretical. Brief 
elaboration is in order. An intensional definition seeks to identify the “set of all 
and only those properties that a thing [or in this case, a medical practice] must 
possess for that term to apply to it.”4  I think that this should be the preferred 
method when it comes to defining the central terms of this discussion. The 
approach undertaken here is to include both precising and theoretical aspects 
to the intensional definition offered below since intensional definitions have 
varying purposes.  
                                                
4 Merrilee Salmon, Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking, Fourth Edition (United 
States of America: Thomson Learning, 2002) 58.  
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Concerning the precising aspect, the euthanasia debate often suffers 
from a degree of vagueness regarding the very term itself.  There are questions 
as to what practices should be included as instances of PAD. And this is the 
case regardless of the moral assessment of these actions. Consider a scenario of 
removing a ventilator from a patient with the patient’s or surrogate’s consent 
when there is no longer any chance of recovery and the dying process is being 
forestalled by these means. Should this be considered an instance of PAD? 
There is some disagreement on how this should be classified, though there is 
fairly strong agreement as to its moral permissibility in a health care context 
under certain conditions. So what is needed is a more précising definition, which 
seeks to eliminate borderline cases of vague terms insofar as possible.   
Furthermore, an intensional definition of PAD needs to be theoretical. This 
aspect of an intensional definition also is aimed at reducing vagueness, but in 
addition carries with it some underlying theory whose truth is presupposed 
alongside other interrelated claims about the nature of the world, an act, or 
some event in order for it to have any sense. For example, consider one among 
other definitions of death. Let’s say the “‘death of a person’ means “cessation 
of that person’s brain functions.” If so, then this definition involves a theory, which 
includes being “committed to the view that a human body that has totally and 
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irreversibly lost the use of its brain is no longer a person, even if machines can 
maintain the body’s circulatory, respiratory, and other systems.”5  
The underlying action theory implicit in the definitions below maintains 
that there are five elements in a moral event, namely, the agent, an act, “the 
circumstances under which it is taken, the consequences of the act, and its 
intention.” 6  I think that Edmund Pellegrino’s commentary on this claim is 
important to the development of the point being made in this section 
concerning the theoretical aspect of an intensional definition so I will quote him 
at length. 
Contemporary moral philosophy has tended to emphasize one or the 
other of these elements.  Thus, consequentialists focus on the outcome of 
the act, that is, it balances of harms and goods.  Situation ethicists focus 
on the circumstances surrounding the act, and deontologists focus 
primarily on the intention of the act itself, and on its intrinsic or intuitive 
rightness or wrongness. For virtue theorists, the moral agent takes center 
stage. 
Any complete description or judgment of a moral event requires 
consideration of each component and the relationships of the 
components to each other. Most ethical theories make these connections 
                                                
5 Ibid., 63-64. 
 
6 Edmund D. Pellegrino, “The Place of Intention in the Moral Assessment of Assisted 
Suicide and Active Euthanasia,” Intending Death, edited by Tom L. Beauchamp (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1996), 163. The terms “act” and “intention” will be defined and more thoroughly 
developed in the last chapter along with other important concepts.  Here I hope that it will suffice 
to describe an “act” as “those events that take place in the world and that are explained by the 
intentions of the agents.” (Daniel P. Sulmasy, “‘Reinventing’ the Rule of Double Effect,” The 
Oxford Handbook of Bioethics, edited by Bonnie Steinbock (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 122), and “intention” roughly speaking, as “the reason, purpose, or end for which 
and to which, moral acts are directed.” (Pellegrino, “The Place of Intention in the Moral 
Assessment of Assisted Suicide and Active Euthanasia,” 164) 
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informally and indirectly. Consequentialists, for example, are concerned 
that moral agents choose acts with the best balance of harms and 
benefits; deontologists want agents to choose the right act; and virtue 
theorists want people to be habitually disposed to act well in all moral 
circumstances.  Situationists want agents to have good intentions so far as 
circumstances dictate. Implicitly, whatever theory one may espouse, 
there will be some appeal to right intention. No moral theory would urge 
wrong intentions.7 
 
It should be noted that there is a difference between saying that 
theoretical definitions carry along with them some underlying theory, which is 
considered to be true, and that theoretical definitions themselves are true.  They 
are “neither true nor false, strictly speaking. The reason is that theoretical 
definitions function as proposals to see or interpret some phenomenon in a 
certain way. Since proposals have no truth value, neither do theoretical 
definitions.”8  
As shown below, the intensional definition proposed is one that affirms the 
important theoretical and practical roles that intention plays, among other 
qualities, in the moral assessment of actions. Furthermore, the definition suggests 
that in identifying instances of PAD there is a move from merely observed 
objective or external qualities of an act to consider subjective qualities of the 
agents that may also need to be discerned in determining what kind of moral 
event has taken place. It should go without saying that not all agree, 
                                                
7 Ibid., 163. 
 
8 Patrick J. Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic, Eighth Edition (Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth Thomson Learning, 2003) 91. This is distinct from merely stipulating a definition. 
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ontologically speaking, that intention matters in the way I want to suggest in 
distinguishing the moral meaning of two actions even though they may have 
the same consequences or outcome. This much is uncontroversial. What would 
be controversial is failing to acknowledge the point. This is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 6. 
An intensional definition that is both precising and theoretical should be 
able to capture the essence of what medical professionals seem to be 
debating concerning PAD. It, then, also would be an aid in making judgments 
regarding the compatibility of certain medical procedures with what would be 
regarded as “proper” medical care. Of course for these judgments to be made, 
there still need to be reasons given as to why practices that are considered 
instances of PAD should be thought of as falling outside or inside the scope of 
proper medical care. For example, those who are opposed to PAD would need 
to provide an account of the wrong-making properties of the actions that are 
considered instances of PAD (which is the goal of Chapter 3). So, at least initially, 
any proposed intensional definition of PAD should leave open the question of 
the morality of PAD in a health care context.  
 
Some Common Characteristics 
There are dizzying arrays of nuanced distinctions that permeate every 
level of discussion in this conversation. These distinctions that some find relevant 
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for meaningful dialogue to take place are often reflected in the various 
definitions proffered for what is meant by the practices of voluntary active 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.  All of this makes it very difficult to 
settle on an agreed understanding of the key terms.   
A helpful way of proceeding at this juncture is to highlight what the more 
helpful definitions share in common. In order to do this, I set forth some 
conditions that select thinkers in the debate claim must be in place in order to 
have an instance of euthanasia generally speaking.  I begin with the account 
by Grisez and Boyle where, among other issues, they specifically address 
voluntary active euthanasia. After indicating that the term ‘Agent’ refers to 
anyone who brings about the death and the term ‘Patient’ refers to anyone 
being killed, they then provide the following criteria: 
(1) Patient either is suffering and dying, or is suffering irremediably, or at 
least irremediably subject to some disease or defect which would 
generally be considered by reasonable persons to be grave and pitiable. 
(2) Agent sincerely believes that Patient would be better off dead—that is, 
that no further continuance of Patient’s life is likely to be beneficial for 
Patient. (3) Agent deliberately brings about Patient’s death in order that 
Patient shall have the benefit of being better off dead—that is, not 
continue to suffer the condition (1) under supposition (2).9 
 
                                                
9 Germain Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A 
Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1979) 139. 
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Another important and more recent voice in providing the conditions 
from which one can recognize when death by euthanasia has taken place is 
Tom Beauchamp of Georgetown University. He writes: 
[A] death will be considered euthanasia of any type if and only if the 
following conditions are satisfied: (1) The death is intended by at least one 
other person whose action is a contributing cause of death; (2) the person 
who dies is either acutely suffering or irreversibly comatose (or soon will 
be), and this condition alone is the primary reason for intending the 
person’s death; and (3) the means chosen to produce the death must be 
as painless as possible, or a sufficient moral justification must exist for a 
more painful method.10 
 
Both of these representative sets of conditions, the former set from opponents of 
euthanasia and the latter from a proponent of particular forms of euthanasia, 
share some basic features that are important for any attempt to capture better 
the essence of euthanasia. Several characteristics can be readily identified 
here.  
First, the decision made by either the patient or the medical professional 
has the effect of shortening life in some way.11  Second, the discussion is limited 
to innocent people in a medical context.  One observes here that the patient is 
deemed to be innocent.  The death of the patient is here distinguished from, 
say, a case of a convicted felon dying of capital punishment. As Dan Brock has 
                                                
10 Tom L. Beauchamp, “Introduction”, Intending Death: The Ethics of Assisted Suicide 
and Euthanasia, edited by Tom L. Beauchamp (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996) 4. 
 
11 This is not to say that any action in a medical context, which has the effect of 
shortening a patient’s life is considered euthanasia.  Shortening the life of a patient than it 
otherwise would have been is a necessary condition of euthanasia though not sufficient. 
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pointed out, “the claim that any individual instance of euthanasia is a case of 
deliberate killing of an innocent person is, with only minor qualifications, 
correct.”12  
Furthermore, the professional circumstances of euthanasia in a medical 
context should be emphasized. So if there are such events taking place where 
someone is not a certified trained medical professional operating outside the 
safeguards of a skilled and licensed medical facility, then this is not considered 
euthanasia. Most advocates of some form or other of euthanasia would be 
against such practices. Fourth, it is thought the patient would be better off dead 
or that death is considered beneficial for the patient. And last, the agent 
intentionally engages in a course of conduct that has as its aim to bring about 
the death of the patient.  
 
Three Broad Categories of Definitional Strategies 
These common conditions or characteristics lie in the background of 
approaches to crafting a definition of euthanasia. “Beyond these points of 
agreement, there are…several major differences” in how ‘euthanasia’ is 
                                                
12 Dan W. Brock, Life and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 208. Brock goes on in the essay quoted to defend the fact 
that in a medical context it is not always wrong to deliberately kill an innocent person.  Given 
certain conditions and qualifications killing an innocent could be morally justifiable.  
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defined.13 There are three approaches to which an intensional definition has 
been developed ranging from more narrow attempts (i.e., limiting the practices 
that would be considered instances of euthanasia) to more broad (i.e., to 
include practices that many medical professionals don’t think to be euthanasia) 
that highlight the different connotations of the term.14 
  To begin, the narrowest category is where ‘euthanasia’ “connotes the 
active, intentional termination of a patient’s life by a doctor who thinks that 
death is a benefit to that patient.” 15  In view here primarily are acts (not 
omissions) that directly cause the death of a patient.  Daniel Callahan, former 
Director of the Hastings Center, expresses this narrow definition. He describes 
‘euthanasia’ as “the direct killing of a patient by a doctor, ordinarily by means 
of a lethal injection.” He considers ‘physician-assisted suicide’ as “the act of 
killing oneself by means of lethal drugs provided by a physician.”16 Callahan, 
while not explicitly stating this in the quote above, includes that these are 
intentional acts on the part of the medical agent for what are considered 
                                                
13 Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy, 10. 
 
14 See the discussion given by John Keown on pages 10-16 where he identifies these 
three broad areas in his Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy. 
 
15 Ibid., 10. 
 
16 Daniel Callahan, “A Case Against Euthanasia,” Contemporary Debates in Applied 
Ethics, edited by Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005) 189, n.1. 
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beneficent reasons. These are the necessary background conditions for the 
context in which his thoughts on this issue are developed. 
Likewise, the American Medical Association (AMA) follows suit in 
describing euthanasia as “the administration of a lethal agent by another 
person to a patient for the purpose of relieving the patient’s intolerable and 
incurable suffering.” 17  The AMA sees physician-assisted suicide as occurring 
when “a physician facilitates a patient’s death by providing the necessary 
means and/or information to enable the patient to perform the life-ending 
act.”18  Another example of this narrow approach to defining euthanasia is 
found in the 1994 report of the New York Task Force on Life and the Law, which 
described it as “direct measures, such as lethal injection, by one person to end 
another person’s life for benevolent motives.” And they viewed ‘physician-
assisted suicide’ as referring to those “actions by one person to contribute to the 
death of another, by providing medication or a prescription or taking other 
steps.”19  
The main point with each of these examples in the narrow sense of 
euthanasia is that there is an introduction of a known lethal cause into existing 
                                                
17 American Medical Association, Code of Medical Ethics: Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs: Current Opinions with Annotations, 2012-2013 Edition, Opinion 2.21. 
 
18 Ibid., Opinion 2.211.  
 
19 When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context (New 
York: The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, 1994) x.  
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patient care. Notably, what is excluded in this narrow sense of euthanasia are 
actions (or some would say omissions) such as withholding and withdrawing life 
sustaining treatment even in those instances when the aim of the agent in doing 
so just is the death of the patient because it is deemed that they would be 
better off dead than alive.  
But there is also a wider sense in which actions or even omissions between 
a medical professional and a patient are thought to constitute instances of 
euthanasia. This leads to the second category. Here ‘euthanasia’ is understood 
as any act or omission in a health care context that has as its aim or intention 
the death of the patient. In expounding this view John Keown writes: 
On this wider definition, ‘euthanasia’ includes not only the intentional 
termination of a patient’s life by an act such as lethal injection but also 
the intentional termination of life by an omission. Consequently, a doctor 
who switches off a ventilator, or who withdraws a patient’s tube feeding, 
performs euthanasia if the doctor’s intention is to kill the patient. 
Euthanasia by deliberate omission is often called ‘passive euthanasia’…to 
distinguish it from active euthanasia.20 
 
Here again, as is the case with Callahan above, the context in which 
Keown is making his points presupposes that these practices are being engaged 
in for reasons that are thought to be beneficent. The key for him is that intending 
the death of the patient by some act (or inaction/omission) is considered an 
instance of euthanasia. So the narrow category would exclude the withholding 
                                                
20 Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy, 12. 
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and withdrawing of life sustaining treatment as an instance of euthanasia even 
if the intent in doing so just is the death of the patient, whereas the second 
category would not. 
Keown thinks this second categorization has more to commend it in 
assessing the ethical issues involved in the debate concerning medical 
euthanasia in a health care context.21 And hence, he advocates this view.  On 
Keown’s account described above, there are two observations that deserve 
mention. To begin, as is the case with the first narrower category, a direct 
(intentional) action undertaken that is intended to kill the patient for what are 
thought to be beneficent reasons is an instance of euthanasia. This is in some 
ways a reiteration of Keown’s aforementioned thought but needs to be stated 
to highlight the next point.   
Second, it is important to note that while the withholding of life-prolonging 
measures could be an instance of euthanasia, albeit “passive” euthanasia, it is 
by no means necessary to always categorize the forgoing of life sustaining 
treatments as such. Supporters of this second category claim that in order to 
understand the difference they want to make between “passive” euthanasia 
and medically indicated forgoing life sustaining treatment one must recognize 
that the intention of the agent and the reasons for acting are different. And this 
distinguishes them as different events. They would not consider as an 
                                                
21 Ibid., 16. 
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occurrence of passive euthanasia the withholding or withdrawing of life 
sustaining treatment when medically indicated or “because the treatment is 
either futile or too burdensome, or in order to respect the patient’s refusal of 
treatment.”22  
The reason is that death in such cases are unintended or not part of the 
agent’s aim in acting. Therefore, those who hold this second view argue that 
passive euthanasia, in which the death of the patient is the aim, and the 
withholding/withdrawing life sustaining treatment under said circumstances are 
discrete events. At this point, the description of euthanasia as described in the 
second category is not to make a judgment on the actions’ moral 
permissibility/impermissibility, but to highlight the salient features that they think 
make these distinctive.  
 The third and broadest category is to see ‘euthanasia’ as including “not 
only the intentional termination of life by act or omission, but also acts and 
omissions which have the foreseen consequence of shortening life.” 23  One 
should presume here that the foreseen consequence is unintended. This third 
approach to defining ‘euthanasia’ differs from the first category, the narrow 
view, in that it includes under the scope of euthanasia “omissions,” passive, or 
                                                
22 Ibid., 217. I say more about each of these criteria in the section titled “Problems with 
the Third Definitional Category” below. 
 
23 Ibid., 15. 
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so-called indirect “acts,” whether intended or unintended, where death is an 
expected consequence of the chosen course of behavior. However, this last 
approach to defining ‘euthanasia’ shares in common with the other two that 
the practice includes the deliberate termination of the patient’s life by some 
direct action, say, lethal injection, for what are thought to be beneficent 
reasons. Another feature it shares in common with the second category, though 
not the first, is that both acts and omissions can be instances of euthanasia 
when the patient’s death is intended thereby.  
The third category also goes further than the second. It includes 
circumstances in which death may be merely a foreseen though an unintended 
consequence such as when life-prolonging treatment is withheld or withdrawn 
when it is deemed that the treatment is either futile, too burdensome, or done in 
order to respect the patient’s refusal of treatment, as falling under the category 
of euthanasia, albeit passive euthanasia.  This is contrasted with the second 
category, which as indicated does not judge such cases as being euthanasia 
when the death of the patient is not intended and when done for what is 
considered medically indicated reasons.  
Many advocates of voluntary active euthanasia tend to adopt definitions 
of this third sort. One such example is John Harris.  He thinks of euthanasia as 
“the implementation of a decision that a particular individual’s life will come to 
an end before it need to do so—a decision that a life will end when it could be 
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prolonged. The decision may involve direct interventions (active euthanasia) or 
withholding of life-prolonging measures (passive euthanasia).”24 While he does 
not explicitly state that foreseen consequences which have the effect of 
shortening life is included under euthanasia, it is nevertheless implicit in his 
understanding of passive euthanasia.  
Another such example of this third approach is Michael Tooley, who is a 
very skillful proponent of euthanasia. He refers to it as “any action where a 
person is intentionally killed or allowed to die because it is believed that the 
individual would be better off dead than alive—or else, as when one is in an 
irreversible coma, at least no worse off.”25 Similar to Harris, Tooley seems to 
include in the scope of his definition of euthanasia those actions (or inaction 
depending on how these are described) that have the unintended but foreseen 
consequence of the death of the patient.  
 
Problems with the First Definitional Category 
Tooley wants to maintain a broad definition of euthanasia and rejects 
more narrow attempts at defining the term such as the one by ethicist Daniel 
                                                
24 John Harris, “Euthanasia and the Value of Life,” Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, 
Clinical and Legal Perspectives, edited by John Keown (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 6. 
 
25 Michael Tooley, “In Defense of Voluntary Active Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide” 
Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, edited by Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath 
Wellman (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 161. 
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Callahan referred to above who defines it as “the direct killing of a patient by a 
doctor, ordinarily by means of a lethal injection.”26  Tooley thinks this narrow 
definition is problematic for the following reasons. He writes: 
In the first place, one is deprived of crisp and very useful expressions – 
such as “passive euthanasia” – for referring to cases where a terminally ill 
person is allowed to die.  Secondly, and more seriously, the person who 
identifies euthanasia with the direct killing of a terminally ill person typically 
does so because he or she views the indirect killing of a terminally ill 
person as morally unproblematic, and similarly for an action of merely 
allowing a terminally ill person to die.  If one holds, however, that such 
actions are morally permissible, but that the direct killing of a terminally ill 
person is morally wrong, then among the most crucial issues that one 
needs to address are, first, why the direct versus indirect distinction has 
such moral significance, and secondly, why the same is true in the case of 
the distinction between killing and letting die.27 
 
I do think along with Tooley, that Callahan’s definition is too narrow, but 
not for all of the same reasons. First, I do not think, contra Tooley, that “passive 
euthanasia” is a “crisp and useful expression.” In fact, I hope to show below that 
it probably confuses the issue to some degree, which is in part why I think that 
medical professionals should adopt some variation of the second category of 
‘euthanasia’ for the purposes of moral assessment.  And so, given that we may 
lose this active/passive distinction in Callahan’s definition, it is not all that 
troubling to me since I do not think it to be relevant, again with respect to 
                                                
26 Ibid., 162. 
 
27 Ibid., 162-163.  
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ethical evaluation. I say more in defense of this claim in a section below and 
again in Chapter 5.  
What is of more concern about Callahan’s definition, at this juncture of 
the discussion, is that it doesn’t seem to capture what I think to be an important 
element in this conversation. Callahan thinks that euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide, as he describes them, ought not be allowed in a medical 
context even if it is for motives of compassion or an expression of mercy.28  If this 
is so, then Callahan’s definition does not seem to include the fact those 
“passive” acts or “acts of omission,” where death is intended and done for 
reasons of compassion, should also be considered a form of euthanasia.  
For example, suppose a health care professional decides to forego life-
sustaining treatment with the intent of bringing about the patient’s death as an 
act of beneficence because the physician judges that the patient’s quality of 
life has deteriorated to an intolerable point. Further, the reason for this was not 
based on any medical indications that would deem the treatment to be 
unacceptably burdensome. It would appear, then, that on Callahan’s narrow 
account, it is possible that this would not be judged as being an instance of 
euthanasia. This seems to miss the essence of the euthanasia debate is about.  
                                                
28 Callahan, “A Case Against Euthanasia,” 183-189.   
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To be fair to Callahan, he does affirm that not all cases of deliberately 
terminating treatment are morally permissible. He thinks that “physicians can 
misuse their power and terminate treatment wrongly: they can stop treatment 
when it could still do some good, or when a competent patient wants it 
continued. In that case, however, the physician is blameworthy.”29 So there can 
be culpability. It is just that there are states of affairs in a medical context that 
many others think should be substantially thought of as instances of euthanasia 
that are unaccounted for on Callahan’s definition. So I do think that Tooley is 
partially correct in his analysis of the problematic nature of the narrow definition 
of ‘euthanasia.’  
 
Problems with the Third Definitional Category 
On the other side of the definitional spectrum, I think Tooley’s definition is 
too broad. It appears that he includes forgoing life sustaining treatment or what 
he calls merely “allowing to die” to be categorized as euthanasia even when 
the intention or aim of these actions is not the same as it would be in an 
instance of the indirect intentional killing of a patient by identical means in a 
medical context. This appears to be the thrust of the second part of his concern 
of the more narrow definitions of ‘euthanasia’ from the quotation above. One 
may recall where Tooley states, “the person who identifies euthanasia with the 
                                                
29 Ibid., 184-185. 
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direct killing of a terminally ill person typically does so because he or she views 
the indirect killing of a terminally ill person as morally unproblematic, and 
similarly for an action of merely allowing a terminally ill person to die.” Again 
these statements were made in response to losing potentially the distinction 
between passive and active euthanasia on a narrower definition.   
Tooley would view the indirect killing of a terminally ill patient and 
seemingly all actions of merely allowing a terminally ill patient to die as both 
being classified as passive euthanasia regardless of the reason for doing so or of 
the intention behind the action.  It seems that Keown is correct when he writes 
that “If what characterises euthanasia is an intention to kill, it surely makes no 
moral difference if the doctor carries out that intention by an omission rather 
than by an act.”30 And so if the doctor carries out the intention to bring about 
the death of the patient for beneficent reasons by some omission or in an 
indirect way, then this is passive euthanasia. So far, so good, it would appear. 
Tooley would no doubt agree with Keown on this score.   
Where Tooley and Keown would disagree—which reflects the difference 
between the second and third definitional strategies—is that Keown would not 
classify all instances of withholding or withdrawal of life sustaining treatment as 
passive euthanasia. Wherein lies the difference?  Those who advocate the 
                                                
30 Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy, p. 14. 
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second definitional approach would say at the level of intent and medical 
warrant. Again, to quote Keown, “An intention to remove a burdensome 
treatment is not an intention to end life” even though death may be foreseen.31 
Or so proponents of this second view claim. Yet there is an insistence, and rightly 
so in my view, that while one can maintain the category of passive euthanasia it 
should nonetheless be kept as a distinct category from that of forgoing life-
sustaining treatment just in those cases when the intent is not to bring about the 
death of the patient and the cessation of life-sustaining treatment is clinically 
indicated. 
Those who have reflected on the moral issues surrounding end-of-life 
ethics in a medical context are aware that there are situations in the process of 
dying where it is morally appropriate to either refuse treatment or discontinue 
current treatment and there is and should be a legal right to do so.  Though 
mathematical precision cannot be had with respect to determining exactly 
when this is the case there are a few helpful and widely accepted observations 
that can provide some assistance. First, “physicians have no obligation to 
provide pointless and futile or contraindicated treatment.”32  As ethicist Gilbert 
Meilaender has described: 
                                                
31 Ibid., 16. 
 
32 Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Sixth 
Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 167.  One needs to tread carefully when 
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This criterion is especially important when a person is in the last stages of 
dying. (We should note, however, that to be irretrievably dying is not the 
same as to be terminally ill. One can be terminally ill but still be expected 
to live for months or even years.) For the patient who is irretrievably dying, 
few if any treatments can really be useful. Continued attempts to cure 
such a patient may well get in the way of the effort to care for this person 
as best we can. In any case, no one is obligated to pursue treatments that 
are not expected to be helpful, and to refuse such treatment is exactly 
that: a refusal of treatment, not the rejection of the gift of life. It is not 
killing but “allowing to die.”33   
 
Second, life sustaining medical treatment can be withheld or 
discontinued and should not be considered obligatory if treatment becomes 
excessively burdensome or if the burdens outweigh the benefits.34 This includes 
that one can “rightly refuse even useful treatment that would prolong … life for 
a significant period of time if that treatment really does carry with it significant 
                                                                                                                                                       
speaking of treatments that are deemed futile because the literature on this notion and its 
application in health care is complex and varied.  Nevertheless, “typically the term futile refers to 
a situation in which irreversibly dying patients have reached a point at which further treatment 
provides no physiological benefit or is hopeless and becomes optional….All of the following 
have been referred to as ‘futile’: (1) whatever physicians cannot perform, (2) whatever will not 
produce a physiological effect, (3) whatever is highly unlikely to be efficacious (i.e., statistically, 
the odds of success are exceedingly small), (4) whatever will probably produce only a low-grade, 
insignificant outcome (i.e., qualitatively, the results are expected to be exceedingly poor), (5) 
whatever is highly likely to be more burdensome than beneficial, (6) whatever is completely 
speculative because it is an untried ‘treatment,’ and (7) whatever—in balancing effectiveness, 
potential benefit, and potential burden—warrants withholding and withdrawing treatment.  Thus, 
the term futility is used to cover many situations of predicted improbable outcomes, improbable 
success, and unacceptable benefit-burden ratios.  This situation of competing conceptions and 
ambiguity suggests that we should generally avoid the term futility in favor of more precise 
language.” Ibid.  
 
33 Gilbert Meilaender, Bioethics: A Primer for Christians, Second Edition (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2005), 69. 
 
34 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 168. 
 
  
50 
burdens.” Again, for those who do not see instances of forgoing life-sustaining 
treatments (under these conditions) as occurrences of passive euthanasia since 
death is not intended, would suggest that this should be considered “a refusal of 
treatment, not of life.”35   
The active/passive distinction does not clarify the ethical issues, or so I 
would claim. It is primarily descriptive and “concerned only with identifying the 
medical cause of death.”36  So the insight from John Kilner should be taken 
seriously when he writes: 
We must look for categories other than…passive/active to guide ethical 
decisions to forgo treatment. In fact, we need a different heading 
altogether under which to examine such questions, for the term 
euthanasia itself is problematic. On its surface it might seem to be an 
excellent term, formed from two Greek words meaning ‘good death.’  
However, even without the modifier ‘active,’ it suggests in the minds of 
many the intentional causing of a patient’s death. As such, it does not 
serve well as an umbrella term for end-of-life decisions.37 
  
This, in my estimation, is the problem with definitions that are developed along 
the lines of the third category. It includes too much. There are many end-of-life 
decisions that are made in a medical context. And to be sure, some of them 
have the effect of shortening life or as some would say “hastening death.”  
                                                
35 Meileander, Bioethics, 70. 
 
36 John F. Kilner, “Forgoing Treatment,” Dignity and Dying: A Christian Appraisal 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996) 72.  Of course, this descriptive account can be helpful in moral 
assessment given that many ethical judgments oftentimes hinge on non-moral facts.  The point 
being made here is that the active/passive distinction in itself cannot bear the weight of giving us 
the insight needed for ethical evaluation of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide/death. 
 
37 Kilner, “Forgoing Treatment,” 72. 
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Take for example a person who decides not to undergo rigorous 
chemotherapy treatments for an aggressive cancer that was detected late in its 
development and instead opts for good palliative care so that in the remaining 
days he can be alert and attentive to his relationships with loved ones. It would 
seem that it could rightly be said that he does potentially shorten his life with this 
“end-of-life” medical decision relative to some alternative, but he does not 
shorten it relative to the “natural” course of events. This, though, does not seem 
to be what the euthanasia debate is all about.  Yet the third definitional 
category allows for these kinds of situations to be included under the umbrella 
term “euthanasia.” This appears wrongheaded.38  
Third, in most cases a patient has a right to refuse treatment and medical 
professionals have a moral obligation to honor that right, all things being equal. 
In respecting the patients’ refusal of treatment, the medical professional is not 
necessarily in a position where he or she is performing euthanasia. That is, if they 
are not intending the death of the patient thereby (more on the role of intention 
in moral assessment in Chapter 6). While death may be a foreseen 
                                                
38 The suggestion being made here that excludes instances of the forgoing of life 
sustaining treatment when medically indicated or in otherwise “appropriate” circumstances 
where death is not intended thereby from the category of euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide (to be discussed below), of course, is vigorously challenged. Two formidable essays to 
this end are Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments,” 
Ethics, 109/3, (April 1999): 497-518, and Dan W. Brock, “A Critique of Three Objections to 
Physician-Assisted Suicide,” Ethics, 109/3, (April 1999): 519-547.  
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consequence in honoring patient refusal of treatment, the key question in this 
second category is what does the medical professional intend in acting or not?  
This line of reasoning does place quite a bit of weight on the notion of 
intention in determining whether or not there is an instance of euthanasia in a 
health care context. Further, to better see the moral obligation of respecting the 
right of a patient to refuse treatment, all things being equal, even if it goes 
against sound medical advice, we must consider the alternatives. Medical 
professionals should not violate bodily integrity of patients without their consent 
even if taking the treatment would prolong life. There is a negative right that 
patients have to be left alone though it is much more controversial and unclear 
as to whether there is a positive right to be euthanized if they desire it. In the 
cases of honoring patient refusal of treatment, the intention of the medical 
professional should not be to aim for the death of the patients, but to respect 
the patients’ right to bodily integrity. So it would seem that if the intention of the 
agent matters at all in moral assessment that this would not be an instance of 
euthanasia since death is not the intention for the course of conduct. So again it 
appears that the third category is too broad in that it includes too much. The 
third definitional strategy makes it difficult to discriminate between the myriad of 
EOL choices and options in a health care context. 
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Why the Second Definitional Category 
It seems that for the sake of consistency that medical professionals, who 
want to support the current legal and professional prohibitions against certain 
forms of euthanasia while also affirming the appropriateness, in prescribed 
circumstances, of forgoing life-sustaining treatment (and for the purposes of this 
dissertation, the use of palliative sedation), should adopt some version of an 
intensional definition of ‘euthanasia’ that falls within the second category. So 
between Callahan and Tooley, I propose that the understanding of 
‘euthanasia’ for the purposes of this dissertation be along the lines developed 
by Grisez and Boyle:39 
Euthanasia (def.) = An event in a medical context where (1) Patient either is 
suffering and dying, or is suffering irremediably, or at least irremediably 
subject to some disease or defect which would generally be considered 
by reasonable persons to be grave and pitiable. (2) Agent sincerely 
believes that Patient would be better off dead—that is, that no further 
continuance of Patient’s life is likely to be beneficial for Patient. (3) Agent 
deliberately brings about Patient’s death in order that Patient shall have 
the benefit of being better off dead—that is, not continue to suffer the 
condition (1) under supposition (2).40 
 
This intensional definition does include those basic features identified 
above that many assert are essential to the discussion. With this definition in 
                                                
39 One recalls that Grisez and Boyle stipulate that ‘Agent’ refers to anyone who brings 
about the death and ‘Patient’ refers to anyone to whom death is brought in the prescribed medical 
context. 
  
40 Grisez and Boyle, Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A Contribution to the 
Euthanasia Debate, 139. 
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place, a few other distinctions need to be made. They are between voluntary, 
non-voluntary, and involuntary forms of euthanasia.  
Voluntary Euthanasia (def.) = cases of euthanasia where Agent knows 
Patient has given free and informed consent to have his or her life ended 
thereby. 
 
Non-Voluntary Euthanasia (def.) = cases of euthanasia where Agent knows 
that Patient has not given consent and does not know whether Patient 
has dissented or would dissent had he or she the capacity or competency 
to do so.41 
 
Involuntary Euthanasia (def.) = cases of euthanasia where Agent knows that 
Patient has dissented to have his or her life ended thereby.42  
 
For the purposes of clarity going forward, euthanasia can be understood 
as not simply an act but a moral event. As mentioned in Chapter 1, I propose 
                                                
41 There is some debate concerning the notions of capacity and competency. Some 
suggest that there is a distinction based on legal and clinical usages of the terms. As Jonsen, et. 
al. have noted, “In the law, the terms competence and incompetence indicate whether persons 
have the legal authority to affect certain personal choices, such as managing their finances or 
making health care decisions. Judges alone have the right to rule that a person is legally 
incompetent and to issue a court order or appoint a guardian. In medical care, however, persons 
who are legally competent may have their mental capacities compromised by illness, anxiety, 
and/or pain. We refer to this clinical situation as decisional capacity or incapacity to distinguish 
it from the legal determination of competency” (Albert R. Jonsen, Mark Siegler, and William J. 
Winslade, Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach to Ethical Decisions in Clinical Medicine, 
Seventh Edition (New York: McGraw Hill Medical, 2010), 65-66). Alternatively, other notable 
figures working in medical ethics suggest the “distinction breaks down in practice. As Thomas 
Grisso and Paul Applebaum note, ‘When clinicians determine that a patient lacks decision-
making capacity, the practical consequences may be the same as those attending a legal 
determination of incompetence’” (Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 
Sixth Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 111). It seems that for my purposes 
here not much of substance turns on affirming one approach or the other. I include both terms to 
account for the broadest understanding of decisional capacity in determining what counts as acts 
of non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. 
 
42 I am indebted to Bruce Russell for the significance of including the epistemic criterion 
in definitions of voluntary, non-voluntary, and involuntary euthanasia. 
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this definition as the one from which medical professionals and other interested 
parties can adjudicate whether or not they are being consistent if they: (i) think 
there is reason to deem that euthanasia is morally impermissible in a health care 
context while also (ii) embracing the practice of palliative sedation as morally 
permissible in a medical setting.   
 
Physician-Assisted Death as an Umbrella Term for PAS and VAE 
In this section I want to argue that based on the account of euthanasia 
being offered, physician-assisted suicide should be considered a form of 
voluntary active euthanasia. And further, that both PAS and VAE can be seen 
as practices under the umbrella term, “Physician Assisted Death.”   
 
PAS as a Form of VAE 
I begin this part of the discussion with a point made by the Hospice and 
Palliative Nurses Association (HPNA) in one of their position statements.  It reads, 
“Euthanasia is a term that is often confused with assisted suicide.  Active 
[voluntary] euthanasia is the act of bringing about the death of a person at his 
or her request.  In euthanasia, someone other than the patient performs the act 
with the intent to end the patient’s life.”43 The statement is correct with respect 
                                                
43 HPNA Position Statement on Legalization of Assisted Suicide (Pittsburgh, PA: Hospice 
and Palliative Nurses Association, 2011) 1.  
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to the fact that euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide should not be thought 
synonymous.  Certainly they remain practically distinct from one another. If this is 
what they are highlighting, then they are certainly correct, and these should not 
be confused.  
However, it should not be thought that since they do remain practically 
distinct and are not synonymous, that they could not be related in a way where 
one is a subset of the other such that they perhaps can be morally assessed 
together. The reason why physician-assisted suicide should be considered a 
form of voluntary active euthanasia in this work is due to the fact that in cases of 
PAS the patient presumably gives consent, desires to be dead due to their 
illness, considers death to be beneficial, and the physician directly assists in the 
facilitation of this state of affairs.  
Furthermore, the proposed necessary conditions for an instance of 
euthanasia expressed above are also true of physician-assisted suicide.  This is 
clearly the case with Beauchamp’s conditions already noted. He therefore 
acknowledges, “Physician-assisted suicide is often considered a form of 
voluntary active euthanasia, because in the latter the death often seems to be 
both suicide [i.e., VAE includes suicidal intent on the part of the patient, which is 
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to be understood descriptively and not pejoratively, nor as an evaluative 
statement at this juncture] and physician assisted.”44    
While the claim being developed here—that PAS is a form of VAE—is 
compatible with the original formulation of the conditions given by Grisez and 
Boyle on pages 35-36, its compatibility is not as explicit on this point as it is 
expressed in the conditions provided by Beauchamp. Their third condition would 
need to be slightly expanded to see that PAS can be subsumed under the 
general description of VAE they develop to read something along the lines: “(3) 
Agent deliberately brings about Patient’s death [or Agent provides the means 
for Patient to become the primary Agent in his/her own death] in order that 
Patient shall have the benefit of being better off dead—that is, not continue to 
suffer the condition (1) under supposition (2).” Hence, the following definition: 
Physician-Assisted Suicide (def.) = a form of voluntary active euthanasia 
whereby Patient is the Agent who acts directly on the known lethal means 
supplied by a certified health care professional which serve as the final 
link that brings about the patient’s death. 
 
Some maintain that there are morally relevant differences between PAS 
and VAE, such that the former should be allowed in a medical context whereas 
the latter ought not. This appears to be the thrust driving some of the “Death 
with Dignity” initiatives that many states have had, are having, or will have to 
                                                
44 Tom L. Beauchamp, “Introduction,” Intending Death: The Ethics of Assisted Suicide 
and Euthanasia, edited by Tom L. Beauchamp (New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1996) 4.   
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address. These initiatives argue for the legalization (and hence moral 
permissibility) of PAS, while keeping VAE illegal in a health care context. Such a 
concession, that is, to argue for the legality, and hence permissibility, of PAS 
while excluding VAE, seems to be more for the purposes of political expediency 
than on the basis of sound moral reasoning.  
Michael Tooley has made this point with, I think, substantial clarity. 
Consider the following argument. 
(1) If a person is suffering considerable pain due to an incurable 
illness, then in some cases that person’s death is in his or her own 
interests. 
 
(2) If a person’s death is in that person’s own interest, then 
committing suicide is also in that person’s own interest. 
 
(3) Therefore, if a person is suffering considerable pain due to an 
incurable illness, then in some cases committing suicide is in that 
person’s own interest. (From (1) and (2).) 
 
(4) A person’s committing suicide in such circumstances may very 
well also satisfy the following two conditions: 
 
a) it neither violates anyone else’s rights, nor wrongs 
anyone; 
 
b) it does not make the world a worse place. 
 
(5) An action that satisfies conditions a) and b), and that is not 
contrary to one’s own interest, cannot be morally wrong. 
 
(6) Therefore, a person’s committing suicide when all of above 
conditions obtain would not be morally wrong. (From (3), (4), 
and (5).) 
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(7) It could be morally wrong to assist a person in committing suicide 
only if (i) it was morally wrong for that person to commit suicide, 
or (ii) committing suicide was contrary to the person’s own 
interest, or (iii) assisting the person to commit suicide violated an 
obligation one had to someone else. 
 
(8) Circumstances may very well be such that neither assisting a 
person to commit suicide nor performing voluntary active 
euthanasia violates any obligations that one has to others.  
 
(9) Therefore, it would not be wrong to assist a person in committing 
suicide in the circumstances described above. (From (3), (6), (7), 
and (8).) 
 
(10) Whenever assisting a person in committing suicide is justified, 
voluntary active euthanasia is also justified, provided the latter 
action does not violate any obligation that one has to anyone 
else. 
 
(11) Therefore, voluntary active euthanasia would not be morally 
wrong in the circumstances in question.  (From (8), (9), and 
(10).)45 
 
This argument was developed for the purpose of showing that “voluntary 
active euthanasia and assisted suicide are not morally wrong in themselves” 
according to Tooley. 46  In standard philosophical fashion, given that this 
argument is valid, those who think that both VAE and PAS are morally 
problematic would need to respond to one or more of the premises. And this is 
certainly a difficult task in its own right.  
                                                
45 Tooley, “In Defense of Voluntary Active Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide,” 163. 
 
46 Ibid. 
 
  
60 
Be this as it may. However, Tooley’s argument seems to pose a particularly 
more challenging obstacle for those who hold that PAS is morally permissible 
and hence ought to be legalized while maintaining that VAE may be morally 
problematic and thus should not be legalized (or at least at this time). It would 
seem that the moral and legal justification one would have for PAS is the same 
moral and legal justification one could marshal for VAE. I use Tooley’s argument 
here to show that PAS and VAE are practices that do not appear to be morally 
distinct from one another in any fundamental way. Moreover, they share many 
morally relevant common features. In light of the kind of justification usually 
provided for PAS, it would seem odd, ethically speaking, that one would not be 
in favor of VAE for the same reasons.   
The worry seems to be that trying to either legalize VAE or argue for its 
moral permissibility is too radical of a position given current public sentiment or 
some perceived reticence toward the idea. If this is so, then the strategy 
employed is not so odd. As a first step, one could argue for the legalization of 
PAS. Then eventually one could argue for not only the moral permissibility of VAE 
but also the legalization of the practice once PAS does not seem to be as 
deleterious as some may have suspected.  However, if Tooley is correct in his 
argument concerning the link between PAS and VAE, then there is no morally 
principled reason as to why one should not simultaneously argue for the same 
legal and moral status for VAE and PAS. So this is why I say that it may be 
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politically expedient to make a two-part argument and why I suggest that it 
does not seem to be on the basis of moral principle. All of this is to lend 
credence to the claim that on the definition of ‘euthanasia’ advocated here 
that PAS should be seen as a sub-set of euthanasia, more specifically, as a form 
of voluntary active euthanasia.   
 
PAS and VAE as Physician Assisted Death 
Some may still object to the broad use of ‘euthanasia’ as a term where 
PAS and VAE are included in the way specified. Further, they may also insist on 
keeping these in separate categories. Even so, both VAE and PAS could be 
considered as moral events that can be classified under the umbrella term of 
‘physician-assisted death.’ Broadly speaking, both of these practices (PAS and 
VAE) “involve some form of assistance in bringing about another’s death” for 
beneficent reasons in a medical context.47  At least, this much appears to be 
true.  
Many proponents of the “Inconsistency Argument” claim that PAS and 
VAE share many of the morally relevant features with most cases of 
palliative/terminal sedation. And so, classifying these two practices under a 
common term could streamline the discussion concerning the “Inconsistency 
                                                
47 Beauchamp, “Introduction,” Intending Death, 4.  
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Argument” due to this perceived affinity. 48  So for the purposes of the 
dissertation, unless otherwise stated, I will use the term ‘physician-assisted death’ 
to include both what is described here as VAE and PAS.   
This nomenclature is to be preferred over “physician-assisted dying.”  In 
my opinion, this phrase is too wide, as it would seem to include some aspects of 
hospice care, various forms of palliation for the irretrievably dying patient, and 
cessation of life-sustaining treatment when it becomes too burdensome or futile. 
Are these instances of physician-assisted dying?  They could plausibly be 
conceived as such depending on how the details are fleshed out. Yet I want to 
say these are distinct issues from the discussion at hand. There would be no 
need to unnecessarily blur the lines by using this phrase especially since many 
are using the term already. ‘Physician-assisted death’ does seem to adequately 
capture the essence of both voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide as I have defined them in this chapter.49   
 
Some Benefits and Burdens of this Approach 
                                                
48 The claim of the “Inconsistency Argument” is that there are no real qualitative 
differences between palliative sedation and PAD that are morally relevant. As types of medical 
practices, these should all be morally assessed in the same way. 
 
49 An added advantage of employing this convention is that it should make the wording in 
some of the premises of the “Equivalency Argument” given in Chapter 1 slightly less 
cumbersome. 
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 There are some perceived benefits for defining ‘physician-assisted death’ 
as I have for this context. I mention a few of these alongside some 
corresponding burdens. First, I think that it avoids the fallacy of petitio principi or 
“question-begging.” One concern in making any attempt to define terms in 
ethical debate is that those definitions can become circular or that the moral 
assessment is embedded into the definiens. I have attempted here to define our 
key terms in a way that accurately describes what actions are taking place 
without incorporating the moral judgment in the account itself. Of course, some 
may think that the words “kill” and “suicide” that show up in my discussion are 
necessarily pejorative and prejudices the discussion in favor of opposing 
physician–assisted death. This is certainly a burden that needs to be overcome 
insofar as possible without losing the clarity that comes with words like “kill” and 
“suicide” for this conversation. I do acknowledge that some may think the words 
“kill” and ”suicide” necessarily describe actions that are inherently wrong. But I 
do not think these judgments would be correct.50   
 Concerning killing, we must ask, “are all acts of killing human beings 
morally wrong?”  Though I talk more about this in the next chapter, at this 
juncture, we can say without argument that many people (other than principled 
                                                
50 This particular terminology use should not be thought to skew the debate before it 
begins by using language that may seem pejorative to some who have a stake in the discussion. 
To be sure, this often proves difficult given that much of our language use in these areas is value 
laden and perhaps may be perceived as somewhat emotive.  
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pacifists) think that while there remains a strong prima facie prohibition against 
killing humans, not all instances of killing are morally unjustifiable (e.g. using 
lethal force in self-defense when no other alternatives seem plausible). So there 
is nothing about the word itself that would suggest any type of impropriety in 
using it to describe accurately what would be a condition of physician-assisted 
death.   
Furthermore, with respect to suicide, something similar can be said.  In 
fact, many of the arguments that are offered in favor of physician-assisted 
death hinge on the case for the claim that there can be rational suicides and 
that they are morally permissible.51 There will still need to be an account of the 
wrongness of killing when it is wrong.  So I do not think that the definitions 
proffered here have in some way defined “killing as morally unjustified, then 
[defined] euthanasia as killing, and then concludes that euthanasia is morally 
unjustified.”52  And hence, the definitions do not commit the fallacy of petitio 
principi.   
                                                
51 For philosophical arguments in favor of rational suicide and criteria for moral 
permissibility of such actions that are aimed at medical ethicists and healthcare professionals see 
the works from C. G. Prado, Choosing to Die: Elective Death and Multiculturalism (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008) and The Last Choice: Preemptive Suicide in an Advanced 
Age, Second Edition (New York and Westport, CT: Greenwood and Praeger Presses, 1998). 
 
52 Daniel P. Sulmasy, “Reading the Medical Ethics Literature,” Methods in Medical 
Ethics, Second Edition, edited by Jeremy Sugarman and Daniel P. Sulmasy (Washington D.C., 
Georgetown University Press, 2010), 318. 
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A second benefit is that it provides conceptual tools to distinguish the 
unique features that characterize instances of PAD from other end-of-life 
medical decisions such as allowing an irretrievably ill person to die without 
appeal to a dubious claim that the morally relevant distinction between these 
two is solely based on a basic distinction between killing and letting die or 
between acts and omissions. Some have thought that what makes forgoing life  
sustaining treatment morally permissible and voluntary active euthanasia 
impermissible is that the former is considered “allowing to die” and the latter is 
actually “killing” the patient. Critics have rightly constructed “Bare Difference” 
arguments on these assumptions. The Bare Difference arguments show that 
appeal to these distinctions in the abstract simply will not do. Too many counter-
examples can be marshaled to highlight this is wrong-headed. 
On the definition of ‘euthanasia’ advocated here these distinctions in 
themselves are irrelevant to aid in morally assessing particular actions (or 
inactions) in a health care context. As one ethicist has rightly put this: 
Allowing a patient to die, or letting a patient die, are often considered to 
be morally different from killing. Correctly labeling an act as “allowing to 
die” does not tell us whether the act is morally justified. If, for example, an 
individual whose life could have been saved in an emergency room is 
knowingly and deliberately allowed to die, such inaction would be 
morally akin to an unjustified killing, given the moral and legal obligations 
to treat in such circumstances.53  
                                                
53 Arthur Dyck, Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities: The Moral Bonds of Community 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 245. 
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The point here is to highlight that it is not simply the bare difference between 
killing/letting die that alone provides the morally relevant qualities. Yet it should 
not be thought the killing/letting die distinction is morally irrelevant. To be sure, I 
agree with one noted philosopher on this point when he states, “the concepts 
of killing and letting die are not evaluatively neutral.  Yet their use, while 
reflecting certain moral beliefs, is nevertheless governed primarily by empirical 
criteria. This is in part because they both exemplify broader categories that are 
clearly defined largely if not exclusively in nonmoral terms.”54 
The definitions given in this chapter focuses on the notion of intention as 
being one essential feature, among others, in morally assessing a particular 
moral event. So if one who adopts the definition on offer wants to argue for the 
moral impermissibility of PAD, then she should not do so on the basis of the 
direct/indirect, active/passive, killing/letting die, or act/omission distinctions 
alone as abstract moral principles where the former of each pair is deemed 
morally impermissible and the latter as morally permissible.  
Moreover, the focus on the notion of intention instead of merely the 
direct/indirect kinds of distinctions just noted, addresses a worry that Tooley 
raised concerning narrower attempts at defining euthanasia stated above. One 
                                                
54 Jeff McMahan, “Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid,” Killing and Letting Die, 
Second Edition, edited by Bonnie Steinbock and Alastair Norcross (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1994), 383. 
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recalls that he thinks there is a heavy burden of proof of one who wants to 
adopt narrower definitions of ‘euthanasia’ than the one he offers. To quote 
Tooley again: 
If one holds, however, that such actions [such as when there are medically 
indicated and otherwise appropriate55 forgoingof life-sustaining treatment] 
are morally permissible, but that the direct killing of a terminally ill person is 
morally wrong, then among the most crucial issues that one needs to address 
are, first, why the direct versus indirect distinction has such moral significance, 
and secondly, why the same is true in the case of the distinction between 
killing and letting die.56 
 
While the definition of ‘euthanasia’ given in this chapter is narrower than 
Tooley’s, it is broad enough to account for the fact that the moral evaluation of 
practices that fall under PAD do not merely rest on the “Bare Difference” 
between direct/indirect kinds of distinctions alone. It should be clear that the 
chosen definitional strategy taken in this chapter does not turn, with respect to 
ethical evaluation going forward, on merely the distinctions with which Tooley is 
concerned as being morally irrelevant.  
                                                
55 The word “appropriate” that modifies the kind of forgoing of life-sustaining treatment 
in question means in this context the cessation of treatment is considered morally permissible 
when it is in keeping with the patient’s expressed wishes to refuse invasive medical procedures 
or when there are other medical indications that the patient is irretrievably dying, treatment is 
either futile, or too burdensome and ought to be discontinued.  The intention in these scenarios 
would not be to forego life-sustaining treatment in order to make the patient dead.  If so, as 
already noted, this would be an instance of passive euthanasia.  At this point this would still be 
descriptive of what has taken place given that no moral assessment of these kinds of actions have 
been provided. 
 
56 Michael Tooley, “In Defense of Voluntary Active Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide,” 
162-163. 
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 Still related to this second point of this section, the understanding of PAD 
on offer in this chapter carries with it the burden to specify plausible responses to 
some of the difficult challenges that are raised by emphasizing the notion of 
intention in evaluating human actions and moral events. Judith J. Thomson 
raises such concerns. She argues that the intentions of the agent have more to 
do with the character of the actor and not so much the moral permissibility or 
impermissibility of the act itself.  She writes,  
I think it is plainly a fact—that the question whether it is morally permissible 
for a person to do a thing just is not the same as the question whether the 
person who does it is thereby shown to be a bad person. The doctor who 
injects a lethal drug to get revenge or out of hatred is a bad person. We 
can add that she acts badly if she acts for that reason. That is compatible 
with its being morally permissible for her to inject the drug. 57   
 
Another issue that emerges is the relationship of intention with the 
controversial principle of double-effect reasoning. It is not feasible for the claim 
undertaken in this work to deal with all of the issues that are raised concerning 
action theory, including intention and the myriad of questions that surround the 
principle of double-effect. Though this is a burden of this approach, to be sure, 
and more will need to be said regarding it and J. J. Thomson’s concern. This is 
undertaken partly in Chapter 5 and more constructively in Chapter 6.   
                                                
57 Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments,” Ethics, 
109/3, (April 1999): 517.  
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Third, the intensional definition offered seems to capture the current 
understanding of the stance of some professional statements concerning issues 
of physician-assisted suicide and aggressive end-of-life care.  Take for instance, 
the American Medical Association (AMA), which affirms: 
When the usual armamentarium of medical interventions has been 
exhausted, choices still remain; these range from letting the terminal illness 
take its course without further intervention to unacceptable choices, such 
as euthanasia. Actions that are solely intended to hasten the death of 
patients, such as physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia, are ethically 
and medically unacceptable….  In contrast, the withholding and 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, when done based on the patient’s 
autonomous refusal of unwanted care, and allowing the natural course of 
disease to take place, are ethically and medically appropriate.58 [My 
emphasis] 
This commentary expresses the understanding of the AMA concerning 
some of the issues surrounding the ethics of end-of-life (EOL) medical care.  It 
certainly includes those relevant features that are found in the definitions of 
‘physician-assisted suicide’ and ‘euthanasia’ as developed in the second 
definitional category above. Of course, the AMA statement makes value 
judgments on PAD.  The point here though at this stage, is to cite them not in 
reference to the value judgments that are being made, but with respect to the 
categorizations of the practices one can detect.   
In the quote given above, one can readily discern the groupings of 
practices that the second definitional category wants to keep distinct 
                                                
58 “Sedation to Unconsciousness in End-of-Life Care,” Council on Ethical and Judicial 
Affairs Report, 5-A-08 (American Medical Association, 2008) 4:27-34.   
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concerning EOL medical care. Namely, the appropriate forgoing of life-
sustaining treatment is to be kept distinct from being identified with or included 
under those practices that are considered euthanasia, whether passive or 
active, as developed in this chapter. While the AMA in the quoted statement 
does not use the language of omission or passive euthanasia, it would seem that 
actions that would fall under these descriptions are also in view given they use 
the phrase, “Actions that are solely intended to hasten the death of patients.”  
Presumably, the examples they give of physician-assisted suicide and 
euthanasia as practices that are solely intended to bring forth death, one would 
think, do not exhaust the kinds of events that can be characterized as such.   
The AMA’s statement is wholly compatible with what some may consider 
omissions or indirect acts that would withhold or withdraw certain kinds of life-
sustaining treatment if the sole intention was to make the patient dead. In this 
case, this would be considered inappropriate withdrawal/withholding of life-
sustaining treatment and as passive euthanasia. Given its context, the AMA’s 
use of the phrase “hastening death” in their commentary seems to highlight the 
importance of the role that intentions play in morally assessing various EOL 
medical decisions regardless if it is done by act or omission, directly or indirectly.   
If the above line of reasoning is correct regarding an exegesis of the their 
commentary, then this would seem to call for the AMA to revise its definition of 
euthanasia by expanding it slightly from the narrower first category to the slightly 
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broader second category recommended here which includes those events that 
are sometimes considered passive euthanasia. 59  The reasoning of the 
commentary already provides the conceptual categories for this move. It is the 
second definitional category that seems to be most in line with the ethical 
reflection of the current stance of the AMA.   
 
Conclusion  
The account of PAD on offer seems to provide the clearest backdrop to 
readily identify those features of the practices in question that medical 
professionals and many others who have a stake in this debate perceive as most 
vexing.  Certainly, these properties that are perceived by some opponents of 
PAD as being the most troubling may not be on the basis of sound moral 
reasoning. Therefore, arguments are still needed to substantiate why PAD as 
described/defined above is morally troublesome in a health care context. The 
moral arguments that are built on those features or properties that seem to be 
of most concern for opponents of PAD would need to give good reasons why 
most variations of these practices should remain morally impermissible in a 
health care context. Of course, proponents of PAD would need to be able to 
                                                
59 As cited previously the AMA’s definition of ‘euthanasia’ is “the administration of a 
lethal agent by another person to a patient for the purpose of relieving the patient’s intolerable 
and incurable suffering.” 
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provide arguments that are strong enough to override the prima facie 
prohibition against killing in a health care context and provide reasons why PAD 
should be included in the scope of EOL medical care.   
All of this (i.e., the definitional work and the arguments against PAD), then, 
sets the stage for determining whether or not the currently widely accepted 
practice of palliative sedation is an instance of PAD and hence is subject to the 
same ethical evaluation. Or is it the case that there are any morally relevant 
differences between them that can be distinguished? One recalls that this 
brings us back to the “Inconsistency Argument” given in Chapter 1 that is slightly 
modified to take into account the use of PAD as advocated in this chapter: 
1) For any two practices, X and Y, if there are no morally relevant differences 
between X and Y, then if Y is morally impermissible, X is morally 
impermissible. 
 
2) There are no morally relevant differences between palliative/terminal 
sedation and PAD. 
 
From 1) and 2), it follows that: 
 
3) If PAD is morally impermissible, palliative/terminal sedation is morally 
impermissible. 
 
Next, we assume that: 
 
4) PAD is morally impermissible. 
 
5) Therefore, palliative/terminal sedation is morally impermissible. 
It is to the moral arguments marshaled in defense of premise 4 of the 
“Inconsistency Argument” that I turn. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
A SURVEY OF SOME ARGUMENTS AGAINST PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH 
 
 
Introduction  
This chapter develops some of the arguments and criticisms of them that 
have been marshaled in favor of premise 4 of the “Inconsistency Argument” 
which states in its augmented version, “Physician-Assisted Death is morally 
impermissible.” I highlight two general areas of argumentation often developed 
against PAD. The first centers on the “Prohibition of Killing Innocents.” The second 
is what is known primarily as the “Argument from the Integrity of the Medical 
Profession.”  
To be clear, the point of surveying these arguments is to highlight why 
some think that instances of PAD are morally impermissible in a health care 
context. Again, as emphasized in chapter one, this is to serve as the basis for 
evaluating whether or not the same arguments can be readily applied to the 
practice of palliative sedation that is currently widely accepted in the medical 
profession. Therefore even if a proponent of PAD thinks the arguments against 
these practices ultimately fail is, in some ways, beside the point for the purposes 
underscored in this project. The issue is this: If opponents of PAD think the 
arguments presented here are adequate to support their view, do these same 
arguments along with their various perceived wrong-making properties equally 
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count against palliative sedation as well? Still the arguments against PAD ought 
to be as robust as possible. So, I sketch below what seem to be the most 
common types of arguments that have been used in the discussion.  The issue 
going forward is whether or not those medical professionals and organizations 
are being inconsistent if they embrace palliative sedation on the one hand, 
while opposing PAD on the other. 
 
Argument from the Prohibition of Killing Innocents (PKI) 
All things being equal, there is a strong moral prohibition against killing 
human beings. The operative moral principle would seem to be something like: 
MP1:  It is morally wrong intentionally to kill human beings without  
sufficient moral justification. 
 
MP1 takes the form of a prima facie moral principle.  In many Western societies, 
MP1 is usually appealed to when considering the appropriateness of killings of 
various sorts. Some of these instances where it is thought that killing humans may 
be morally justifiable have included those of self-defense, the killing of 
combatants in the context of a just military conflict, and in cases of capital 
punishment. Of course, not all would agree that these examples are justifiable.  
Given the context of this debate, MP1 is not as central to the discussion 
developed here given that PAD focuses on the moral justification of killing those 
who are apparently innocent. It is in this sense that it is often thought, however 
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ironically it may seem to principled pacifists, that capital punishment and killing 
in self-defense are compatible with homicide law and the strong prima facie 
prohibition against killing human beings reflected in MP1. As one ethicist notes: 
Killing an individual who is not threatening anyone’s life, however, is unjust, 
and homicide law neither permits such an act nor leaves it unpunished. 
Given that there are those who threaten to kill or do kill others, homicide 
law recognizes a moral basis for using as much force as necessary, even 
to the point of killing, in order to defend and protect innocent human life, 
whether one’s own life or the life of others.1  
 
Clearly with respect to instances where claims of self-defense, engaging 
in a just military conflict, or capital punishment are in view, presumably we are 
not discussing the moral justification of taking the life of those who are innocent. 
This is true regardless of whatever judgments one makes about these matters. It 
is claimed that the aforementioned situations are said to include individuals who 
do pose a significant threat to the common good. Whether or not lethal force is 
justified in such situations remains controversial and rigorously debated. 
Nevertheless, the point can still be taken. 
The argument advanced for the claim that PAD is morally impermissible is 
on the basis of what is claimed to be a longstanding and widely accepted 
moral principle. The discussion of this section develops in three phases. The first 
phase identifies this principle, and then develops and evaluates the moral 
argument built upon it. I call this argument the “Argument from the Prohibition of 
                                                
1 Arthur J. Dyck, Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities: The Moral Bonds of Community 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005) 242. 
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Killing Innocents” (PKI). Moreover, in the following sub-section, I highlight some of 
the ways in which the argument has been challenged while sketching out in the 
final sub-section what would be needed in any potential counter-responses for 
those who want to maintain moral opposition to PAD based upon PKI.   
 
An Exposition of the Prohibition of Killing Innocents Argument, PKI(AA): 
If MP1 is an appropriate moral principle with respect to the ethics of killing, 
then, a fortiori, there is a moral prohibition against killing innocent human beings. 
Some would perhaps be willing to argue that the moral prohibition against killing 
innocents should be considered absolute. The operative moral principle in this 
case would be: 
MP2:  It is morally wrong intentionally to kill innocent human beings. 
 
MP2 takes the form of an absolutist moral principle. It appears to be the principle 
to which many, though by no means all, opponents of PAD make appeal. That 
is, when the opposition is made on the basis of the wrongness of killing innocents 
in a medical context.  
If MP2 is a legitimate moral principle and PAD is rightly described as events 
that violate MP2, then the moral impermissibility of these events would be 
established, that is, according to opponents of PAD. An argument to this end 
could be constructed as follows. Let’s call this absolutist version of the argument, 
the Prohibition of Killing Innocents, PKI(AA).  
  
77 
1. It is morally wrong intentionally to kill innocent human beings. (MP2) 
 
2. The practices that fall under PAD are instances of intentionally killing 
innocent human beings. 
 
3. Therefore, PAD is morally wrong. 
 
So what can be said in favor of premise 1 of PKI(AA)? Some have appealed 
to the idea that the sanctity or inviolability of human life is what undergirds MP2. 
Simply stated this view holds that “all human life has an inherent dignity, worth 
and sacredness” such that “its very essence is distinct within the biological world 
and of incalculable worth, thus warranting protection throughout the course of 
its entire existence.”2 One proponent of this view identifies “the ethical core of 
the doctrine of the sanctity of human life [as] an absolute (i.e., exceptionless) 
prohibition on intentionally killing another human being for reasons incompatible 
with justice.”3 The impetus behind this idea for traditional morality is that “respect 
for justice rests on the belief in the equality in fundamental worth and dignity of 
every human being.”4 Human beings are the kinds of entities whose lives ought 
not be taken in “virtue of their nature as human beings rather than in virtue of 
                                                
2 Dennis Hollinger, “Sanctity of Life,” Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Volume 3, Third 
Edition, edited by Stephen G. Post (New York: MacMillan Reference, 2004), 1402.  
 
3 Luke Gormally, “Terminal Sedation and the Sanctity of Life,” Terminal Sedation: 
Euthanasia in Disguise? (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 83. 
 
4 Ibid., 84. 
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the value we attach to activities in which we are able to engage because of 
the development of distinctive human abilities.”5 
Many often associate this notion with religiously based philosophical 
systems, and in some cases rightfully so, given that many such traditions often 
appeal to the idea.6 On the one hand, Helga Kuhse describes this idea as 
flowing from a religious context. She writes, “The Doctrine has its source in the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition, which holds that all innocent human life, irrespective 
of its quality or kind, is equally valuable and inviolable and must never 
deliberately be taken.”7 Kuhse ultimately goes on to reject the idea of the 
sanctity of life being helpful for discussions in end-of-life medical ethics. 
On the other hand, some claim that the sanctity or inviolability of life need 
not be construed as a purely religious idea or necessarily flowing from religious 
                                                
5 Ibid., 84-85. 
 
6 Some examples include the works of Jewish theologian and moral philosopher, David 
Novak, The Sanctity of Human Life (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2007); the 
Neo-Orthodox Protestant theologian, Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Creation, 
Volume III, Part 4 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2010) especially pages 397-470; the 
Jesuit philosopher, John F. Kavanaugh’s development of his view of “Radical Personalism” in 
Who Counts as Persons? Human Identity and the Ethics of Killing (Washington D.C., 
Georgetown University Press, 2001); and the protestant theological ethicist, David P. Gushee, 
The Sacredness of Human Life: Why an Ancient Biblical Vision is Key to the World’s Future 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012) amongst many others that could be listed. 
 
7 Helga Kuhse, “Why Terminal Sedation is no Solution to the Voluntary Euthanasia 
Debate,” Terminal Sedation: Euthanasia in Disguise? (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2004), 58. 
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contexts even if oftentimes it is associated closely with these. As one ethicist 
writes with respect to the notion of sanctity/inviolability of life: 
As this account of human dignity may suggest, the principle can also be 
articulated in non-religious terms, in which ‘inviolability’ would be a more 
fitting word than ‘sanctity’ with its religious overtones. Indeed, a 
prohibition on killing is central to the pre-Christian fount of Western 
medical ethics—the Hippocratic Oath—and the modern reaffirmation of 
that Oath by the arguably post-Christian Declaration of Geneva. Indeed, 
many non-believers recognize the right of innocent human beings not to 
be intentionally killed. …[t]he sanctity principle has long been recognized 
in most, if not all, civilized societies throughout the modern world, as is 
evidenced by its recognitions by international conventions on human 
rights.8 
 
In other words, the notion of the sanctity or inviolability of life indicates that 
human beings are the kinds of things that have intrinsic value or worth in some 
way or other.  
Perhaps Kant is an example on this latter score. For him, it must be kept in 
mind that the only things that are intrinsically good and of ultimate value are a 
good will and a person. Kant’s first and second formulations of the categorical 
imperative are linked to these two areas of absolute value. It is his application of 
the second formulation of the categorical imperative, which seems most 
relevant for this context. That formulation holds that one is to “Act in such a way 
that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or the person of another, 
                                                
8 John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An Argument Against Legalisation 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 40-41. 
 
  
80 
always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.”9 He develops 
his moral prohibition against suicide, and presumably of assisting another in the 
same, on the basis of the first two formulations of his categorical imperative. 
Though it is his application of the second version of the categorical imperative 
to the issue of suicide that is important for the point being made. Kant writes: 
[A]s regards the concept of necessary duty to oneself, the man who 
contemplates suicide will ask himself whether his action can be consistent 
with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys himself in order 
to escape from a difficult situation, then he is making use of his person 
merely as a means so as to maintain a tolerable condition till the end of 
his life.  Man, however, is not a thing and hence is not something to be 
used merely as a means; he must in all his actions always be regarded as 
an end in himself. Therefore, I cannot dispose of man in my own person by 
mutilating, damaging, or killing him.10 
 
The point here is not to suggest that Kant’s categorical imperative establishes for 
us the moral impermissibility of suicide even though he thought that it did. It is, 
instead, to acknowledge that for Kant the human person is of ultimate worth or 
inviolable and his moral philosophy was in many ways predicated upon this 
idea.   
Whatever the judgment concerning the ultimate grounds of the 
inviolability or sanctity of human life, or whether it is best thought of in religious or 
non-religious terms, the claim is that human beings nevertheless possess intrinsic 
                                                
9 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, (429), translated by James 
W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981), 36. 
 
10 Ibid. 
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value and therefore should be preserved from unjust assault. If so, then there are 
corresponding obligations on the part of communities to recognize the moral 
bonds with others to nurture and protect innocent human life, even from one’s 
own self. On this account, then, the wrong-making properties of killing innocents 
(i.e., why killing innocents is wrong when it is wrong) is that it disregards the 
inviolability of life and stifles genuine flourishing of human communities which 
nurture the inalienable right to life. 
Furthermore, from this line of reasoning it is observed that MP2, as it is 
rooted in the notion of the inviolability of life, is what undergirds current homicide 
law. While to be sure, it is not always the case that what the law reflects is 
ethical, it does raise the issue, according to opponents of PAD, as to “whether 
killing oneself and assisting someone to kill himself or herself [violates] the moral 
basis for homicide law, even when this is done and allowed under very limited 
circumstances.”11  Some claim that by allowing PAD to be an exception to 
current homicide law that it “does indeed attack the existing moral structure of 
homicide law and leaves it without a principled basis for protecting life.”12 And 
this for opponents of PAD, to say the least, would be problematic since the goal 
                                                
11 Arthur Dyck, Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities, 243. 
 
12 Ibid., 243. 
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of homicide law is the protection of innocent human beings and maintenance 
of the common good.13  
Some perhaps would say that PAD should not constitute murder given 
that there may not be malicious intent involved. Others, however, argue that at 
the very least, it should be viewed as manslaughter. Even though PAS (which on 
the account on offer is a form of PAD) is legally permitted in three states at the 
time of this writing, “Many states [nevertheless] have specific statutes that 
criminalize [physician-assisted suicide]. Even in the states where this is not clearly 
defined as a crime, it may nonetheless be considered a form of homicide.”14 If 
so, this lends some credence to the charge from opponents that PAD is a 
violation of homicide law, which again, is rooted in MP2, so it is claimed.  
All of this is said to be in defense of premise1 of PKI(AA), which is the 
affirmation of MP2: “It is morally wrong intentionally to kill innocent human 
beings.” To reiterate, the wrong-making properties of intentionally killing 
innocents for whatever reason is that in doing so: (i) we fail to recognize the 
intrinsic value of human life that is the basis of morality, and (ii) it erodes the 
moral bonds of human community that promote human flourishing on which our 
long-standing current homicide law is based.  
                                                
13 Ibid., 241-275. 
 
14 Jerry Menikoff, Law and Bioethics: An Introduction (Washington D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2001) 327. 
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With respect to premise 2 of PKI(AA), the question at this point is, “Are the 
practices that fall under PAD instances of intentionally killing innocent human 
beings?” One recalls from chapter 2 that the description of PAD on offer in this 
project would be seen as describing events in the medical context, which 
include the intentional killing of innocent human life. This point would be difficult 
even for proponents of PAD to deny. PAD simply does include the intentional 
killing of innocent human beings, albeit in a medical context for reasons thought 
to be morally sufficient to warrant the actions, which, of course, is what 
opponents of PAD reject. Again, as discussed in chapter 2, this descriptive point 
must be coupled with some moral principle in order to engage in moral 
evaluation. In this case, it would be MP2. Therefore, in keeping with the 
conclusion of PKI(AA), PAD is considered to be morally wrong. 
 
Three Categories of Criticisms to PKI:  
These claims certainly are not without their ablest detractors. Several types 
of formidable objections have been leveled against these, admittedly general, 
reasons given in favor of PKI(AA). Given what was stated above concerning 
premise 2, this section will provide a general analysis of premise 1, which affirms 
MP2. In what follows, I highlight three coalescing categories of criticism of 
premise 1, namely, (i) that it fails to account for the moral significance of the 
distinction between a human being and a human person, (ii) it highlights the 
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wrong wrong-making properties, and (iii) the moral principle on which it is based 
is too strong.  
To begin, it may be argued that premise 1 is false because it situates the 
locus of value in the wrong place.  The issue of moral importance centers not on 
the value of mere human beings but the value of human persons. It is human 
persons who matter with respect to ethics and our human rights talk. So human 
value is in personhood, and not merely in the fact that the entity in question is 
human. This notion reflects the common and widely appealed to distinction 
between biological and biographical life that is brought out with particular 
precision by James Rachels. He writes: 
[T]here is a deep difference between having a life and being alive. Being 
alive, in the biological sense, is relatively unimportant. One’s life, by 
contrast, is immensely important; it is the sum of one’s aspirations, 
decisions, activities, projects and human relationships. The point of the rule 
against killing is the protection of lives and the interests that some beings, 
including ourselves, have in virtue of the fact that we are subjects of 
lives… In deciding questions of life and death, the crucial question is: Is a 
life, in the biographical sense, being destroyed or otherwise affected? If 
not the rule against killing offers no objection.15 
 
We can see that this view affirms that it is human persons who have rights. 
Human beings, if they lack the property of personhood, do not. This is not to say 
that there won’t remain strong sentiments with respect to the “human being 
formerly known as grandma” or that any kind of treatment towards the human 
                                                
15 James Rachels, The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986) 5. 
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being would necessarily be morally permissible if the entity in question lost the 
property of personhood, any more than a coroner can do anything she pleases 
with a corpse. It is to say that any language that employs concepts of 
“inalienable rights to life,” “the sanctity of life,” or “the inviolability of human life” 
more aptly applies to persons than it does to human beings. Rachels, and those 
who follow him on this score, suggest that if one wants to make some kind of 
appeal to the sanctity of life idea, then “[it] ought to be interpreted as 
protecting life in the biographical sense and not merely life in the biological 
sense.”16 So on some accounts that develop this line of thought, it may always 
be wrong to kill innocent human persons, while it is not always wrong to kill 
innocent human beings, contra MP2. Hence, premise 1 of PKI(AA) is false.  
Of course, the question emerges as to what is the difference between a 
human being and a human person? Or what are those properties that would 
need to be possessed by human beings that make them persons such that 
when humans lose these they cease to be persons? Many contemporary 
thinkers have followed or further developed the discussion provided by Mary 
Anne Warren in her widely read and often referenced essay from 1973.17 She 
argues that human beings, in the genetic sense, should not be thought to be 
                                                
16 Ibid., 26. 
 
17 Mary Anne Warren, “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,” Monist 57 (1973). 
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included in the moral community, which is the set of beings with full and equal 
moral rights.18 She suggests that the moral community “consists of all and only 
people, rather than all and only human beings.” 19  This self-evident truth is 
demonstrated, according to Warren, by considering the concept of 
personhood, which is characterized in people.  
She identifies five traits “which are most central to the concept of 
personhood, or humanity in the moral sense.” They are: 
i. Consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to 
the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain; 
 
ii. Reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively 
complex problems); 
 
iii. Self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of 
either genetic or direct external control); 
 
iv. The capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of 
an indefinite variety of types, that is, not just with an indefinite 
number of possible contents, but on indefinitely many possible 
topics; 
 
v. The presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either 
individual or racial, or both.20 
 
The result of these is that “[b]iological life alone does not endow a being 
with interests. Without interests, they cannot have moral status.”21 And hence 
                                                
18 Ibid., 54 
 
19 Ibid. 
 
20 Ibid., 55.  
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human non-persons (or mere human beings) are not necessarily included into 
the moral community.  Many others have also developed various criteria for 
personhood.22 But for the purposes of this chapter Warren’s criteria should suffice 
both to illustrate how the distinction is to be understood and to prefigure how 
they are subsequently applied. 
This leads to the second area of critique of premise 1. By maintaining the 
human being/human person distinction, one is in a better position to identify the 
wrong-making properties of “Why killing innocents is wrong when it is wrong.” 
The proposed wrong-making properties of MP2 noted above, critics claim, are 
simply not wrong-making properties. Killing innocents is not wrong due to the 
fact that it disregards the inviolability of life, nor because humans possess intrinsic 
value. Instead, they would maintain that killing innocents is wrong when it is 
wrong is due to the fact that it harms them. As Rachels straightforwardly 
highlights, “If we should not kill, it is because in killing we are harming someone. 
That is the reason killing is wrong. The rule against killing has as its point the 
                                                                                                                                                       
21 Bonnie Steinbock, Life Before Birth: The Moral and Legal Status of Embryos and 
Fetuses (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) 5. It should be noted that Steinbock is not in 
support of legalizing physician-assisted suicide for consequentialist reasons. See her essay “The 
Case for Physician Assisted Suicide: Not (Yet) Proven,” J Med Ethics 2005; 31:235-241. doi: 
10.1136/jme.2003.005801, at least at the time of the referenced essay. 
 
22 See for example the following: Daniel Dennett, “Conditions of Personhood,” What is a 
Person, edited by Michael F. Goodman (New Jersey: Humana Press, 1988) 145-167; Joseph 
Fletcher, Humanhood: Essays in Biomedical Ethics (New York: Prometheus Books, 1979) 
Chapter 1; H. Tristram Englehardt, Jr., The Foundations of Bioethics (New York University 
Press, 1986) 107-108; Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1983). 
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protection of victims.” 23  Don Marquis, writing in another though related 
bioethical context, identifies the nature of the harm inflicted in circumstances of 
wrongful killings when he writes: 
The loss of one’s life is one of the greatest losses one can suffer. The loss of 
one’s life deprives one of all the experiences, activities, projects, and 
enjoyments that would otherwise have constituted one’s future. Therefore, 
killing someone is wrong, primarily because the killing inflicts (one of) the 
greatest possible losses on the victim.24 
 
Interestingly, both Rachels and Marquis seem to develop a type of Harm 
Based account of the wrongness of killing, though, in application Marquis thinks 
that abortion would be morally wrong for the same reason that killing adult 
human beings is wrong. Yet Rachels would disagree. To be sure, there are a 
myriad of philosophical reasons underlying their disagreement on the 
application of the operative harm principle that have not been mentioned due 
to the general thrust of this section. Nevertheless, there does seem to be 
something missing from the Harm Based account of the wrongness of killing as 
articulated to this point. Otherwise, according to Jeff McMahan, “it implies that, 
if other things are equal, the killing of a fetus or infant is more seriously wrong 
than the killing of an older child or adult, because the death of the fetus or 
                                                
23 James Rachels, The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986) 6. 
 
24 Don Marquis, “Why Abortion is Immoral,” Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989): 189. 
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infant involves a greater harm—that is, the effect of the death on the value of 
the life as a whole is worse.”25   
The point here is not to enter into the even more controversial debate 
over abortion. Instead it is to home in on why it is thought that killing is wrong 
when it is wrong and what makes death bad when it is bad. The description 
given by Marquis above, which identifies the nature of the harm in killing 
humans, is thought to be deficient for those who would push back against MP2. 
It is thought to be deficient because the reason why the loss of life is so tragic is 
not simply due to the loss of life itself but it is that certain desires by the human 
person remain unfulfilled or frustrated. There needs to be a “conceptual link 
between harm and desire” to capture the essence of the wrongness of killing in 
developing a Harm-Based account.26 In other words, a person is harmed “if she 
is prevented from accomplishing her aims [or desires] by being killed.”27 So this 
can be described as a Desire Based Harm account of the wrongness of killing. 
This is thought to be more fitting for identifying the wrong-making properties of 
killing when it is wrong.   
                                                
25 Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 192. 
 
26 Ibid. 
 
27 Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva, “After birth abortion: why should the baby 
live?” JMed Ethics Published Online First: 23 February 2012. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2011-
100411 
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When these aforementioned distinctions are applied to the issue at hand, 
it follows, then, that there can be some instances such that not only innocent 
human beings, but also innocent human persons may be killed. In such cases it 
may not always be morally wrong to kill human beings or human persons since 
these individuals would not be harmed thereby. The reason could either be due 
to the fact that they lack the capacity to have desires or they desire another 
agent to assist them in their death for various rational considerations. 
Let’s first consider the moral permissibility of killing human beings on this 
Desires Based Harm account. If a distinction between human being and human 
person is upheld, then we are in a position to identify cases where a human 
being ceases to be a person. Hence, the entity would not be harmed if killed via 
PAD.  There would just need to be criteria in place to determine when 
personhood is deemed to be lost and if the implementation of PAD is consistent 
with previously stated values of the patient in question.28 As noted above, this is 
what Mary Anne Warren and others have attempted to do. With respect to 
situations like this, it is difficult to see how one can meaningfully speak of the 
entity actually being harmed in some way if the decision is made intentionally to 
cease the biological life of the patient. Or so it is argued.   
                                                
28 One could suggest that this latter point is irrelevant if one holds to the human 
being/human person distinction. See more on this below. 
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If it is only wrong to kill innocent persons, there could be instances of killing 
innocent human beings that are not morally problematic because the wrong-
making properties that make killing wrong when it is wrong are absent. 
Furthermore, those who reject MP2 can claim that now there also may be some 
instances where the killing of an innocent human person could be morally 
justified under specific conditions. The point is made clear if we recall to mind 
very common and widespread scenarios where a patient’s life has deteriorated 
to a point where it no longer has any value for that person, she has nothing else 
to accomplish, and she makes a rational request to give up her right to life by 
having it intentionally ended due to the patient’s perception that her life lacks 
an acceptable level of quality. This approach usually takes the form of “Quality 
of Life” (QOL) type arguments also coupled with notions of autonomy (to be 
discussed below). Again, one would be hard pressed in these situations to see 
how PAD would indeed harm a patient in some way or other. So it may not 
always be wrong to kill an innocent human person though, of course, there 
remains a strong prima facie prohibition against it. And so there is another 
reason to reject premise 1 of PKI(AA) according to the critics of the argument.  
The third category of criticism is that proponents of PAD could argue is 
that MP2 is too strong of a moral principle especially in light of the highly casuistic 
nature of medical ethics. There just seems to be some extreme circumstances 
where it would be morally permissible to kill innocents intentionally. Of course, 
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we could develop thought experiments of various sorts that would describe a 
scenario where the continued existence of the world population is hanging in 
the balance unless some innocent person is killed. Some would then ask, “Is it 
not morally permissible to kill an innocent in these situations?” If so, then the 
prohibition against killing innocents cannot be absolute.  
Thought experiments, certainly, have been part of the conceptual tools 
philosophers have employed to do their work to test intuitions and develop 
counter-examples to specific claims, and rightfully so. Though in this situation 
one would not need to appeal to thought experiments that employ highly 
improbable states of affairs, even if philosophically it would not be inappropriate 
to do so. One could think of significant natural meteorological occurrences 
(combined with human moral irresponsibility) that have disastrous effects on 
communities such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Many cases emerged where 
medical professionals felt forced to decide between non-voluntary euthanasia 
on the one hand and what some describe as patient abandonment on the 
other in those situations where patients were unable to be moved out of rooms 
in some clinical facilities where there were rising flood waters. There has been 
much debate surrounding what the right course of action should have been in 
these cases. Even if these are not common occurrences in the context of health 
care, they are, nevertheless, real scenarios. Perhaps, then, the argument should 
be framed around prima facie responsibilities.  
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The aim would be to modify MP2 away from an absolutist formulation 
given that it is not clear that it is always morally wrong to kill innocent human 
beings while maintaining there is a strong prima facie prohibition against it. 
Proponents of PAD would perhaps be more likely to accept something akin to: 
MP3:  It is morally wrong intentionally to kill innocent human beings  
without sufficient moral justification.  
 
MP3 is a modification of MP1 in that the qualification of the person’s innocence is 
included. Proponents of PAD would then appeal to some of the reasons given in 
favor of PAD and suggest that these do provide sufficient moral justification for 
the killing of innocents under certain proscribed circumstances, those in which 
the patients are benefitted and not harmed.  
And so proponents of PAD can develop an alternative argument to the 
absolutist version of the Prohibition of Killing Innocents (PKI) that would argue for 
the moral permissibility of PAD under certain conditions in a medical context. 
Let’s call this prima facie counter-argument, PKI(PFCA). It can be stated as follows: 
4. It is morally wrong intentionally to kill innocent human beings without 
sufficient moral justification. (MP3) 
 
5. The practices that fall under PAD are instances of intentionally killing 
innocent human beings in a health care context. 
 
6. Patient autonomy and the alleviation of pain and suffering are essential 
values in the professional practice of medicine. 
 
7. Honoring the values of patient autonomy and the alleviation of pain 
and suffering in some cases may require, professionally and morally, 
PAD.  
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8. If 6 and 7, then in some cases the values of patient autonomy and the 
alleviation of pain and suffering provide sufficient moral justification to 
override the prima facie prohibition of killing innocent human beings in a 
health care context. 
 
9. Therefore, in some cases the values of patient autonomy and the 
alleviation of pain and suffering provide sufficient moral justification to 
override the prima facie prohibition of killing innocent human beings in a 
health care context. 
 
10. If 9, then PAD is sometimes morally permissible in a health care context. 
 
11. Therefore, PAD is sometimes morally permissible in a health care context. 
 
 
What can be said in favor of the premises? Premise 4, which affirms MP3, is 
thought to be a more reasonable operative moral principle. Much of what was 
stated concerning MP2 coupled with the extreme scenarios identified above 
would lend support for premise 4 of PKI(PFCA) argument or the adoption of MP3. 
Even if the extreme scenarios described infrequently are actual and the 
philosophical challenges to MP2 have some initial responses to them, it would 
seem that one must consider that there may be some cases in which it is not so 
clear that it is always wrong to kill innocents, even in a medical context. 
Moreover, that it may sometimes be right. 
Premise 5 (as in the case with premise 2 in PKI(AA)) has been established 
with respect to the descriptive analysis of PAD provided in chapter 2.  Patient 
autonomy and the alleviation of pain and suffering as stated in premise 6 are 
essential values in the practice of medicine. The importance of these concepts 
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in medical care cannot and ought not be minimized or trivialized. Both of these 
values should be accepted by all who are involved in professional health care 
though there is some debate as to what counts as genuine expressions of 
autonomy and compassion in alleviating suffering. But the values themselves 
generally speaking are almost universally accepted in Western approaches to 
medicine. 
The next premise is stated as follows: 
7. Honoring the values of patient autonomy and the alleviation of pain 
and suffering in some cases may require, professionally and morally, 
PAD. 
 
The majority of the literature on this topic identifies variations of two primary 
arguments, which contend that there does exist sufficient moral justification in 
health care to allow for the intentional killing of human beings under carefully 
proscribed conditions of PAD. These are the arguments from patient autonomy 
and the argument from the alleviation of pain and suffering.  
With respect to the former, patients have the right of self-determination. If 
they so choose and are not under duress or any other form of coercion and if 
they think that death is better than their current debilitated medical condition, 
then they have every right to PAD even if they are not required to choose that 
option. A notable text in the area of medical ethics has defined the concept of 
autonomy relevant for the field as:  
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[E]ncompassing, at a minimum, self-rule that is free from both controlling 
interference by others and from certain limitations such as an inadequate 
understanding that prevents meaningful choice. The autonomous 
individual acts freely in accordance with a self-chosen plan, analogous to 
the way an independent government manages its territories and 
establishes it policies.”29  
 
If patients indeed are autonomous, then there are corresponding obligations on 
behalf of others to treat patients as autonomous persons and assist them in PAD, 
provided patients are so inclined. As Margaret Battin summarizes the argument 
when she writes: 
In the context of end-of-life medical care, respecting autonomy for the 
dying patient not only means honouring as far as possible that person’s 
choices concerning therapeutic and palliative care, including life-
prolonging care if it is desired, but could also mean refraining from 
intervening to prevent the person’s informed, voluntary, self-willed choice 
of suicide in preference to a slow, painful death, or even providing 
assistance in realizing that choice.30 
 
The alleviation of pain and suffering is the second major argument given 
for the moral permissibility of PAD. It is often known as the argument from 
compassion and mercy as well. There are instances of intractable pain that 
cannot be managed otherwise. No patient “should have to endure pointless 
terminal suffering. If the physician is unable to relieve the patient’s suffering in 
other ways acceptable to the patient and the only way to avoid such suffering 
                                                
29 Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Sixth 
Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 99. 
 
30 Margaret P. Battin, “Euthanasia and Physician Assisted Suicide,” Ending Life: Ethics 
and the Way we Die, edited by Margaret P. Battin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 
20-21. 
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is by death, then as a matter of mercy death may be brought about.”31 The 
remaining combination of premises and conclusions found in lines 8 through 
11of the PKI(PFCA) argument follow the basic rules of inference which collectively 
take the form of modus ponens. So maybe it is preferable to think about these 
issues in ways that are along the lines of PKI(PFCA) in order to rule out potential 
counter-examples that stretch our intuitions on the absolutist version of the PKI 
argument.  
 
Some Responses to Criticisms of PKI:  
In this section, I can only offer a sketch of what might comprise an 
adequate response to what is stated above. For those who want to maintain 
that PKI(AA) is sound, what could an opponent of PAD say by way of rejoinder to 
these criticisms? Primary focus here again is on premise1. 
To begin, defenders of premise 1 of PKI(AA) may respond to the first 
objection by denying the legitimacy of the human being and human person 
distinction since it has a number of counter-intuitive implications. The first 
counter-intuitive implication is that it goes too far as it ends up excluding a 
number of vulnerable groups of human beings whom we would otherwise, 
absent the distinction, consider a part of our moral community and hence have 
moral obligations to them.  
                                                
31 Ibid., 29. 
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Recall the traits that are most central to the concept of personhood 
provided by Mary Anne Warren, namely (i) consciousness, (ii) reasoning, (iii) self-
motivated activity, (iv) the capacity to communicate, and (v) self-awareness. 
While acknowledging “there are apt to be a great many problems involved in 
formulating precise definitions of these criteria, let alone in developing 
universally valid behavioral criteria for deciding when they apply,” she 
nevertheless thinks that these should be clear enough - so much so that any 
entity “which satisfies none of [(i)-(v)] is certainly not a person.”32 An individual 
must possess these characteristics in order to be deemed as having 
personhood. Yet, one may ask, what are we to do with human persons who are 
asleep, temporarily unconscious, or in a reversible coma? Human beings in 
these states do not satisfy the criteria of personhood that Warren et. al. identify. 
But it is counter-intuitive to think that human beings in such conditions are no 
longer part of our moral community.  
Now of course, the most obvious counter-response to this is to emphasize 
the temporary states of the examples given above. Yet it seems that according 
to the criteria, it is not enough for it to be the case that the human being will 
have these in the future or perhaps, and more importantly for this discussion, has 
had these traits in the past. Personhood rests in the exhibition of the traits 
described in the criteria above. If the counter-response takes the form of 
                                                
32 Warren, “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,” 56. 
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emphasizing the temporary nature of these conditions, then this would suggest 
that what gives human persons value is not the actual exercise or lack thereof of 
particular traits identified in these criteria at time t1 or t2, and so on.  
Consider a scenario where some human being, S, is temporarily 
unconscious at t1 and then regains consciousness at t2. Then, say, a defender of 
the human being/human person distinction emphasizing the temporary nature 
of this condition claims that S remains part of the moral community. But this 
would imply that during the interval between t1 and t2 none of Warren’s criteria 
are met. So then a critic of the distinction would suggest that perhaps it is that 
which grounds the expression of the capacities that is fundamentally important. 
And this ground is intrinsic to the nature of the kind of complex entities human 
beings are.  
Further, how does the being/person distinction fare for those who have 
impairments that limit the expressions of the capacities in question? Some 
examples here would involve infants, the mentally handicapped, and human 
beings suffering from dementia. Arguably, those human beings in these 
categories fall below the base threshold given in the criteria. Health care has 
been on the forefront of reaching out to vulnerable populations such as these to 
provide care and assistance for the very fact that it is thought these individuals 
are part of the moral community. Hence, we have special obligations to care 
for those human beings who are not in the best position to care for themselves. 
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Perhaps an additional way of “framing the view is that the members of the 
moral community include not only duty-bearers (moral agents who have the 
capacity to perform their duties) but also right-holders (who may not be duty-
bearers because they lack the relevant moral capacities but have claims or 
rights against others).”33 
The second counter-intuitive implication of the distinction is that it allows 
us to judge certain actions towards human beings as being morally permissible 
that we otherwise think and actually take to be ethically inappropriate. 
Consider the following scenario. A cognitively fully functioning man goes into 
the hospital for a 12-hour surgery. The doctors render the patient completely 
unconscious using strong narcotics in preparation for the procedure. During the 
time of the surgery the estranged ex-wife of the patient finds his debit card 
along with his pin number and then proceeds to wipe out his bank account. The 
patient recovers fully from the surgery only later to discover that he has no 
money. On the criteria set forth concerning personhood, would an advocate of 
the distinction be in a position to say that the estranged ex-wife’s actions 
violated the patient’s rights at the time of the taking of the money? Critics of the 
                                                
33 I am indebted to Dr. Katherine Kim for this point in personal correspondence. 
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distinction do not think so. But they would then add that this does not seem to 
be right-headed, which in turn may indicate a problem with the distinction.34  
 Maybe the case above has assumed an uncharitable understanding of 
consciousness in Warren’s criteria. What should be emphasized is that only 
conscious or temporarily unconscious beings are in the moral community. If so, 
perhaps the case could be modified further to consider two scenarios. The first is 
one in which the man in the 12 hour surgery regains consciousness only to learn 
his account has been wiped out by his estranged ex-wife. The second scenario 
is one in which he never regains consciousness and is officially pronounced 
dead 18 hours after the surgery. So a critic of the view may suggest that a 
defender of the human person/human being distinction is to conclude that the 
estranged ex-wife’s action was wrong while the man was in surgery in the first 
scenario when he was completely and deeply unconscious. Since the state was 
temporary, he is still part of the moral community. However, in the second 
scenario, one would be forced to conclude that there was no moral wrong 
committed during the time of the surgery because of what turned out to be the 
                                                
34 Now, to be sure, this kind of response to the human being/human person distinction is 
based on certain interpretations of it. There no doubt are moves that can be made to counter these 
concerns. Nevertheless, the point here is not to provide a complete refutation of the distinction 
given the complexity of the topic. Instead is to highlight that not all agree that these kinds of 
moves can be made with the kind efficiency that it sometimes suggested. The goal is to simply 
point in the direction that a more robust response to the being/person distinction must take. The 
arguments developed in this chapter are to provide an exposition of select reasons as to why 
some have thought PAD is morally problematic, which when all is said and done could be 
misguided. 
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permanent nature of his unconscious state. So it would seem that we must 
suspend moral judgment as to the actions of the estranged wife until we know 
whether the man would regain consciousness or not.  
A further question would be: At what point, then, would the man no 
longer be part of the moral community? While not a refutation of the distinction, 
the claim that moral evaluation of the estranged ex-wife’s action can only be 
made retrospectively may strike some as odd. Intuitions, no doubt, will run in 
opposite directions on these kinds of scenarios and further modifications to the 
distinction might be made (say, that membership in the moral community can 
be possessed by those who are only temporarily unconscious and by those who 
in the past have been conscious).  These sorts of additions and modifications 
have been proposed in discussions of the abortion problem, but to pursue them 
would take us too far afield here. 
Another case in point would be a severely senile person or someone with 
advanced dementia who is living in a skilled nursing facility. These individuals’ 
property and bodily integrity are protected by codes of professional conduct 
and the law such that actions such as theft of their property or sexual abuse 
against them would be penalized in some form or other. The perpetrators of 
these acts would be judged to have done something not only illegal, but also 
on most accounts, something morally impermissible. Again, on the criteria set 
forth concerning personhood, would an advocate of the distinction be in a 
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position to say those perpetrators against the severely senile or human beings 
with advanced dementia act wrongly?  It seems not, unless the distinction were 
expanded to include those who have once been conscious, along with those 
actually conscious and only temporarily unconscious, in the moral community. 
Lastly, most proponents of PAD insist that it only be performed with patient 
consent such that any proposals in favor of these practices should not slide into 
non-voluntary euthanasia. At times many have expressed moral outrage either 
when non-voluntary euthanasia is performed or if it is suggested that support of 
PAD naturally leads to it. Fair enough—though if one wants to maintain the 
human being/human person distinction along with this stance against non-
voluntary euthanasia, then there is a conceptual tension present. Critics of the 
human being/human person distinction point out that, “if biographical life is the 
determinant of personhood such that when it is lost, we are not killing a person, 
then there is no reason to be outraged when euthanasia is performed without 
someone’s consent or even without their knowledge.” 35  Of course, this is 
completely consistent for those who think that non-voluntary euthanasia is 
morally permissible. However, for those who do not, it would seem that this 
judgment would be inconsistent with the human being/human person 
distinction. 
                                                
35 J. P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae, Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in 
Ethics (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2000) 326. 
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Given the serious ethical implications involved in these discussions many 
critics argue that the distinction is imprudent. This is the thrust of Robert 
Spaemann’s book length critique of the notion. He writes: 
What properties must someone possess to have the right to recognition as 
a person? But that is the wrong way to pose the question, because it uses 
the word ‘someone’. Anything that is ‘someone’ is a person. We would do 
better to ask, When is some-thing some-one? But that is still wrong. Some-
thing is never some-one. To be ‘some-one’ is not a property of a thing, 
whether animate or inanimate; it is not a predicate of some previously 
identified subject. Whatever we identify, is identified either as someone or 
as something from the word go.36 
 
To be sure, Spaemann overstates his case since we can identify some x in the 
class of humans as “some being,” which does not presuppose that it is some-
one nor some-thing. Nevertheless, rightly or wrongly, for Spaemann and other 
critics, it is more appropriate to think of all living human beings as human 
persons. “Human beings have certain definite properties that license us to call 
them ‘persons’; but it is not the properties we call persons, but the human beings 
who possess the properties.”37  
To be sure, there has been much debate on this point. The literature on 
the subject is immense. And there remain a number of other criticisms that can 
be leveled against the distinction and just as many counter-responses or 
                                                
36 Robert Spaemann, Persons: The Difference between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something’, 
translated by Oliver O’Donovan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 237.  
 
37 Ibid., 236.  
 
  
105 
modifications to the views can be made to circumvent these particular charges. 
Moreover, a host of metaphysical issues concerning philosophical anthropology 
are not raised here. Nevertheless, enough has been hinted at to underscore that 
regardless of however meaningful the human being/human person distinction 
appears to be, on some accounts it is not wholly unproblematic.  
 The second criticism of PKI(AA) is that it advocates for the wrong wrong-
making properties concerning the ethics of killing humans. What could 
defenders of MP2 say in response to this charge? Perhaps they would proceed 
by noting that any account of right and wrong action or the nature of the good 
is embedded in some overarching moral philosophy. It could be the case that a 
rejection of Desire-Based Harm accounts of killing humans (DBHA) would be on 
the grounds that the moral philosophy from which it is derived is flawed or simply 
just different. In such instances, we have conflicting and some cases 
incompatible moral philosophies at work in the same field of ethical discourse. 
Certainly, it is not always the case that different moral theories generate 
conflicting conclusions. In many instances they may converge in the realm of 
applied ethics albeit for different reasons perhaps.  
 It is important to emphasize that many actions in various contexts are 
morally complex. In other words, they often have more than one right and 
wrong-making property. Perhaps the insight from W. D. Ross’s moral philosophy 
and the development of his notion of prima facie duties shed some light on the 
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claim being offered. He notes, “any act is the origination of a great variety of 
things many of which make no difference to its rightness or wrongness. But there 
are always many elements in its nature … that make a difference to its rightness 
or wrongness, and no element in its nature can be dismissed without 
consideration as indifferent.”38  
So one could concede that the DBHA of the wrongfulness of killing 
humans, per se, may not be completely wrongheaded when considering the 
“nature” of killing humans. If so, then it is possible that DBHA could be a 
legitimate expression of the wrongfulness of killing when it is wrong in some 
circumstances. However, this is not to say that if the killing in question does not 
violate DBHA, then it is therefore morally permissible. It could be, but may not 
necessarily be so. The reason is, it may be claimed, that the killing in question 
while not exhibiting one wrong-making property, could exhibit another. If so, 
then it would seem that for some particular action that instantiates any wrong-
making property with respect to the ethics of killing humans would constitute a 
sufficient condition for it to be judged as morally wrong. It may not be as wrong 
as it would be if, say, multiple wrong-making properties supervened on the 
action, but wrong nonetheless, though feasibly to a lesser degree. As Jeff 
MacMahan writes: 
                                                
38 W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good, edited by Philip Stratton-Lake (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) 33, n. 2. (originally published in 1930) 
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An act may have various morally objectionable or, as some have said, 
“wrong-making” features. These features may, in certain contexts, be 
outweighed by other considerations, so that the act, though morally 
objectionable in some respects, may be permissible, or not wrong (in the 
sense that it ought not to be done), all things considered. But if the 
reasons why it is morally objectionable are not outweighed (or nullified or 
otherwise overcome), it will be wrong, in the sense that it ought not to be 
done. Still, the degree to which it is morally objectionable is variable. If the 
moral objections to it, or the reasons why it ought not be done, are very 
strong and are not substantially opposed by countervailing 
considerations, we say that the act would be seriously wrong. If, by 
contrast, the objections to it are weak, or are almost counterbalanced by 
countervailing moral considerations, it may be only slightly wrong.39 
 
It could be argued by opponents of PAD that what we have with regard 
to the killing of innocent human persons are actions that, depending on 
circumstances, may have more than one right or wrong-making properties. This 
is a similar situation to the role that Ross’s prima facie duties play. So perhaps it is 
not the case after all that opponents of PAD have highlighted the wrong wrong-
making properties. Opponents of PAD could argue that DBHA has just possibly 
identified another wrong-making property in addition to those already 
recognized by those who are proponents of the inviolability of life view as 
discussed above.  
Now these same opponents of PAD, say, may reject the underlying moral 
theory of which DBHA is a part, if it required “right action” to be reduced only to 
that which allows for the greatest expression of human desires or something akin 
                                                
39 Jeff MacMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 190. 
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to this. It does seem that if they make this sort of move, one that acknowledges 
that there might be multiple right and/or wrong-making properties, then 
perhaps they would need to move from an absolute prohibition of killing 
innocents to understanding it in a ‘Rossian’ prima facie manner.40 
MacMahan’s comments above lead nicely to the third and final area of 
criticism of PKI(AA) noted in this section, which is that MP2 is too strong of a 
principle. What about the claim to adopt something along the lines MP3 which 
states, “It is morally wrong intentionally to kill innocent human beings without 
sufficient moral justification” and the subsequent PKI(PFCA) argument? And then, 
moreover, are there “countervailing moral considerations that counterbalance” 
MP3?  
Obviously, one response could be to hold to a principle of tenacity and 
maintain an absolute prohibition against killing innocents in any and every 
conceivable situation. But to many moral philosophers, including those who may 
be opposed to PAD, this would seem a bit difficult to embrace given certain, 
admittedly extreme, thought experiments. This is the case even if they hold to 
some form of the “inviolability of life” or “sanctity of life” principle. For those in 
this latter category the sanctity of life principle and MP3 are not incompatible.41 
                                                
40 See particularly chapters 1 and 2 of Ross’s The Right and the Good. 
 
41 As discussed in the next section, some opponents of PAD could maintain that the 
prohibition against killing innocents may not be an absolute moral principle in the sense of 
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And so some opponents could concede the point to those who suggest that 
MP2 is too strong.  
It would seem that some opponents of PAD might be willing, at least for 
the sake of argument, to embrace MP3 as endorsed in premise 4 of PKI(PFCA). If 
MP3 would be accepted by many of the disputants in the conversation, both 
pro and con, then we would be in a position to evaluate the claims of PKI(PFCA). 
The moral permissibility or impermissibility of PAD would turn on whether or not 
there is sufficient moral justification that would override the killing of innocents in 
a medical context under certain conditions. PKI(PFCA) is crafted as a modus 
ponens styled argument. Given this, we have the classic case of one person’s 
modus ponens is another’s modus tollens. So opponents of PAD conceivably 
can embrace MP3 and reject a crucial premise in PKI(PFCA). It does not take 
much to see that premise 7, which appeals to patient autonomy and alleviating 
pain and suffering, is the crucial premise of PKI(PFCA) rejected by opponents of 
PAD.  
How might a response look for proponents of MP3 to this objection? 
Certainly, they would need to affirm that autonomy is of utmost importance in 
medical ethics. When properly understood it is a principle that is wholeheartedly 
                                                                                                                                                       
universally applied, but could be seen as an absolute moral rule within the context of health care. 
To avoid being a completely question-begging justification the reasons why it is considered an 
absolute moral rule in the context would need to be different from the reasons developed here in 
this section. 
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endorsed in professional health care. Though, autonomy should not be thought 
to be an absolute value. To be fair, this is acknowledged by many who are 
proponents of some forms of PAD. For example, Beauchamp and Childress 
carefully acknowledge, “we do not hold, as some critics suggest, that the 
principle of respect for autonomy overrides all other moral considerations.”42 We 
already have limits on our autonomy because we are necessarily social beings. 
This is true for the medical context as well. Beauchamp and Childress also make 
this point clear, “Furthermore, we attempt to show that, in a properly structured 
theory, respect for autonomy is not excessively individualistic (thereby 
neglecting the social nature of individuals and the impact of individual choices 
and actions on others)….”43  
And so it is widely accepted that patients cannot demand a health care 
facility provide any treatment whatsoever simply because it is requested.  If (1) a 
health care team says “no” to some request for a treatment that the facility is 
able to provide and (2) the treatment is morally permissible to perform in 
principle, then there should be good reason given to the patient as to why it is 
being withheld. It could be for reasons that the treatment is not medically 
indicated, or futile (providing no benefit on balance) for the particular patient 
                                                
42 Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Sixth 
Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 99. 
 
43 Ibid. 
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making a request, say. Furthermore, autonomy does not require physicians to 
perform acts they deem to be morally impermissible for health care 
professionals to engage in, even if they have the professional expertise and skills 
to accomplish it.  
Moreover, many question whether or not it is even possible for patients to 
be truly autonomous in the relevant sense given the medical circumstances 
surrounding their requests. For if the moral claim “to autonomy is to be 
actualized in clinical decisions, the patient must, in fact, be able to exercise her 
autonomy.” 44  Many opponents of PAD think that the “complex and highly 
uncertain phenomenology of fatal illness, dying, and suffering make the exercise 
of genuine autonomy highly problematic.” 45  Consider the description by 
Edmund P. Pellegrino: 
The person desperate enough to seek exit by suicide or euthanasia is 
beset with anxiety, despair, guilt, depression, and a sense of unworthiness. 
These, as much as pain, are at the root of the desperate pleas for 
surcease through death. Often these feelings are exacerbated by the 
way family, friends, physicians, nurses, and others behave and respond to 
the patient’s predicament. Any signs or semblances of insensitivity, 
indifference, revulsion, loathing, distancing, pity, or impatience to be 
about one’s business are quickly transmitted to those in the grasp of a 
fatal illness. They can see either reassurance or confirmation of their worst 
fears in the way others approach them. Their feelings of alienation from 
the world of the well and their sense of a loss of dignity are easily 
                                                
44 Edmund P. Pellegrino, “The False Promise of Beneficent Killing,” Regulating How We 
Die: The Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues Surrounding Physician-Assisted Suicide, edited by 
Linda L. Emmanuel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 80. 
 
45 Ibid., 81. 
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reinforced. Unknowingly, physicians and family may add to a patient’s 
depression or influence his choice of suicide.46   
 
The observations that Pellegrino makes may be contested in a place or 
two and may not always obtain. For instance, not all people seeking suicide feel 
guilty or unworthy, and it might be rational for them to feel anxious and 
depressed. Furthermore, proponents of PAD may declare that at most 
Pellegrino’s comments would only go to support stringent safeguards, not 
universal moral impermissibility.47 His statements, nevertheless, do highlight the 
psychological, professional, and social complexity that raises moral concern in 
sorting through what an autonomous request really looks like in the situations in 
which a request is made. The effect of more stringent safeguards to stem 
potential abuse would result in people who otherwise would seem to be good 
candidates for PAD being excluded from taking advantage of the option. This is 
already the case in those states that have legalized PAS. The current safeguards 
in order to rule out unwanted consequences end up excluding certain kinds of 
patients that seem to be likely candidates for PAD. 
Along slightly different lines, opponents of PAD wonder, if the argument in 
favor of it is really about autonomy at all. To make this point more salient, 
consider the fact that most proposals for implementing PAD by its proponents 
                                                
46 Ibid. 
 
47 I am thankful to Dr. Bruce Russell for raising this sort of observation. 
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are not advocating for ‘PAD on Demand’ that is, “simply at the patient’s request 
and without the considered assessment, judgment and approval of a 
responsible doctor.”48 Responsibility in the medical profession would require its 
practitioners to be discerning. An autonomous request for particular drugs on 
behalf of the patient does not obligate a physician to prescribe them if they are 
not medically warranted or deemed medically inappropriate. So opponents of 
PAD argue that the “the real…justification for [PAD] is not the patient’s 
autonomous request but the doctor’s judgment that the request is justified 
because death would benefit the patient.”49  
If this is correct, then some further worry that this issue becomes 
exponentially more complex in a health care setting. Consider the descriptive 
claims by physician and medical ethicist Edmund Pellegrino about the position 
that health care professionals find themselves in: 
Physicians, like all other human beings, cannot entirely escape their own 
prejudices and biases about what constitute quality of life, a good death, 
and whether suffering has meaning. In the end, physicians will be the key 
interpreters of any criteria established by law or society when applied to a 
particular patient. Their interpretations will vary tremendously and may 
well reflect their preferences rather than the patient’s. This is not to ascribe 
to physicians a collective defect of character, but only to recognize the 
power of a physician’s own values, beliefs, and fears when deciding 
about the lives of others.50  
                                                
48 Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy, 77. 
 
49 Ibid. 
 
50 Pellegrino, “The False Promise of Beneficent Killing,” 80. 
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Certainly, proponents of PAD would push back against Pellegrino on this 
score and suggest that the universal criteria are established to help minimize 
instances of poor judgments on behalf of the medical profession. The reality is, 
proponents of PAD maintain, that medicine is an art and a science. There is 
inevitability and unavoidability of making clinical judgments that do include the 
background, context, training, biases, etc. of the physician making the 
judgment. And at any given time for the same patient, physicians may disagree 
on their judgments. Opponents of PAD point out that this is no doubt true. But 
given the well-documented ethnic and economic health care disparities that 
currently plague the U.S. health care system, do we really want to make the 
kinds of judgments where, for the most part, there are no “do-overs”?51 
So while on the one hand the argument from autonomy seems to be a 
powerful one that provides counter-balancing evidence to the strong 
prohibition against killing innocents as applied in a health care context, 
opponents argue to the contrary. It may be a necessary condition for a 
legitimate instance of PAD only if PAD can be first shown to be morally 
permissible. But in itself, patient autonomy is not a sufficient condition to 
                                                
51 For details and documentation for the widespread problem of health care disparity in 
the U.S. health care system see for examples Donald A. Barr, Health Disparities in the United 
States: Social Class, Race, Ethnicity, and Health (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2008) and Harriet A. Washington, Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical 
Experimentation on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Harlem 
Moon, Broadway Books, 2006). 
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substantiate the moral permissibility of PAD in a health care context. If so, then 
the argument in favor of PAD cannot be made purely on the basis of patient 
autonomy. It would need to be coupled with justification that there are medical 
or health care needs that cannot be met unless PAD is implemented. This is what 
seems to be behind the claim of the second argument in favor of the moral 
permissibility of PAD. 
The second primary reason often given for allowing PAD is that it is an act 
of compassion in the face of pain and suffering. The problem here for 
opponents of PAD is in addressing the powerful emotion of compassion “that 
can take on a life of its own and, in distorted forms, can produce harm.”52 It is 
difficult for most human beings, but especially for medical professionals, to be 
around suffering patients and not be moved by compassion to want to act. 
Certainly, the experience of the powerful emotion of compassion does, in most 
cases, come with a strong desire or motivation to do something. This emotion is 
important, most definitely, for human flourishing and human relationships. 
Without it, many of the vulnerable in our moral community could suffer the most 
inhumane treatment. “The emotion of compassion has engendered some of the 
most admirable and heroic acts of which humans are capable. But the fact that 
we experience the emotion of compassion does not per se give moral 
                                                
52 Pellegrino, “The False Promise of Beneficent Killing,” 83. 
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legitimacy to any action that compassion might motivate.”53 In other words, 
how is it that being motivated to act by a particular emotion, legitimizes the acts 
themselves that fall under PAD? It would seem that in order to keep the 
argument from compassion from becoming merely question-begging there 
would need to be independent reasons given in favor of PAD. 
So perhaps the real issue is need. PAD should be morally permissible as a 
last resort since it may be the only way to alleviate pain and suffering of 
patients. So the argument is not based on compassion, an emotion, per se, but 
on the moral responsibility that medical professionals have to alleviate pain and 
suffering. However, through advances in effective pain management medical 
professionals can manage patients’ pain extremely well. So pain doesn’t 
appear to be the primary issue here. Suffering often stems from the meaning 
that one gives to their circumstances and at times can be more difficult to 
address. The response here is usually an appeal to the fact that there are 
options in dealing with suffering that do not cross the line of killing innocents in a 
health care context such that there is no need for PAD. Some of these options 
are the rise of hospice, more highly developed and improved palliative care 
services, and most notably for this project, palliative sedation.  
                                                
53 Edmund Pellegrino, “Compassion is Not Enough,” The Case Against Assisted Suicide: 
For the Right to End-of-Life Care, edited by Kathleen Foley and Herbert Hendin, (Baltimore, 
MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2002), 45. 
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Defenders of premise 7 may suggest that the response being developed is 
based on an incorrect conception. They will argue, as alluded to above, that 
the responses up to this point have assumed that these are independent 
reasons offered for the morality of PAD. Autonomy and the merciful alleviation 
of pain and suffering should not be thought of as being individually sufficient 
conditions for PAD. Instead, it should be “most naturally and plausibly 
understood as providing necessary conditions that, in suitable circumstances, 
may be together sufficient for making it permissible.” 54  So the individual 
problems with autonomy and with the alleviation of pain and suffering are 
overcome by both of these being necessary conditions for the morality of PAD. 
Gerald Dworkin admits, “if either of these views is considered by themselves they 
do have unwanted implications. But the most plausible view that it is both 
choice and condition [of the patient] that make a doctor’s killing permissible.”55  
Opponents of PAD push back against Dworkin’s move here by asking an 
important question. Why is this so? How is it that these two reasons are jointly 
sufficient to render PAD morally justifiable? As stated, Dworkin thinks that these 
joint conditions “may be together sufficient for making it permissible” in suitable 
circumstances. But there is no discussion of exactly how.  
                                                
54 Gerald Dworkin, “The Nature of Medicine,” Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted 
Suicide: For and Against, edited by Gerald Dworkin, R. G. Frey, and Sissela Bok (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 10. 
 
55 Ibid. 
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Perhaps a defender of Dworkin’s move may say something along the lines 
that “these principles are intuitively plausible, explain what lies behind lots of our 
intuitions about what is permissible and what not, and there aren’t any good 
counterexamples to them.” A potential counter-response to this entirely credible 
claim is that the intuitions of opponents of PAD may go in the other direction. For 
those who think, rightly or wrongly, that they have good reasons against PAD, 
the declared intuitive force of Dworkin’s claim that “both choice and condition 
[of the patient is what] make a doctor’s killing permissible” will not be felt as 
strongly as it does for those who may be more inclined to PAD. To be sure, our 
intuitions do a lot of philosophical work for us but cannot do all of it. There would 
still need to be some account of how this conjunction bears the property of 
moral permissibility given conflicting intuitions.   
Certainly, the claim cannot be from opponents of PAD that because the 
two reasons may be individually flawed, therefore, jointly they must be flawed as 
well. This would be a standard example of the informal fallacy of reasoning from 
the parts to the whole, though claiming that these are jointly sufficient 
conditions does not seem to make the case as to why PAD is morally permissible. 
There would need to be independent reasons given as to why this combination 
of properties overrides the prima facie prohibition of killing innocents. It appears 
that the move to see these as jointly sufficient conditions give us a test as to 
when an instance of PAD would be considered morally justified only if it can be 
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shown first that there are some instances where it would be morally permissible. 
But a proponent of PAD cannot simply make this appeal to justify the act itself 
without begging the question. Or so it would seem to some critics of premise 7.  
It is thought by opponents of PAD that advocates of the position have not 
met the burden of proof needed to justify this crucial premise.56 Debate on this 
issue, of course, continues, though many opponents of PAD think that the 
current arguments given in favor of these practices, regardless of however 
moving, do not constitute sufficient moral justification that would warrant the 
killing of innocents even in carefully proscribed medical circumstances contra 
premise 7 of PKI (PFCA).  
 
Argument from the Integrity of the Medical Profession (IMP) 
We now turn to the second argument highlighted in support of premise 4 
of the “Inconsistency Argument” concerning the moral impermissibility of PAD. 
The primary claim is simply that PAD violates the integrity of the medical 
profession. So opponents of PAD may claim that even if there remain no fully 
adequate philosophical responses to the principled argument developed in 
PKI(AA), they would nevertheless be compelled to reject the practices on the 
basis of the integrity of the medical profession.  
                                                
56 Bonnie Steinbock, “The Case for Physician Assisted Suicide: Not (Yet) Proven,” J 
Med Ethics 2005; 31:235-241. doi: 10.1136/jme.2003.005801  
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The professional moral principle (PMP) in operation here would be along 
the lines of: 
PMP:  It is always wrong in a health care context for a health care  
provider to intentionally cause, or bring about, the death of another  
person.  
 
Here it would be maintained that PMP at once provides both the operative 
moral principle to guide appropriate medical decisions at the EOL as well as to 
identify one of the key wrong-making properties of PAD from the perspective of 
the medical profession. An argument can be constructed in the following way. 
We’ll call it the Argument from the Integrity of the Medical Profession (IMP): 
12. It is always wrong in a health care context for a health care provider to 
intentionally cause, or bring about, the death of another person.  
 
13. The practices that fall under PAD are instances of intentionally causing, 
or bringing about, the death of another person.  
 
14. Therefore, PAD is morally wrong in a health care context. 
 
With respect to premise 12, it is not in the purview of medicine, as a 
profession, to engage in killing innocents. Or so it is argued.  Even if there is no 
perceived harm with respect to the patient, there is harm with respect to the 
profession. There are actions in certain professional occupations that are morally 
and professionally impermissible to engage in even if there may be no 
perceived harm involved on an individual basis.  
For example, consider a scenario in which there is a professional counselor 
who develops romantic feelings for a client. Let’s assume that the client was not 
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in bad shape to begin. It actually turns out the client didn't really need the 
counseling after all, but decided to go because a friend suggested that he do 
so after a close familial death. And furthermore, the friend paid for a set number 
of sessions in advance. During the process of the counseling an intimate 
relationship develops between the client and the counselor. Both are 
consenting adults. There was no manipulation on the part of the counselor. As 
stated, the client really didn’t need the counseling but continued the remaining 
sessions because his friend had already paid for it and because he had 
developed romantic feelings for the counselor. The client and counselor go on 
to have a very fruitful committed relationship for several years after the initial 
sessions were completed.  
Yet this would be deemed entirely inappropriate, morally and 
professionally, on most accounts of professional ethics. There are certain rules 
that govern particular kinds of jobs to guard the integrity of that profession. So 
too is the case with medicine, opponents of PAD claim. Medicine has “its own 
immanent principles and standards of conduct that set limits on what physicians 
may properly do.”57  
Implementing the practice of PAD would be a decisive shift in the 
philosophy of medicine as currently practiced within the confines of the 
                                                
57 Leon R. Kass, “ ‘I Will Give No Deadly Drug’: Why Doctors Must Not Kill,” The 
Case Against Assisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care, edited by Kathleen Foley and 
Herbert Hendin (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 19. 
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Hippocratic tradition, broadly understood.  Physicians would be called upon to 
participate in the dying process of patients in ways that have been customarily 
considered as being at odds with what falls under the scope of proper medical 
care. To be sure, medicine has been “successful” in preserving physical or 
biological life even in the face of debilitating disease and illness. The problem is 
that this ability has too often generated “conditions of great pain and suffering, 
irreversible incompetence, and terminal loss of control.”58 Medical professionals 
suggest that there are other ways to deal with the problems created by the 
“successes” of medical technology that simply prolong the dying process.  One 
way is by providing better education concerning the purposes of technological 
developments in medicine as bridge treatments and not necessarily life 
sustaining ones. Another way is by implementing quality palliative care earlier in 
the process of treating those illnesses where death seems inevitable in the short-
term. Regardless of technological changes that have taken place in 
contemporary medicine that seem to create a need for PAD or changes in 
public opinion towards tolerating these practices, these do not, according to 
opponents of PAD, constitute a need nor provide justification for a blurring of 
the lines between medical care and medical killing (even if the latter is said to 
be for beneficent reasons).  
                                                
58 Ibid., 17. 
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As some health care professionals have claimed “Neither legal tolerance 
nor the best bedside manner can ever make medical killing medically ethical."59  
For these health care professionals “the first and most hallowed canons of the 
medical ethic [is that] doctors must not kill.”60 “The heart of the argument rests 
on understanding the special moral character of the medical profession and 
the ethical obligations it entails.”61 This issue for some medical professionals runs 
deep. It is that killing, even for beneficent reasons, is fundamentally at odds with 
the practice of medicine.  
Premise 13 claims that PAD just does represent instances in a health care 
context that violate PMP. Again, if one accepts the account of PAD provided in 
chapter 2 of this work, then it would seem that this claim would be descriptively 
true. One also recalls, there was some care taken there to make an attempt to 
describe PAD in a way that does not necessarily embed the wrongness of killing 
in a medical context in the very concept itself. Leon Kass, a bit more 
                                                
59 Willard Gaylin, Leon R. Kass, Edmund Pellegrino, and Mark Siegler, “Doctors Must 
not Kill,” Journal of the American Medical Association 259, no. 14 (April 8, 1988): 2139. 
 
60 Ibid. Now of course, it is not the case the medical profession to a person would 
wholeheartedly agree with the Gaylin, et. al. here. For they were responding to an essay titled, 
“It’s Over, Debbie” in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) written by an 
anonymous resident earlier that year where he describes his role in mercy killing of a particular 
patient named Debbie. Given that the resident felt compelled to act in this situation, write about 
it, and that it was published in JAMA would suggest that there are differences of opinions on the 
matter. Nevertheless, the medical professional qua profession at the time of this writing remains 
fairly resistant to the idea despite a growing affinity for PAD in the general public.  
 
61 Kass, “‘I Will Give No Deadly Drug’: Why Doctors Must Not Kill,” 17. 
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aggressively, summarizes the specific thrust of the claim in premise 13 when he 
writes: 
[i]n assisted suicide and all other forms of direct killing, the physician must 
necessarily and indubitably intend primarily that the patient be made 
dead. And he must knowingly and indubitably cast himself in the role of 
the agent of death. This remains true even if the physician is merely an 
assistant in suicide. Morally, a physician who provides the pills or lets the 
patient plunge the syringe after he leaves the room is no different from 
one who does the deed himself. ‘I will neither give a deadly drug to 
anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect.’62 
 
By way of conclusion (premise 14), it is maintained that it is morally and 
professionally inappropriate for doctors or any other health care professional to 
use their professional skills in the intentional taking of human life. Some have 
offered a clarion call “for the medical profession to rally in defense of its 
fundamental moral principles, to repudiate any and all acts of direct and 
intentional killing by physicians and their agents.” They go on to state rather 
forcefully, “we must say to the broader community that if it insists on tolerating or 
legalizing active euthanasia, it will have to find nonphysicians to do its killing.”63 
                                                
62 Ibid., 37. 
 
63 Willard Gaylin, Leon R. Kass, Edmund Pellegrino, and Mark Siegler, “Doctors Must 
not Kill,” Journal of the American Medical Association 259, no.14 (April 8, 1988): 2140. Many 
have taken up this gauntlet laid down by these physicians. For example, in a recent article the 
authors suggested that the lethal prescription would not need to come from a physician. They 
“envision the development of a central state or federal mechanism to confirm the authenticity 
and eligibility of patients’ requests, dispense medication, and monitor demand and use.” They go 
on to say, “Such a mechanism would not only obviate physician involvement beyond usual care 
but would also reduce gaps in care coordination.” (Julian J. Z. Prokopetz and Lisa Soleymani 
Lehmann, “Redefining Physicians’ Role in Assisted Dying,” The New England Journal of 
Medicine, 367:2, 97.) Interestingly, Gerald Dworkin, a proponent of PAD, rejects such proposals 
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Objections & Responses to the PMI Argument 
This section is significantly shorter than its counterpart under PKI(AA). Here 
the primary objective is to set the stage for the subsequent chapter that moves 
us into the heart of this project. While there are a number of potential criticisms 
that can be leveled against the Integrity of the Medical Profession argument, 
the primary one raised here is that the intentional killing of patients is already 
being done in other medical practices that are currently deemed morally 
permissible.  
Actions that are considered morally permissible, such as the voluntary 
cessation of eating and drinking, aggressive pain management at the end of 
life, the forgoing of life-sustaining treatment, and terminal/palliative sedation are 
not significantly different in a morally relevant way from the kinds of actions said 
to fall under PAD. All of these options, along with PAS and VAE, are options for 
patients who decide against continuing curative therapy because they have 
chosen to no longer prolong the dying process. Yet these latter two options, at 
the time of this writing, are considered widely to be outside the pale of 
                                                                                                                                                       
in general since he thinks “it is preferable that the same person who has been the ally of the 
patient in the patient’s fight against illness remain an ally to the end.” And furthermore he thinks, 
“it is important that the physician experience the full consequences of his convictions. If it is 
emotionally difficult to aid a patient to die, the physician should not be able to evade that 
difficulty.” (Gerald Dworkin, “The Nature of Medicine,” Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted 
Suicide: For and Against, edited by Gerald Dworkin, R. G. Frey, and Sissela Bok (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 16.) 
 
  
126 
professional medical practice. This inconsistency to many thinkers is 
unacceptable. Dan Brock is one such example. He writes: 
Voluntary stopping eating and drinking, terminal sedation, and physician-
assisted suicide are all potential interventions of last resort for competent, 
terminally ill patients who are suffering intolerably, in spite of intensive 
efforts to palliate, and desire a hastened death. Many opponents of 
physician-assisted suicide defend the current legal status of these options, 
arguing that, along with forgoing life-sustaining treatment, voluntary 
stopping eating and drinking and terminal sedation constitute adequate 
and appropriate options for hastening death, obviating the need for 
legalization of physician-assisted suicide. However, in my view, the 
differences between these practices and physician-assisted suicide do 
not justify the continued prohibition of assisted suicide.64 
 
Many such proponents of PAD follow Brock in this sentiment.  
Contra Brock, there is thought to be an asymmetry between the morally 
permissible practices and those that fall under PAD. It is often purported that the 
ethical asymmetry is justified on the basis of the “moral significance of 
distinctions such as killing versus letting die, intention versus foresight (and the 
associated principle of double effect), act versus omission.”65 However, most 
proponents of PAD claim that these distinctions simply do not hold up under 
careful philosophical scrutiny. 
                                                
64 Dan W. Brock, “Physician-Assisted Suicide as a Last-Resort Option at the End of 
Life,” Physician-Assisted Dying: The Case for Palliative Care and Patient Choice, edited by 
Timothy E. Quill and Margaret P. Battin (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2004) 131. 
 
65 Gerald Dworkin, “Introduction,” Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: For and 
Against, edited by Gerald Dworkin, R. G. Frey, and Sissela Bok (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 4. 
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Opponents of PAD insist that we must keep each of these nontherapeutic 
end of life care options separate and evaluate them independently in order to 
best examine their moral permissibility or impermissibility in a health care context. 
With respect to pain management and refusal of life-sustaining treatments, one 
thinker attempts to clarify the primary differences: 
Refusals of treatment, including of life-support treatment and artificial 
hydration and nutrition, and the provision of necessary pain-relief 
treatment or treatments for other symptoms of serious physical distress are 
not euthanasia, even if these actions shorten life. In respecting refusals of 
treatment, the primary intention is to respect the person’s right to 
inviolability-the right not to be touched, including by treatment, without 
one’s consent. In giving pain-relief treatment, the primary intention is to 
relieve pain, not to inflict death. In euthanasia, the primary intention is to 
inflict death in order to relieve pain and suffering. It is this primary intention 
that makes euthanasia unacceptable to those who oppose it.66 
 
Notably absent from the statement above is mention of terminal/palliative 
sedation. Nonetheless, this response, with its emphasis on the role of intention in 
moral assessment, illustrates a key aspect of the ongoing debate concerning 
PAD. Each of these end of life medical decisions mentioned above merits its 
own isolated discussion to sort through the ethical concerns and philosophical 
issues germane to making appropriate moral judgments. It is beyond the scope 
of this project to address all of these. Going forward I isolate one of these 
practices, namely, terminal/palliative sedation, in order to examine whether or 
                                                
66 Margaret Somerville, The Ethical Canary: Science, Society, and the Human Spirit 
(Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004) 119. 
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not medical professionals who deem PAD as morally impermissible can 
consistently practice the former.  
 
Conclusion 
Of course, not all in the debate will embrace the aforementioned 
justification for rejecting PAD.  Furthermore, many would also think that the 
counter-responses to the objections that were raised against the initial 
arguments for rejecting PAD are inadequate. As mentioned above, the point 
here was to highlight those arguments that many think to provide good reasons 
for rejecting the practice of PAD in a medical context, rightly or wrongly, in order 
to offer a back drop for evaluating if these same arguments count against the 
acceptance of palliative sedation. In other words, is there any inconsistency on 
the part of those who reject the former while embracing the latter? The subject 
matter taken up next explores some of the arguments provided for thinking that 
palliative sedation and PAD are morally equivalent (i.e. in defense premise 2 of 
the “Inconsistency Argument” raised in Chapter 1). 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE CHALLENGE OF THE INCONSISTENCY ARGUMENT FOR 
PALLIATIVE/TERMINAL SEDATION 
 
 
Introduction 
In the first chapter of this work, the “Inconsistency Argument” makes manifest 
the conceptual ethical tension that obtains when attempts are made to limit 
the scope of palliative care options to dying patients by excluding PAD. The 
argument goes as follows: 
1) For any two practices, X and Y, if there are no morally relevant differences 
between X and Y, then if Y is morally impermissible, X is morally 
impermissible. 
 
2) There are no morally relevant differences between palliative/terminal 
sedation and PAD. 
 
From 1) and 2), it follows that: 
 
3) If PAD is morally impermissible, palliative/terminal sedation is morally 
impermissible. 
 
Next, we assume that: 
 
4) PAD is morally impermissible. 
 
5) Therefore, palliative/terminal sedation is morally impermissible. 
 
This chapter focuses on what can be said in support of premise 2 of the 
argument.  
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PAD as Morally Equivalent to Terminal Sedation  
Many philosophers and medical ethicists have set out to argue that 
terminal sedation is morally equivalent to (or at the very least, no less worse) 
than PAD.1 In other words, one procedure is not intrinsically more advantageous 
or better than the other, ethically or practically speaking. In chapter 1, two very 
capable and accomplished proponents of this view were identified, namely 
Dan W. Brock and Margaret P. Battin. This chapter begins with the argument 
developed by Dan Brock and others in a seminal essay and subsequent versions 
of this earlier piece. Then, I present a similar argument by Margaret P. Battin. 
Both of these can be seen as in essence contending for what is claimed in 
premise 2 of the “Inconsistency Argument.”  
 
Brock’s Formulation of the Argument 
 In making his case, Brock offers definitions of the terms ‘terminal sedation’, 
‘physician-assisted suicide’, and ‘voluntary active euthanasia’. He then lists the 
ethical and practical advantages and disadvantages of each of these 
                                                
1 Margaret P. Battin, “Terminal Sedation: Pulling the Sheet over Our Eyes” Hastings 
Center Report 38, no. 5 (2008) 27-30; Dan W. Brock, “Physician Assisted Suicide as a Last-
Resort Option at the End of Life,” Physician-Assisted Dying: The Case for Palliative Care and 
Patient Choice, edited by Timothy E. Quill and Margaret P. Battin (Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 2004) 130-149; and Timothy E. Quill, Bernard Lo, and Dan Brock, 
“Palliative Options of Last Resort: A Comparison of Voluntary Stopping Eating and Drinking, 
Terminal Sedation, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Voluntary Active Euthanasia,” Terminal 
Sedation: Euthanasia in Disguise? edited by Torbjörn  Tännsjö (The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2004) 1-14. 
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practices. While I have combined both physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and 
voluntary active euthanasia (VAE) in this work to include what is to fall under the 
scope of physician-assisted death (PAD), they will be separated in this section 
since Brock and others think that VAE and PAS as medical procedures do not 
share all of the same ethical and practical advantages and disadvantages with 
one another. 
 
On the Advantages and Risks of Terminal Sedation 
According to Brock, ‘terminal sedation’ refers to “the administration of 
sedative drugs at the end of life; it is not, strictly speaking, a form of assisted 
death.”2 Yet he does think that there remains no morally relevant difference 
between terminal sedation, on the one hand, and PAS or VAE, on the other. He 
gives a more vivid description of the practice by writing: 
With terminal sedation, the suffering patient is sedated to 
unconsciousness, if need be, usually through ongoing administration of 
barbiturates or benzodiazepines, and all life-sustaining interventions, 
including nutrition and hydration, are withheld. Generally, the patient then 
dies of dehydration, starvation, or some other intervening complication. 
Although death is inevitable, it usually does not take place for days or 
even weeks, depending on clinical circumstances.3 
                                                
2 Dan W. Brock, “Physician-Assisted Suicide as a Last-Resort Option at the End of Life,” 
Physician-Assisted Dying: The Case for Palliative Care and Patient Choice, edited by Timothy 
E. Quill and Margaret P. Battin (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2004) 132. 
 
3 Ibid. Interestingly, Brock in a later co-authored piece seems to be a bit more nuanced in 
identifying the range of various forms of what is known as palliative sedation or what is often 
called terminal sedation. See Timothy E. Quill, Bernard Lo, Dan W. Brock, and Alan Meisel, 
  
132 
It is thought that this procedure as described by Brock and others is widely 
accepted and practiced in contemporary medicine, particularly in hospice.  
Further, Brock identifies a number of ethical and practical advantages. To 
begin, it can be performed in patients who have severe physical limitations.4 
Next, the delay between the time when terminal sedation begins and the 
patient’s death occurs allows for reconsideration of the procedure along the 
continuum. He includes in this possible reassessment period both the 
reconsideration of members of the professional health care team as well as the 
family. Last, the patient’s decision is informed and voluntary, keeping with 
patient autonomy, since a professional health care team would need to 
administer and monitor the kinds of drugs that are used in sedations of this sort.5 
Of course, this last point can be said to be an advantage of the other options as 
well. Nevertheless, given the centrality of autonomy in medical ethics, Brock 
includes it in order to establish its moral permissibility along with other EOL 
palliative care options. 
 Brock also raises a number of corresponding risks that may be and often 
are associated with terminal sedation as he describes it above. First, with 
                                                                                                                                                       
“Last-Resort Options for Palliative Sedation,” Annals of Internal Medicine 2009, Volume 151, 
Number 6: 421-424.  
 
4 As noted below, the relevance of this is seen when one considers the fact that in states 
where PAS is legally practiced the laws require that patients must be physically able to take the 
lethal prescription of medication that has been provided to them by a physician. 
  
5 Ibid., 133. 
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terminal sedation, “unlike physician-assisted suicide, the final actors are the 
health care providers, not the patient. Terminal sedation could therefore be 
carried out without explicit discussions with alert patients who appear to be 
suffering intolerably, or even against their wishes.”6 This, of course, would not be 
in keeping with the value of patient autonomy and hence potentially morally 
problematic. Second, some patients believe that their dignity is violated and 
their families will suffer during a prolonged or drawn out terminal sedation. Third, 
those patients who desire to die at home may not be able to do so since 
admission to a health care facility is required in order to administer and monitor 
the sedation properly.7 Fourth, terminal sedation is not a panacea. There are 
some symptoms that cannot be relieved by this particular procedure.8 Fifth, 
                                                
6 Ibid. 
 
7 Brock does not seem to consider that those individuals who receive palliative sedation 
while in hospice programs can and often do have the procedure performed at home by and with 
trained hospice palliative care staff. Given the context and patient population in which Brock 
describes terminal sedation taking place, it would seem that a good number of those would be 
hospice eligible and hence able to have the procedure performed in the home if they were 
appropriate candidates. So while Brock’s comment on this score may very well be true, it seems 
far less likely to be the case that if one wanted to have a terminal sedation performed in the home 
that they would be prohibited from doing so unless they are admitted into a facility. 
 
8 Ibid. Brock and others do provide some examples to consider for the point he is making. 
Some instances where terminal sedation would not address symptoms are occurrences “when a 
patient is bleeding uncontrollably from an eroding lesion or a refractory coagulation disorder, 
cannot swallow secretions because widespread oropharyngeal cancer, or has refractory diarrhea 
from…AIDS.” Timothy E. Quill, Bernard Lo, and Dan W. Brock, “Palliative Options of Last 
Resort: A Comparison of Voluntary Stopping Eating and Drinking, Terminal Sedation, 
Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Voluntary Active Euthanasia,” The Journal of American 
Medical Association December 17, 1997, Volume 278, No. 23: 2100. It would seem that these 
  
134 
there is controversy surrounding whether or not deeply sedated patients “are 
actually free of suffering or are simply unable to report or remember it.”9 Sixth, it 
is dubious that families will perceive the sedated patient’s death as being 
dignified or peaceful. 10  Seventh, terminal sedation would be deemed 
inappropriate to use if the patients found their condition personally 
unacceptable even if they were not experiencing considerable pain as would 
be the case with PAS. And last, clinicians are sometimes confused about their 
role and professional “ethical responsibility for contributing to the patient’s 
death.”11 
 
On the Advantages and Risks of Physician-Assisted Suicide 
 Brock defines PAS as those instances when “the physician provides the 
means, usually a prescription of a large dose of barbiturates, by which a patient 
                                                                                                                                                       
symptoms would be palliated by other means than terminal sedation. If terminal sedation could 
otherwise eliminate particular symptoms for a patient experiencing the aforementioned 
problems, there is no reason that other palliative measures cannot be employed simultaneously to 
address the kinds of refractory symptoms that Brock identifies.   
 
9 Brock, “Physician-Assisted Suicide as a Last-Resort Option at the End of Life,” 133. 
On page 146 of this essay, he references the work of N. Moerman, B. Bonke, and J. Oosting, 
“Awareness and Recall During General Anesthesia: Facts and Feelings,” Anesthesiology 79 
(1993): 454-64; and J. E. Utting, “Awareness: Clinical Aspects, Consciousness, Awareness, and 
Pain,” General Anesthesia, edited by M. Rosen and J. N. Linn (London: Butterworths, 1987) 
171-79, 184-92 in support of this claim.  
 
10 Brock does not cite a specific source for this particular point. 
 
11 Ibid., 133. 
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can end his or her life. Although the physician is morally responsible for this 
assistance, the patient has to carry out the final act of using the means 
provided.”12 The ethical and practical advantages for PAS are numerous. First, 
having a prescribed lethal dose of medication may provide the needed 
reassurance to persevere in the dying process if patients know that they could 
escape if their situation becomes intolerable for them. Second, PAS is likely to be 
voluntary since patients must take the lethal prescription themselves. Third, the 
death may be considered more dignified and humane since it doesn’t entail a 
prolonged period of days or weeks after the medication has been ingested. 
Fourth, some physicians are “more comfortable with assisted suicide than with 
voluntary active euthanasia, presumably because their participation is 
indirect.”13 
 The first, and perhaps most obvious disadvantage of PAS, is that many 
professionals think, rightly or wrongly, that it violates their duty and ethical 
responsibility not to be involved (albeit, on some descriptions of action, 
indirectly) in an intentional way in the death of a patient. Another associated risk 
of PAS is that “since there is often a substantial period of time between the 
provision and use of the means for assisted suicide, and since physicians are 
often not present when the means are used, there is often no evaluation and 
                                                
12 Ibid., 134. 
 
13 Ibid. 
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assurance of competence or voluntariness at the time of use.” Moreover, there 
are instances when medical complications arise such as vomiting or aspirating 
as a result of the medication. If the physician is not present this can be seen as 
an instance of patient abandonment. And furthermore, there is a related, 
though nevertheless, distinct point: if the medications are not bringing about the 
death of the patient in the way they are intended, then the absence of a 
physician in such circumstances leaves “families to respond to medical 
complications alone.” If they are brought to an emergency room in this 
situation, patients are likely to “receive unwanted life-prolonging treatment” by 
these hospital facilities’ medical staff. Last, there is concern that PAS is 
discriminatory in unacceptable ways. 14 I want to expand further on this fourth 
point.  
In the states where PAS is legal, only those patients who are physically 
capable of taking the medications and are mentally competent to give 
consent are allowed to take advantage of PAS. The problem here may not be 
as obvious on the surface. PAS could be guilty of “Compassion Rationing.”15 PAS 
doesn’t provide comfort to or the freedom for people with, say, ALS or 
advanced dementia.  ALS stands for Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis and is 
                                                
14 Ibid. 
 
15 I am indebted to my colleague, Paul MacLean, who serves with me on the Community 
Ethics Committee sponsored by the Harvard Ethics Leadership Group in Boston, MA for this 
particular expression. In the lines that follow, I provide insight and expand the concept that the 
phrase designates. 
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commonly known as Lou Gherig’s disease (named after the professional 
baseball player whose career was ended by it).  ALS is a neurodegenerative 
disease of unknown cause that breaks down tissues in the nervous system and 
affects the nerves responsible for movement. So at a certain point in the illness, 
ALS patients may have the mental capacity to make a free and informed 
decision for PAS, but lack the physical ability to actually ingest the lethal dose of 
medication on their own. Advanced dementia patients have the physical 
capacity to ingest the lethal prescription but lack the mental competence to 
make a free and informed decision to do so. But given the beneficial reasons 
often cited by proponents of PAS as to the need for this option, it would seem 
that advanced dementia and ALS patients should be included under the scope 
of any such practice. But, as things stand at the time of this writing, in states 
where the practice is legal these patient populations are prohibited from 
participating in the practice of PAS. 
 
 On the Advantages and Risks of Voluntary Active Euthanasia 
 In cases of VAE, Brock and others state, “the physician not only provides 
the means, but is the final actor by administering a lethal injection at the 
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patient’s request.” 16  Of course, this more infrequent proposed option of 
palliative care has the practical advantage of being “quick and effective.” 
Morally speaking, this eliminates the possibility of prolonging the suffering of the 
family who is anticipating the inevitable death of the patient, the same 
inevitability of death as with the case of terminal sedation. Further, patients do 
not need to be physically able to ingest a lethal prescription, though 
presumably they must be mentally competent to give consent for VAE to be 
performed. Last, it “requires active and direct participation” on the part of 
physicians so that they can “ensure the patient’s competence and voluntariness 
at the time of the act, support the family, and respond to complications.”17 The 
ethical implication is that one is better able to avoid the potential moral 
problems of patient abandonment that may obtain in some instances of PAS. 
Concerning the moral disadvantages, it is first to be acknowledged that 
even more apparent than is the case with PAS, VAE is thought to transgress an 
ethical prohibition of medical professionals being directly and actively involved 
in the death of a patient in a medical context. For opponents of PAD, this is true, 
regardless if it is done for beneficent reasons and from motives of compassion. 
For some who are proponents of PAS, VAE would be seen as crossing an ethical 
                                                
16 Timothy E. Quill, Bernard Lo, and Dan W. Brock, “Palliative Options of Last Resort: 
A Comparison of Voluntary Stopping Eating and Drinking, Terminal Sedation, Physician-
Assisted Suicide, and Voluntary Active Euthanasia,” 2101. 
 
17 Ibid. 
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line, though, to be sure, this is not the case for all who are proponents of PAS.18 
Second, Brock and others point out that VAE is seen as relieving suffering by 
causing death.19 
 
Drawing to a Conclusion in the Direction of Premise 2 
One of the key ingredients that each of these proposed and controversial 
options of palliative care at the end of life share in common is that each seems 
to have the outcome of hastening death, according to Brock. If all options have 
the outcome of “hastening death” and each has its own set of distinct moral 
advantages and ethical risks, then it becomes arbitrary to limit one option over 
the others as being morally superior in every situation. Therefore, Brock 
summarizes the thrust of his observations when he writes:  
[T]erminal sedation…physician-assisted suicide [and voluntary active 
euthanasia] each have complex sets of advantages and disadvantages. 
For each practice, particular advantages and disadvantages may be 
more or less important with a specific patient seeking a hastened death. 
No one of these practices has a clearly superior balance of advantages 
over disadvantages in all cases. This implies that physician-assisted suicide 
                                                
18 See for example the essay by Michael Tooley, “In Defense of Voluntary Active 
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide,” Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, edited by Andrew I. 
Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005) referenced 
in Chapter 2. 
 
19 Ibid. 
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[and presumably VAE] should not be prohibited while…terminal sedation 
[is] permitted.20  
 
His analysis certainly appears to support the general contention made in 
premise 2 of the “Inconsistency Argument” which reads, “There are no morally 
relevant differences between palliative/terminal sedation and PAD.”  
While I think this is correct for the purposes set up in this chapter, it could 
be that Brock, if pushed, would draw a more nuanced conclusion relevant for 
premise 2 of the “Inconsistency Argument.” An interlocutor might suggest 
something along the lines of changing premise 2 from, “There are no morally 
relevant differences between palliative/terminal sedation and PAD” to including 
a qualification, which would then read: “There are no universally morally 
relevant differences between palliative/ terminal sedation and PAD.” The 
implication would be then for Brock that in some situations one form of ending 
life is morally superior than other options and at another time one of the other 
options along the spectrum of palliative care is to be preferred morally. 
Further, perhaps it would be the case, that with this qualification our 
interlocutor might propose that “in some situations” now be included in the 
antecedent and consequent of 3, before 4, and before “palliative” in the 
                                                
20 Dan W. Brock, “Physician Assisted Suicide as a Last-Resort Option at the End of 
Life,” Physician-Assisted Dying: The Case for Palliative Care and Patient Choice, eds. Timothy 
E. Quill and Margaret P. Battin (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2004) 135. 
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conclusion of the Inconsistency Argument. The modified argument would then 
read: 
1*) For any two practices, X and Y, if there are no “universally” morally 
relevant differences between X and Y, then if Y is in some situations 
morally impermissible, X is in some situations morally impermissible.  
 
2*) There are no “universally” morally relevant differences between 
palliative/terminal sedation and PAD. 
 
3*) Therefore, if PAD is in some situations morally impermissible, then in some 
situations palliative/terminal sedation is morally impermissible. 
 
4*) PAD is in some situations morally impermissible. 
 
5*)  Therefore, in some situations palliative/terminal sedation is morally 
impermissible. 
 
The question on this reading, then, is 1*) true? It would seem not. For 
example, say, “If PAD is morally impermissible when dealing with incompetent 
patients, nothing seems to follow about whether palliative/terminal sedation is 
impermissible for them, or for anyone else. Whether it is or isn’t would have to be 
established independently, for other things will not be held equal when” the 
move is made “from one class (incompetents) to another (competents) or even 
within the same class (say, incompetents) because the balance of moral 
advantages/disadvantages of PAD might make it impermissible to apply to 
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incompetents while the balance of moral advantages/disadvantages makes it 
permissible to apply palliative/terminal sedation to incompetents.”21  
Those who think that PAD may be morally permissible in some situations 
might want to develop the argument in the way described above in order to 
show that the “Inconsistency Argument” is unsound. However, as stated in 
Chapter 1 and delineated throughout this work, I am exploring the consistency 
of those who embrace palliative/terminal sedation while categorically rejecting 
PAD. So in the modified version of the Inconsistency Argument above PAD is not 
categorically rejected as is the case with the “Inconsistency Argument” stated 
at the beginning of the chapter. So this modified line of reasoning is not open to 
those who think PAD is categorically impermissible, which is the scenario 
constructed for the purposes of this dissertation.  
 My appeal to Brock in support of premise 2) is not to imply that he would 
argue for the “Inconsistency Argument” in the same manner in which I have set 
it up in this work. Instead, one is to keep in mind that Brock, in his essay, provides 
common observations concerning various practices at the EOL such that a 
general conclusion may be drawn. And it is that: there are no morally relevant 
differences between palliative/terminal sedation and PAD since each category 
of practice is said to hasten the death of the patient and have varying degrees 
                                                
21 Thanks to Dr. Bruce Russell for personal correspondence on this particular line of 
reasoning and some of the implications that could be drawn from it developed in the latter part of 
this section. 
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of advantages and disadvantages. And thus, based upon his comments above, 
we can find support for premise 2 of the “Inconsistency Argument,” which is the 
primary aim of this chapter. Of course, Brock doesn’t think that premise 4 of the 
“Inconsistency Argument” is true. But if it were, then it would seem that he would 
not have any problem affirming that terminal sedation also would be morally 
impermissible. And hence, to quote Brock again, PAD “should not be prohibited 
while…terminal sedation [is] permitted,” thus providing some support for premise 
2).22  
 
Battin’s Formulation of the Argument 
 Margaret P. Battin develops her version of what I am calling generically 
the “Inconsistency Argument” in a slightly different manner than Brock. She 
argues that terminal sedation is no compromise with respect to the debates 
surrounding PAD and this claim is developed along two discernible lines. The first 
is by identifying the key concerns of proponents of PAD and then showing how 
the terminal sedation alternative fails to meet these. The second is by 
highlighting the reasons often given by opponents of PAD to reject the view and 
then showing how terminal sedation is just as vulnerable to the same criticisms. 
 
 
                                                
22 See footnote 20 on page 140. 
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 Terminal Sedation Fails to Meet the Concerns of Proponents of PAD 
Battin begins by noting that those who are in favor of PAD often make 
their case by appeal to autonomy and mercy/compassion as being the primary 
grounds for the moral justification of the view. She thinks that both of these are 
undermined by terminal sedation such that it is not plausible to think this would 
be a reasonable “alternative” for those who advocate PAD. Let’s take each of 
these in turn.  
According to Battin, the practice of terminal sedation undermines patient 
autonomy. She thinks that consent is necessary for genuine instances of 
autonomy to be expressed. And consent cannot be “honored in decisions to 
use terminal sedation.”23 She gives two primary reasons why this is the case. The 
first is that unimpaired consent is really not possible due to unrelieved pain 
experienced by the patient. Therefore, decision-making about treatment “must 
be deflected to a second party.”24 Of course, one could argue that the patient 
could make a decision for terminal sedation in advance of the onset of 
excruciating pain that is unable to be managed otherwise.  
While acknowledging this point, Battin says the problem is more severe 
than this. Herein is the second primary reason why autonomy is undermined. She 
                                                
23 Margaret P. Battin, “Terminal Sedation: Pulling the Sheet over Our Eyes” Hastings 
Center Report 38, no. 5 (2008): 27. 
 
24 Ibid. 
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thinks that even if there is a decision made in advance, the focus of what a 
patient gives consent to is actually suppressed. In other words, the aim of 
terminal sedation is obscured. If so, this makes advance consent difficult since it 
is not fully understood what a patient is giving consent to. The issue for Battin is 
that while it is true that “terminal sedation may end pain, it also ends life.”25 It is 
this point that is not so clear in the minds of patients. There are two ways in 
which life is ended. The first is that sentient life is ended immediately along with 
the possibility of any ongoing social interaction. Second, biological life is ended 
because artificial nutrition and hydration are usually withheld. 
Moreover, Battin thinks the linguistic shift to “palliative sedation”26 from 
“terminal sedation” is a new euphemism that only goes to further bolster the 
problem of concealing the true aim of terminal sedation making consent 
difficult, if not impossible. She takes the word “terminal” to signify the intent of 
the sedation and says then that the practice is confused with palliative care.27 
So she concludes that terminal sedation undermines consent and thereby 
autonomy “because the assumption is that sedation is used just to end pain, 
without the intention of ending life, the patient cannot be asked for consent to 
                                                
25 Ibid. 
 
26 This phrase and variations of it is my preferred use for thinking about this particular 
medical procedure. This is done in order to distinguish and bring clarity to the multiple forms 
and contexts in which palliative sedation is practiced. This is described in more detail in chapter 
6 of this work. 
 
27 Ibid., 28. 
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end his or her life, but only to relieve his or her pain.”28 So the focus of consent 
should be firmly on the more crucial claim of the fact that life, whether sentient 
or biological, will be ended. If this, then, is part and parcel of terminal sedation, 
the question emerges: What really is intended in providing terminal sedation? 
The answer that Battin would give to this question is clear when she writes, “the 
focus of consent is on avoiding pain, but it should be on causing death.” If her 
charges are correct, then they render genuine consent, which is necessary for 
patient autonomy, nullified “whether the patient’s capacity for reflection is 
impaired by severe pain or not.”29  
Not only is autonomy undermined, but also terminal sedation is not an 
adequate proactive merciful or compassionate response to suffering patients in 
the way that PAD is thought to be. She writes, “The use of terminal sedation ‘to 
relieve pain’ presupposes that the patient is already experiencing pain. It 
provides no rationale for sedating a patient who is not currently in pain. Thus, the 
rationale for the use of terminal sedation in effect requires that the patient 
suffer.”30 This claim is evident for Battin since terminal sedation is often billed as a 
last resort on the continuum of palliative care in dying patients. And so when 
                                                
28 Ibid. 
 
29 Ibid. 
 
30 Ibid. 
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terminal sedation is evaluated in light of both autonomy and mercy, it falls short 
as a reasonable “alternative” for those who would prefer the option of PAD.31  
  
Terminal Sedation Violates the Reasons Given for Rejecting PAD 
 Battin identifies two widely held and broad reasons as to why many have 
rejected PAD. They are that it violates the sanctity of life and that there is the 
possibility of abuse. Those who consider terminal sedation an adequate 
alternative to PAD are being inconsistent, if their reasons for doing so fall under 
the two mentioned above. Upon analysis, Battin thinks that terminal sedation 
fails to uphold the sanctity of life principle and it does not fare any better with 
respect to the possible forms of abuse that many are troubled about with 
respect to PAD. 
 The sanctity of life principle, according to Battin, “has focused mainly on 
ending a person’s life before it would ‘naturally’ end.” Terminal sedation violates 
this principle because “it unarguably causes death, and it does so in a way that 
is not ‘natural.’” She then goes on to describe the process as to how her 
conception of terminal sedation works and is practiced by medical 
professionals. It involves two components. First, sedation is induced in the 
                                                
31 Battin would affirm that terminal sedation might appeal to some patients and their 
families.  For example, “those who see the gradual induction of death over the several days or 
more that terminal sedation takes…especially if this slow process is perceived as gentler and 
easier for the patient, and as permitting the family more time to absorb the reality of their loss.” 
(“Terminal Sedation,” 28) 
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patient, which of course, is not lethal itself. Second, the administration of fluids 
and nutrition are usually withheld from the patient. This second component, 
however, if pursued long enough, is fatal. She makes the strong claim that in a 
terminal sedation where the two components are employed, the patient will 
“necessarily die virtually always before they would have died otherwise.”32  
 She further claims that not only do the two components taken together 
form a lethal mix, but also that this is often billed as letting nature take its course. 
But she thinks otherwise. The way patients die with respect to terminal sedation is 
unnatural in that it is not the underlying disease that is the cause of death. 
Instead, “death typically results from or is accelerated by [an unnatural 
physician induced] dehydration.” In sum concerning this point, Battin concludes: 
“If respect for the sanctity of life means that a patient’s life should not be 
caused to end, but rather that death must occur only as the result of the 
underlying disease process, then terminal sedation does not honor this 
principle.”33  
 Beyond the practice of terminal sedation failing to uphold the sanctity of 
life principle, it also does not fare any better with respect to two primary forms of 
the possibility of abuse that are often associated with PAD. The two general 
                                                
32 Ibid. 
 
33 Ibid. 
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forms in view are: “1) concern that the integrity of the medical profession will be 
undercut, and 2) concern that various familial, institutional, or social pressures 
will maneuver the patient into death when that would have been neither her 
choice nor in accord with her interests.”34 She thinks that terminal sedation is just 
as susceptible to abuse as is PAD. The same issues of overworked physicians, 
biased health care providers, exasperation with difficult patients, and so on that 
may lead to premature and involuntary use of PAD that alarms many of its 
opponents are no less real with regard to terminal sedation.  
In contrast, she thinks that on this score PAD may actually fare better than 
terminal sedation. She observes that in those states where PAS is legal, such as 
Oregon, there are a series of safeguards in place that mitigate the possibility of 
abuse which are missing with respect to terminal sedation. Terminal sedation is 
more easily influenced negatively because what the patient is agreeing to, to 
reiterate a point made above, is obscured.  This goes back to the problem of 
terminal sedation and autonomy. Since the question is not framed as “a choice 
of death versus life, but only as pain versus the relief of pain – a seemingly far 
easier choice to make, and hence one presumably far more easily shaped by 
external pressures from greedy family members, overworked or intolerant 
                                                
34 Ibid. 
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physicians, or the agents of cost-conscious institutions.” 35  So the inevitable 
conclusion here would be that terminal sedation may be even more prone to 
abuse than PAD, or perhaps at least as likely, according to Battin. Therefore, 
terminal sedation provides no greater protection against abuse than PAD does. 
 
Drawing to a Conclusion in the Direction of Premise 2 
Based on Battin’s views expressed above, terminal sedation is no 
compromise with respect to the debates surrounding PAD. Terminal sedation 
fares no better than the problems often associated with PAD. And further 
terminal sedation seems to be condemned by the reasons often given for 
rejecting PAD. Again, to be clear, Battin does not think that terminal sedation is 
morally wrong per se. For she thinks “a case may be made for [it]” in that “it 
offers a definite response to uncontrollable suffering,”36 though she interestingly 
takes the argument in favor of terminal sedation to be one primarily of 
perceptions. It seems that one may be able to detect a modest cynicism in 
Battin’s view on this point when she writes: 
The argument in favor of terminal sedation is one of perceptions: it may 
feel natural (even if it is not), it may feel safer (even if it offers less 
protection from abuse), it may feel like something the patient can openly 
choose (even if the choice is constructed in a way that obscures its real 
                                                
35 Ibid. 
 
36 Ibid., 29. 
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nature), and it may feel to the physician as if it is more in keeping with 
medical codes that prohibit killing (even if it still brings about death). We 
live in a society that tolerates many obfuscations and hypocrisies, and this 
may be another one we ought to embrace.37 
 
It is by no means an interpretive reach to see that Battin understands terminal 
sedation as really a form of slow euthanasia. Recall her quote from Chapter 1 of 
this work, where she states: 
It’s not that palliative sedation/sedation to unconsciousness is wrong. It 
can be practiced hypocritically…. Because there is so much anxiety that 
it might be confused with euthanasia, the features that it shares with 
euthanasia are obscured or sanitized. …The implausible effort to draw a 
completely bright line between continuous terminal sedation and 
euthanasia makes the practice of terminal sedation both more 
dangerous and more dishonest than it should be—and makes what can 
be a decent and humane practice morally problematic.38 
 
 
Conclusion  
If Brock and Battin are correct, then their arguments lead us in the 
direction of affirming the claim made in premise 2 of the “Inconsistency 
Argument.” If so, then we have a couple of arguments developed that attempt 
to establish the soundness of the “Inconsistency Argument” such that if one 
thinks that PAD is morally impermissible, then one should hold the same 
judgment with respect to terminal sedation.  
                                                
37 Ibid. 
 
38 Ibid., 30. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
AN INDEFENSIBLE WEDGE ARGUMENT 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the argument given by Torbjörn Tännsjö in which he 
attempts to make a morally relevant distinction between the two practices of 
terminal sedation and euthanasia contra the kinds of claims discussed in 
chapter 4. I ultimately think that his attempt is not fully adequate as a “Wedge 
Argument” to sufficiently distinguish the practices in a morally relevant way on 
the supposition that PAD is morally problematic. After presenting his arguments, I 
then offer a series of objections to his view. In sum, it appears that sometimes he 
uses the wrong conceptual tools in an attempt to make his case. And the 
potentially legitimate conceptual tools he does use, he employs them the 
wrong way. 
 
Tännsjö’s Wedge-Argument 
 Torbjörn  Tännsjö has sought to develop a “Wedge Argument” that 
defends the moral status of terminal sedation against the kinds of equivalency 
arguments made by Brock, Battin, and others. He understands terminal sedation 
as:  
[A] procedure where through heavy sedation a terminally ill patient is put 
into a state of coma, where the intention of the doctor is that the patient 
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should stay comatose until he or she is dead. No extraordinary monitoring 
of the medical state of the patient is undertaken. Normal hydration is 
ignored. All this means that in some cases where patients are being 
terminally sedated, death is hastened; if the disease does not kill the 
patient, some complication in relation to the sedation, or the withdrawal 
of treatment and hydration, or the combination of these, does.1 
 
He positions his view between the extremes of those involved in the euthanasia 
debate and suggests that terminal sedation, as described above, provides the 
best compromise for such a contentious issue. He writes: 
Adherents of euthanasia may well argue that terminal sedation is not 
good enough. Some patients may want to be intentionally and actively 
killed by their doctors, they may claim. However, while they continue to 
argue their case, they should be prepared to admit that terminal sedation 
renders dying easier for the very patients on behalf of whom they put 
forward their argument for euthanasia. 
And adherents of the Sanctity-of-Life Doctrine, who oppose 
euthanasia, should be able to appreciate that there exists a way for them 
to answer the stricture that they are insensitive to human suffering. They 
can accept a practice of terminal sedation and yet, for all that, stick to 
the Sanctity-of-Life Doctrine and their opposition to euthanasia.2 
 
Tännsjö thinks one can hold to his understanding of terminal sedation and still 
identify morally relevant differences between it and PAD. So in essence he seeks 
to argue against premise 2 of the “Inconsistency Argument” that there are no 
morally relevant differences between palliative/terminal sedation and PAD.  
                                                
1 Torbjörn  Tännsjö, “Terminal Sedation: A Substitute for Euthanasia?” Terminal 
Sedation: Euthanasia in Disguise? edited by Torbjörn  Tännsjö (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2004) 15. 
 
2 Ibid., 29. 
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Morally Distinguishing Features  
He takes euthanasia to be incompatible with “two basic principles of 
medical ethics” which are the principles of “acts and omissions and double 
effect.”3 Further he thinks that terminal sedation, as he has defined it, does not 
suffer the same fate as euthanasia with respect to these principles, and 
moreover it is in fact compatible with them. He wants to say that it is on this basis 
that he is able to make an ethical distinction between terminal sedation, on the 
one hand, and euthanasia, on the other. 
How does Tännsjö see the relevance of these two principles at work? With 
respect to the acts/omission distinction, he thinks that this has traditionally 
affirmed something like the following: “it is always wrong actively to kill a person, 
it may sometimes be right to allow death to come about. Active killing is always 
wrong, passive killing may sometimes be right.”4  To be clear, he thinks the 
phrases “passive killing” and “letting nature take its course” as being both apt 
descriptions that can refer to the same state of affairs. Actions that would fall 
under “passive killing” for him are those such as deciding not to feed a patient 
who thereby starves to death or removing a ventilator and then the patient 
subsequently suffocates as a result.  
                                                
3 Ibid., 17-18. In my opinion, what he is calling medical ethical principles seem better to 
be understood as key conceptual distinctions. Nevertheless, this is the nomenclature chosen by 
Tännsjö. He does, though, refer to these on occasion as distinctions throughout his essay. 
 
4 Ibid., 18. 
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He acknowledges, “all concrete actions are active under some 
description of them. However, some kinds of actions allow that we sort instances 
of them into the active or passive category, relative to the kind in question.” This 
is a key move for Tännsjö’s appeal to these principles and the ethical work that 
they are supposed to do for him. So just as removing a ventilator could 
constitute an instance of passive killing, actions like “injecting an opioid, which 
kills the patient, is to kill actively.”5 
He goes on to state that the acts/omission distinction in itself is not of 
moral importance within the euthanasia discussion. The reason is due to the fact 
that “in most Western countries, even active killing of severely ill patients is 
legally tolerated.” What he has in mind on this point are “cases where patients 
are given a sedative medication or opioids in a manner that hastens death. This 
is clearly a case of active killing.”6  So in order for the acts/omission distinction to 
have moral import it needs to be coupled with something else, which is 
identified below. 
He articulates the second medical ethical principle, the principle of 
double effect, in the following way: “it is always wrong intentionally to kill a 
patient, but it may be right to provide aggressive palliative care, with the 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Ibid. 
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intention of relieving pain, even if it can be foreseen that the patient will die 
from the care in question.”7 He believes that the principle of double effect is 
clear enough for most and perhaps seems reasonable to a good many people. 
Here again, as is the case with the first distinction/principle, he suggests that this 
distinction in itself is not of moral importance with respect to the euthanasia 
discussion. He also thinks that in most “Western countries…we do not abide by 
it” since “intentional killing of patients is legally tolerated.”8 What Tännsjö has in 
view are situations like those many others have classified as instances of passive 
euthanasia in the sense that it is understood as “the withholding/withdrawal of 
medical treatment (or tube-feeding) with the intention (aim) of hastening 
death.”9 Understood in this way, he sees the refusal of treatment with the aim or 
intention of causing death as an instance of “passive killing” and this is legally 
tolerated and morally permissible.  
                                                
7 Ibid. 
 
8 Ibid., 19. 
 
9 John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An Argument Against Legislation 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 217. Tännsjö does not make a distinction 
between passive euthanasia and withholding and withdrawing treatment. However, in this work, 
following Keown and many others, I suggest that what counts as instances of PAD relies heavily 
on the notion of intent being a necessary ingredient of what constitutes the moral event in 
question. So that when treatment is withheld or discontinued with the intention of causing death 
it is deemed an instance of passive euthanasia. However, if treatment is withheld or withdrawn 
“because the treatment is either futile or too burdensome, or in order to respect the patient’s 
refusal of treatment,” then on the account developed in Chapter 2 of this work, this is not seen as 
an instance of passive euthanasia. (Ibid.) Tännsjö does not make appeal to this sort of distinction 
in his essay. He only seems to identify and conceptually embrace the former notion. 
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The question emerges, then, if neither of these two principles that Tännsjö 
takes to be part of medical ethics, in and of themselves, are of moral 
importance with respect to the discussion surrounding euthanasia, then how 
does euthanasia violate these two principles as he claims in his essay? He wants 
to say that it is “only a combination of the two principles (of acts and omissions 
and the double effect) [which] can substantiate” the moral impermissibility of 
euthanasia while morally permitting terminal sedation.10  
So then according to Tännsjö, we can sort various end-of-life medical 
practices or medical decisions into four discrete categories based on the 
combination of these two principles or distinctions. The first category is that of 
active killing where death is intended. An example here would be the practice 
of active euthanasia, and though he does not state explicitly, one would 
presume that he would include here as well instances of PAS. The second 
category is that of active killing where death is merely foreseen. He would place 
his form of terminal sedation into this category. For “the point in sedating the 
patient is not to cause death, but to relieve suffering. So even if the sedation 
(actively) kills the patient, the death of the patient is merely foreseen, not 
intended.” 11  Third, there is the category of passive killing where death is 
                                                
10 Torbjörn  Tännsjö, “Terminal Sedation: A Substitute for Euthanasia?” 19. 
 
11 Ibid., 20. 
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intended such as the withdrawing of life sustaining treatment with the aim of 
causing the death of the patient. He states, “the withdrawal of treatment is 
undertaken with the intention to hasten the death of the patient. However, this is 
a case of passive, not of active, killing.”12 And the last category is passive killing 
where death is merely foreseen. What he has in view here seems to be the 
withholding of life sustaining treatment (in contrast to the withdrawing indicated 
in the third category above) or refusing to feed someone (without sedation) in a 
health care setting, if that is what is chosen by the patient or the patient’s proxy. 
So in other words, this category would include not even initiating certain LST to 
begin with.13  
                                                
12 Ibid. 
 
13 I do have some questions as to whether or not Tännsjö has accounted adequately for 
the idea of “passive killing.” The notion, as he develops it, seems a bit problematic. He has as an 
account of “passive killing” that is two-fold. First, “passive killing” can be an instance of 
intended death by withdrawing LST. He gives the famous Tony Bland case as an example. He 
writes, “In this case it was decided that a patient in a persistent vegetative state should not be 
artificially fed or hydrated any more. It is obvious that the intention behind the action (of not 
feeding or hydrating the patient) was to hasten death.” (emphasis mine, Ibid., 19) So this is 
represented by box (3) in the Brussellian Matrix below on page 160. Second, “passive killing” as 
represented in (4) is “not to feed a patient, who, as a consequence, starves to death, is to kill 
passively (to allow nature to takes its course).” (Ibid., 18) From this we see that he marks the 
distinction between types of “passive killing” on the basis of withdrawing (intending death) and 
withholding (not intending death). Further, he thinks that both of these are “tolerated.” On the 
account developed concerning the role of intention for moral permissibility in this work, his 
approach is problematic. We can intend death by withholding and fail to intend death by 
withdrawing LST. We may just intend to discontinue futile treatment, or even intend to use the 
one ventilator we have to save someone else with better life prospects in a genuine triage 
situation foreseeing that removing it from this patient will mean his death.  
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Concerning moral evaluation of these four categories, he wants to say 
that only the first category, that of active killing where death is intended, would 
be morally forbidden in a health care context. Actions in the other three 
categories are legally tolerated, and hence on Tännsjö’s view, morally 
permitted. With regard to the moral permissibility of passive killing or allowing 
nature to take its course, he does qualify somewhat his view. 
Of course, this does not mean that all instances of passive killing are 
morally acceptable. Sometimes it is morally wrong to kill passively. As a 
matter of fact, this is wrong, and very wrong in most cases. But when it is 
wrong to kill passively, this is not due to the inherent wrongness in the act, 
but to particular consequences of it. It may for example be wrong to 
allow a patient to die because of lack of treatment, if one has promised, 
or undertaken, to provide the treatment in question, most obviously so if 
the treatment would had saved the patient.14 
 
Tännsjö’s view can be represented in the following “Brussellian Matrix”:15 
 
                                                
14 Ibid.  
 
15 Tännsjö does provide a matrix in his chapter that is essentially the same as this one 
though the wording is slightly different in the one represented here to highlight some of the 
points made in the preceding footnote. Professor Bruce Russell, who is known for clarifying and 
evaluating certain philosophical distinctions using various matrices, which I call “Brusselian,” 
inspires the inclusion of it in this chapter. By way of brief commentary, many think that the 
difference between withdrawing and withholding will not give the essential difference between 
the two types of “passive killing.” Given that for Tännsjö both of these are “tolerated,” he would 
respond that appeal to these distinctions are just meant as examples to illustrate the essence of 
the distinction as indicated in the matrix above about “intending” as a means and “merely 
foreseen” or “unintended” as a consequence. A charitable reading of Tännsjö can let this be as it 
may. However, my purpose in this part of the chapter is to highlight his views and then later 
interact with the category where he would place his understanding of terminal sedation, which is 
box (2). Boxes (3) and (4) represent the distinction he makes with respect to “passive killing.” 
These areas are not the primary aim of my criticisms of Tännsjö. 
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KILLING Death Intended  Death is not Intended  
 
Active – what is done 
causes death 
 
FORBIDDEN 
(1) 
 
TOLERATED 
(2) 
 
 
Passive – what is done 
does not cause death 
 
TOLERATED 
(3) 
 
TOLERATED 
(4) 
 
 
It is somewhat unclear as to exactly how his emphasis on the 
consequences is supposed to be as significant as he intimates. He admits his 
view “may seem strange” to some. If instances of active killing are tolerated and 
also if intentional killing is tolerated, then how can these all of a sudden be 
morally problematic when taken together? He responds to this question by 
noting “it is the argument from the observation that a certain distinction lacks 
moral relevance in one situation to the conclusion that it lacks relevance in all 
situations that is fallacious.” 16  And so, this is his exposition of how the two 
principles independently are not morally important for the euthanasia 
discussion, yet jointly they do have moral significance for it. Tännsjö thinks that his 
view has adequately developed a wedge argument that distinguishes the 
moral permissibility of terminal sedation for those who also want to oppose PAD. 
In the next section I evaluate Tännsjö’s view.  
  
                                                
16 Ibid., 20. 
  
161 
A Critique of Tännsjö’ Wedge Argument 
 The reasons Tännsjö provides as to why his view is able to justify the use of 
terminal sedation while euthanasia still may be opposed legally, and perhaps 
morally, are two-fold. It is, first, that terminal sedation does not violate two basic 
“principles” of medical ethics, namely, acts and omissions and double effect; 
and second it is consistent with the sanctity of human life view. But many have 
thought his development of these issues is exceptionally problematic, myself 
included. He seems to be using the wrong conceptual tools and the conceptual 
tools he does use, he uses wrongly. Thus his view does not constitute an 
appropriate response to the “Inconsistency Argument” developed in this work.  
 First, with respect to the claim that he is using the wrong conceptual tools, 
I think this is seen in his combined appeal to acts and omissions and double 
effect. 17  The way Tännsjö discusses the “acts/omission” distinction closely 
parallels the conversations surrounding the “active/passive” distinction, which 
also corresponds in many ways to the more specific “killing/letting die” 
distinction. This fact seems unavoidable based on what he writes and the 
general direction of the literature on the subject for those who are acquainted 
with it. Dan Brock’s description is correct when he states: “The active-passive 
                                                
17 This is not to say that some form of double effect reasoning is a wrong conceptual tool 
for this discussion. This is made evident below. It is to say, instead, that the appeal that he makes 
to the acts/omission distinction seems not to be morally relevant in the manner in which Tännsjö 
needs it to be to substantiate his claim. 
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distinction is typically understood to mirror the distinction between killing and 
allowing to die. … However, how the distinctions between active and passive 
and between killing and allowing to die should be drawn, as well as how they 
apply to these…practices, remains controversial.”18 And ultimately, he thinks, 
unhelpful.  
To be charitable to Tännsjö, he admits this much as noted above when he 
says, “all concrete actions are active under some description of them.” 19 
Furthermore, he also admits that the distinction taken alone is not of moral 
importance to the discussion at hand. Fair enough. However, when this is 
combined with double effect, he still seems to make appeal to the wrong tools 
to distinguish ethically between euthanasia, on the one hand, and terminal 
sedation, on the other. How so?  
It seems that despite his denial, he needs the act and omissions distinction 
to be morally important as such in order to make his case as to why intentional 
active killing is morally prohibited but intentional passive killing may not be. For 
Tännsjö, an instance of medical killing that is morally impermissible or forbidden 
(to use his term) must both be active and intentional. These serve as individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of an immoral case of medical killing. 
The question for him then is, “Why is intentional active killing wrong, but 
                                                
18 Brock, “Physician-Assisted Suicide as a Last-Resort Option at the End of Life,” 137. 
 
19Tännsjö, “Terminal Sedation: A Substitute for Euthanasia?” 18. 
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intentional passive killing not?” The answer is not explicitly given in his essay. On 
the surface, he affirms that the first category of intentional active killing is not 
legally tolerated whereas the other categories are. But he would need to say 
more than this if we are to understand why instances of intentional active killing 
are morally wrong but ones of intentional passive killing are not. In other words, 
asserting that the practices in this first category are not legally tolerated does 
not get at the proper wrong-making properties to answer our question.  
If he is pressed on this point, we can suppose his response would be based 
on other more explicit comments made in his piece. Perhaps he would say that 
it is intentional active killing that violates the sanctity of life that he wants to 
maintain in some form, at least for his project. But what is it about intentional 
active killing that gives it a wrong-making property that intentional passive killing 
in a health care context, ceteris paribus, does not? It seems that the only 
recourse he has is appeal to the mode of the intentional killing, which under a 
particular concrete description is said to be active.  
So while he wants to say that it is the combination of acts and omission 
and double effect reasoning that is of moral importance, it seems difficult to 
avoid introducing the moral significance of the former, in itself, in order to 
explain why intentional active killing is wrong whereas intentional passive killing 
need not be. The notion of intention is not synonymous with double effect 
reasoning. These are not by any means coextensive. Here is where there seems 
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to be the conceptual rub. Many have pointed out that the use of the 
acts/omission distinction is unable to carry the moral freight often placed upon 
it. Tännsjö agrees to this in principle but seems in practice to make appeal to it 
anyway. But it seems wrong-headed to put this kind of moral freight on the 
active/passive distinction, even if he claims it is not independently sufficient to 
determine moral impermissibility. The reason why the actions in the first category, 
that of of intentional active killing, is morally forbidden for Tännsjö is that the 
state of affairs described therein, presumably, violates the sanctity of life. But as 
discussed below, the sanctity view focuses on the role of intention with respect 
to a course of conduct when determining the wrongness of killing when it is 
wrong, not the passive or active mode of agency. If so, then this leads us to the 
next primary concern.  
Second, Tännsjö seems to use the conceptual tools he does employ 
inappropriately. His conception of terminal sedation seems to be deeply flawed. 
The tools Tännsjö utilizes and the manner in which he makes his case ends up 
making terminal sedation on his view a form of euthanasia, albeit slow 
euthanasia, which is incompatible with traditionally formulated accounts of the 
sanctity of human life view. Furthermore, he misunderstands the sanctity 
principle and misapplies double effect reasoning. I look at these latter two in 
more detail below. Chapter 6 of this work seeks to provide a more nuanced 
understanding of palliative/terminal sedation that clarifies certain factors 
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involved in the process that Tännsjö and others appear to miss. His inadequate 
understanding of terminal sedation should be apparent in the contrasting 
picture developed in the next chapter.  
Most traditional formulations of the sanctity view exclude all modes of 
intentionally killing innocents, whether passive or active.20 In order to see the 
problem, it is helpful to follow the line of thinking developed by Luke Gormally. 
The prohibition of intentionally killing innocents that is entailed by the principle of 
the sanctity of human life bears not only on “physical causation as such but on 
chosen courses of conduct, i.e., courses of conduct specified by the reasons for 
which they were chosen.”21 Gormally describes a “course of conduct” as being 
“identifiable as intentional precisely by reference to the practical reasoning of 
the agent.”22 This notion is an important component for the sanctity of human 
life view for those proponents of it. Gormally further expounds on this idea in a 
                                                
20 A defender of Tännsjö on this point could say something like “perhaps he is providing 
a revisionist stipulative definition of the sanctity of life view.” It is possible that he may very 
well be doing so self-consciously, though there is nothing in his essay to indicate that this is what 
he is aiming for. Further, it is seems to be what he does not want to do given that he sees his 
model as being a compromise of views put forth in the contemporary discussion, which would 
presumably be utilizing the categories and components that are held essential for traditional 
formulations of the sanctity view. I fail to see how this move would be of any help to Tännsjö’s 
claims here.  
 
21 Luke Gormally, “Terminal Sedation and the Doctrine of the Sanctity of Life,” 
Terminal Sedation: Euthanasia in Disguise? edited by Torbjörn  Tännsjö (Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004) 83. 
 
22 Ibid. 
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way that the relevance is made clear concerning the discussion surrounding 
PAD. He writes:  
Thus a course of conduct is a case of intentional killing if what results in the 
killing was brought about, or allowed to happen (when it might have 
been prevented), because an agent chose that course of conduct in 
order to bring about the death of another. The purpose of securing the 
other person’s death was the reason for the agent’s action.23 
 
So proponents of traditional formulations of the sanctity of human life do 
not have conceptual space for a “distinction between acts and omissions,” 
even if it is coupled with double effect, in the way that Tännsjö thinks morally 
relevant.24 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that his conception of terminal 
sedation and intentional passive killing entail employing a course of conduct in 
order to bring about the death of another. Terminal sedation then, as 
understood by Tännsjö, does involve intending death though when properly 
understood, I want to argue that it ought not. He appeals to, uses, and applies 
the sanctity of human life view in the wrong way.  
Does the appeal to the rule of double effect get Tännsjö “off the hook” so 
to speak? I do not think so. This is another area where he employs a potentially 
appropriate conceptual tool in the wrong way.  The rule of double effect is 
                                                
23 Ibid. To be clear, many of those who do embrace a sanctity view think it is morally 
permissible in certain circumstances to withdraw and withhold life-sustaining treatment. They 
may posit different reasons for doing so other than simply bringing about the death of the patient. 
They usually appeal to some form of proportionality of benefits and burdens. For proponents of 
the sanctity view the death of the patient cannot be the aim of the action.  
 
24 Ibid., 85. 
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invoked typically as a last resort when most other plausible options have been 
exhausted. Simply stated, the rule is that under certain conditions “an action is 
morally permissible, even if it results in something one would deem wrong if done 
intentionally.”25 It is said to entail the following conditions as given by Sulmasy: 
1. That one’s action has two effects, [one good, one bad], that 
follow from it immediately (“immediate” not in a temporal sense 
but in the sense that there are no other intended intervening 
states or other agents). 
 
2. That one’s action not be intrinsically wrong. 
 
3. That one foresees but does not intend the bad effect; one only 
intends the good effect.  
 
4. That the bad effect not be the cause of the good effect that one 
does claim to intend. 
 
5. That one’s act is proportionate: that is, that the means are 
proportionate to the end, and that the good to be expected 
outweighs the bad in the particular situation.26  
 
Tännsjö seems to be advocating a form of palliative/terminal sedation 
known as “palliative sedation to unconsciousness” where the intended goal of 
the sedation is unconsciousness in contrast to the sedated state being a 
                                                
25 Daniel P. Sulmasy and Nessa Coyle, “Palliative Sedation and the Rule of Double 
Effect,” End-of-Life Ethics: A Case Study Approach, edited by Kenneth J. Doka, Amy S. Tucci, 
Charles A. Corr, and Bruce Jennings (Washington D.C.: Hospice Foundation of America, 2012) 
111. 
 
26 Daniel P. Sulmasy, et. al., “Ethics of Palliative Sedation and Medical Disasters: Four 
Traditions Advance Public Consensus on Three Issues,” Ethics & Medicine: An International 
Journal of Bioethics, Volume 28:1, Spring 2012: 41. 
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foreseen consequence.27 One recalls the first line of his description of terminal 
sedation at the beginning of this chapter, when he states that terminal sedation 
is “a procedure where through heavy sedation a terminally ill patient is put into 
a state of coma, where the intention of the doctor is that the patient should stay 
comatose until he or she is dead.”28 In palliative sedation to unconsciousness the 
aim of the sedated state is used “as a means of dissociating patients from their 
symptoms.” 29  The claim by many advocates of “palliative sedation to 
unconsciousness” is that it is distinguished from euthanasia in that with respect to 
the former death is foreseen, but not intended, as would be the case with the 
latter. However, upon analysis, “palliative sedation to unconsciousness cannot 
be justified under the rule of double effect.”30  
The problem is that this form of terminal sedation, palliative sedation to 
unconsciousness, does not satisfy some aspect or other of the double effect 
criteria. To begin, with respect to “palliative sedation to unconsciousness” it does 
                                                
27 See the distinctions and descriptions of this and other forms of palliative sedation in 
Timothy E. Quill, Bernard Lo, Dan W. Brock, and Alan Meisel, “Last-Resort Options for 
Palliative Sedation,” Annals of Internal Medicine 2009, Volume 151, Number 6: 421. These are 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
28 The quote is found on pages 152-153 of this chapter. 
 
29 Daniel P. Sulmasy and Nessa Coyle, “Palliative Sedation and the Rule of Double 
Effect,” 114. 
 
30 Ibid. This is not to say the palliative sedation to unconsciousness may not be morally 
justified in some other manner. Instead the claim here is that double effect reasoning is not the 
appropriate tool to be appealed to for justification of this particular form of palliative sedation. 
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not meet the first criterion since the action in question only produces one effect, 
not two. The first criterion, “that one’s action have two effects that follow from it 
immediately,” has often been rightly and reasonably presupposed but often not 
explicitly stated. Yet it is obvious that “if one is to employ double-effect 
reasoning there need to be two distinct effects.”31  
In order to illustrate the criticism, consider the following. It is often claimed 
that aggressive use of morphine can be justified under the rule of double effect 
because it meets all the criteria, including the first one. Morphine, as an opiate, 
causes both pain relief and respiratory depression.32 In other words, with respect 
to the relation between the brain’s receptors and various subsequent 
physiological functions that result, morphine serves to produce these two effects 
in the form of a causal fork, that is, in the form of “a causes both b and c.” 
Morphine does not fit into a causal chain of the form “a causes b which causes 
                                                
31 Ibid., 114-115. 
 
32 It is not the case that respiratory depression always leads to a hastened death when it is 
used in patients at the end of life care. This would be the wrong implication to draw. Yet it is true 
that it can lead to death either if it is not monitored carefully or if the dose has to be significantly 
high enough to get the symptoms under control that it could lead to an unintended hastening of 
death. It should be pointed out that this would be the case with any drug. Hence, this is why there 
is often appeal to the rule of double effect. The physiological effects of morphine use need to be 
carefully understood to minimize the anxiety often associated with it in managing pain. This 
anxiety is perpetuated and increased by a number of unfounded and unwarranted statements 
about its use in dying patients. 
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c.”33 In order to appeal to the rule of double effect, one action is to produce 
two effects in the form of a causal fork and this is the case with the use of 
morphine. In another essay Sulmasy develops this point in greater detail. He 
writes:  
Although in such a case it might not seem immediately obvious, there are, 
in fact, two separable events, distinct in time and space: pain relief 
(intended) and respiratory depression (unintended). To see why these 
really are two distinct events, making the application of the RDE [rule of 
double effect] plausible, it is perhaps best to think about this case on a 
molecular level. The analgesic and respiratory depressant effects of 
morphine occur by the binding of morphine molecules at different 
subtypes of morphine receptors, populating different locations in the 
nervous system. The chemistry for each effect has a different time course 
(kinetics). Morphine achieves pain relief via µ1 receptors and respiratory 
depression via µ2 receptors. These molecular differences are manifested in 
the response of the patient to the drug. Pain relief occurs at lower doses 
and more rapidly than respiratory depression. Thus, while the effects are 
scattered throughout the body, conceptually this is still a Causal Forks 
Scenario…. So the claim that one intended pain relief and not respiratory 
depression is plausible and coherent. 34 [Sulmasy’s parenthetical remarks] 
 
On the other hand, “If one is using benzodiazepines to induce sedation, 
one cannot claim that there are two distinct effects that both follow from the 
administration of the drug, sedation and hastened death. The benzodiazepines 
would be used to cause unconsciousness, and unconsciousness, in turn hastens 
                                                
33 Daniel P. Sulmasy and Nessa Coyle, “Palliative Sedation and the Rule of Double 
Effect,” 115. 
 
34 Daniel P. Sulmasy, “‘Reinventing the Rule of Double Effect,” The Oxford Handbook 
of Bioethics, edited by Bonnie Steinbock (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) 142. 
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death.”35 One can see that this is a causal chain with the form of “a causes b 
which causes c.” Consequently, in a causal chain there is “really only one effect 
and so ‘double’ effect does not apply.” 36  So if “palliative sedation to 
unconsciousness” is morally justifiable at all, it cannot be on the basis of the rule 
of double effect. It would need to be done on some other basis. 
Perhaps, Tännsjö could reply that his understanding of terminal sedation is 
justified by appeal to double effect reasoning claiming that unconsciousness is 
not the aim, but instead it is the relief of suffering. He does, in fact, make a move 
in this direction in the middle of his essay, which is a decisive shift from what he 
previously had stated. When he moves to identifying what sort of practices fall 
within the four categories developed by the combination of acts/omission and 
double effect, he writes of the second category: “the point in sedating the 
patient is not to cause death, but to relieve suffering.37 So even if the sedation 
                                                
35 Daniel P. Sulmasy and Nessa Coyle, “Palliative Sedation and the Rule of Double 
Effect,” 115. 
 
36 Ibid. 
 
37 There may be an inconsistency here for Tännsjö given that he initially stated that 
terminal sedation is a procedure “where the intention of the doctor is that the patient should stay 
comatose until he or she is dead. No extraordinary monitoring of the medical state of the patient 
is undertaken. Normal hydration is ignored. All this means that in some cases where patients are 
being terminally sedated, death is hastened; if the disease does not kill the patient, some 
complication in relation to the sedation, or the withdrawal of treatment and hydration, or the 
combination of these, does.” See quote on page 153, footnote 1. 
 
  
172 
(actively) kills the patient, the death of the patient is merely foreseen, not 
intended.”38  
However this may be, the question remains, “Does this shift from aiming to 
unconsciousness to aiming at the relief of suffering now entitle Tännsjö to make 
use of the rule of double effect in order to justify terminal sedation?” I do not 
think this shift fares any better with respect to the rule of double effect when it is 
applied to his formulation of terminal sedation. His overall purpose, once again, 
is to distinguish terminal sedation from euthanasia. It would seem that he has a 
singular intention, which is to relieve suffering and two effects, namely, (1) the 
intended effect, relief of suffering and (2) the foreseen effect, unconsciousness 
leading to death. On the assumption that the rule of double effect is defensible, 
what, then, is the problem with Tännsjö’s view? 
Several points can be made. First, as is the case with his initial description 
of terminal sedation as discussed above, one wonders if this modified way of 
depicting the event involves a causal chain (rendering one effect) rather than a 
causal fork (which renders two effects). Again, the latter is what would be 
needed for a legitimate appeal to the rule of double effect (see pages 168-
171).  
                                                
38 Tännsjö, “Terminal Sedation: A Substitute for Euthanasia?” 20.  
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Second, the shift by Tännsjö to say that the intended aim is “the relief of 
suffering” lacks specification. It is simply too vague to be useful for double effect 
reasoning. The rule of double effect does not have conceptual space for 
affirming simply that the ends justify the means. So the means by which the goal 
of suffering relief is accomplished must be evaluated. This is a central concern 
for appealing to the rule of double effect in the first place. Of course, one would 
not think it morally justifiable to kill all the children in a city to alleviate child 
abuse therein. While the goal of alleviating child abuse is certainly worthwhile 
and to be sure morally praiseworthy, there are ways, such as the one suggested 
above, that are offered to accomplish the goal of alleviating child abuse that 
would be morally unacceptable. So then the question must be asked in 
reference to the topic at hand, “How is the goal of relieving suffering to be 
attained for Tännsjö?” This has to be specified in a concrete way in order to 
judge if it meets the other stated criteria of the rule of double effect. It appears 
that he does offer a more concrete description of terminal sedation as a 
medical procedure. This brings us back to the initial description of Tännsjö’s 
understanding of terminal sedation that was provided at the beginning of this 
chapter (pages 152-153). If so, then the criticisms from the previous section 
come back to the fore.   
Third, Tännsjö does not provide any philosophical reflection on the 
relevance of the timing of when terminal sedation is to begin in the patients’ 
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trajectory toward death. Nor does he provide any philosophical reflection on 
identifying under what circumstances would the withholding or withdrawal of 
life-sustaining treatment affect one’s moral assessment of the practice of 
terminal sedation. I argue in Chapter 6 that both of these tasks, not seen as 
relevant by Tännsjö, need to be accomplished and incorporated into the 
practice of palliative sedation in order for it to be adequately distinguished from 
PAD. Otherwise, some procedures performed under the name of “terminal 
sedation” in essence may be the same as PAD. Sulmasy and Coyle rightly 
identify the problem with claiming that it is morally justified via double effect 
reasoning to aim for or intend unconsciousness in order to relieve suffering for 
those who oppose PAD. They write: 
To justify palliative sedation to unconsciousness, in which one aims at 
unconsciousness until death, one would thus be required to argue that it is 
better for the dying patient to be unconscious than conscious. And if that 
is the case, it becomes hard to say how the justification for palliative 
sedation to unconsciousness differs from the justification for 
euthanasia….The justification in both cases must be that it is better for the 
patient to be rendered permanently unable to speak, think, eat, pray, 
love, or interact with others, whether this is brought about through 
induced coma or death.39 
 
The further danger with this move by Tännsjö is that Battin’s criticisms from 
Chapter 4 of this work become much more salient. She thinks, one is reminded, 
                                                
39 Sulmasy and Coyle, “Palliative Sedation and the Rule of Double Effect,” 116. It is 
possible that there could be other ways where this state of affairs could be morally justified. But 
it does not appear that it can be done so by appeal to double effect reasoning which is the mode 
of justification in question in this section. 
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that there is a greater likelihood, or perhaps even an inevitability, of abuse and 
deception with the practice of terminal sedation or palliative sedation to 
unconsciousness until death, than with PAD. On the account of terminal 
sedation with which Tännsjö is working, and the manner in which he employs the 
conceptual tools in question, it seems that Battin’s worries are legitimate when 
one aims to relieve suffering by palliative sedation to unconsciousness until 
death. If so, then it is not surprising that: 
[t]here have been reports of those who, failing to see the distinction 
between the justification for euthanasia and the justification for palliative 
sedation to unconsciousness, have titrated up the sedating drug far past 
the doses needed to dissociate the patient from his or her symptoms, 
explicitly in order to hasten death. It is a violation of transparency to 
“cloak” these latter practices deceptively under the guise of palliative 
sedation.40 
 
It does appear that once deep sedation to unconsciousness until death 
becomes the aim in order to relieve suffering, as Tännsjö claims, “the distinction 
between justifiable and unjustifiable doses becomes easier to blur and the 
distinction between symptom control and euthanasia becomes more difficult to 
defend logically.” 41  (emphasis mine) And so Battin’s counter conceptual 
slippery slope argument from Chapter 4 appears to have some merit.  
Fourth, Tännsjö seems very close to arguing for terminal sedation on 
demand regardless of whether or not it is clinically indicated. If this is so, then 
                                                
40 Ibid. 
 
41 Ibid. 
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terminal sedation is not being appealed to as a last resort as is the standard 
amongst palliative care experts. Further, if double effect reasoning is to be 
employed the action one is considering performing should be seen as last resort. 
The basis for these claims is two-fold. First, given the “ethical and legal 
controversy about the acceptability of physician assisted suicide and voluntary 
active euthanasia…terminal sedation [has] been proposed as ethically superior 
responses of last resort that do not require changes in professional standards or 
the law.”42 The very procedure itself is considered appropriate when all other 
attempts at managing pain or treating symptoms fail. This is why terminal 
sedation is often associated with or discussed in the context of dealing with 
intractable pain (i.e. pain that is resistant to relief) or refractory symptoms (i.e. 
symptoms that are not responsive to standard treatments).  
If standard treatments were successful, there would be no need to 
employ such extreme measures as terminal sedation. If terminal sedation were 
employed and other less radical treatments were available and reasonably 
thought to be effective, then one would have a difficult time justifying its use 
professionally. Furthermore, it would seem that appeal to the rule of double 
effect would not be appropriate in these situations since it would not meet the 
                                                
42 Timothy E. Quill, Bernad Lo, and Dan Brock, “Palliative Options of Last Resort: A 
Comparison of Voluntary Stopping Eating and Drinking, Terminal Sedation, Physician-Assisted 
Suicide, and Voluntary Active Euthanasia,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 
Volume 278, No. 23, (December 1997): 2099.  
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proportionality requirement. This would be because the good effect (the relief of 
suffering) could be achieved with a less invasive means that does not in the first 
instance aim for unconsciousness. So herein is the two-fold basis for thinking that 
both terminal sedation and double effect reasoning are employed in palliative 
care when considering options of last resort. Here, again, is another indication 
that this conceptual tool is being used in the wrong way. 
All of this suggests that palliative sedation to unconsciousness as Tännsjö 
has conceived it does not meet the necessary criteria for it to be a morally 
justifiable medical practice under traditional formulations of the rule of double 
effect. Thus, the claim that Tännsjö uses a potentially helpful conceptual tool in 
the wrong way is reinforced. To be sure, double effect reasoning can be 
notoriously complex and controversial. We, nevertheless, need to tread carefully 
here. Certainly, much of what is said and believed in applied ethics, as well as in 
philosophy more generally, is controversial. The mere fact that there may be 
deep and widespread disagreement as to the moral importance of some 
distinction or form of reasoning, say, does not in any way automatically make 
the controversial point in question irrelevant to the discussion. I do think a version 
of double effect reasoning in the end may be defensible and seems to many to 
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make good sense in some cases.43 However, I do not make appeal to it in 
Chapter 6 in my formulation of a Wedge Argument. 
However, for the purposes here it is enough to affirm that regardless of 
what one thinks about double effect reasoning, it simply cannot be appealed 
to in order to justify morally any and every situation in which some acts have 
unintended yet foreseen consequences. One of the problems with double 
effect reasoning is that, in practice, some have attempted to apply it too 
widely. It should not be thought of as a “Get out of Jail Free Card,” so to speak. 
We return to this issue in Chapter 6, “Toward a More Defensible Wedge 
Argument.”  
 
Conclusion  
In light of what is discussed in this section, those who hold to traditional 
formulations of both the sanctity of human life view and double effect reasoning 
should see terminal sedation as described by Tännsjö and PAD as morally 
equivalent. In the end, then, it appears that Tännsjö’s formulation is a form of 
PAD. And so it cannot be considered an effective “Wedge Argument.” 
                                                
43 A helpful treatment and robust defense of this topic referenced above is by Daniel P. 
Sulmasy, “‘Reinventing’ the Rule of Double Effect,” 114-149. The central question here with 
respect to double effect and terminal sedation is: Is it needed for moral justification of the 
practice in a health care context? I discuss this in the next chapter. 
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If Tännsjö’s “Wedge Argument” is inadequate, then the equivalency 
arguments developed by Battin, Brock, and others that in essence support 
premise 2 of the “Inconsistency Argument” remain intact, which reads: “There 
are no morally relevant differences between palliative/terminal sedation and 
PAD.” The conclusion articulated in 5 also holds sway, which reads: “Therefore, 
palliative/terminal sedation is morally impermissible.” So those medical 
professionals and medical ethicists who reject PAD, for the reasons developed in 
Chapter 3, must also reject Tännsjö’s form of terminal sedation in order to be 
morally consistent. And herein remains the challenge of the “Inconsistency 
Argument” for the terminal sedation alternative. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
TOWARD A MORE DEFENSIBLE WEDGE ARGUMENT 
 
 
Introduction 
 This final chapter attempts a more defensible wedge argument than the 
one offered in Chapter 5 by Tännsjö to the “Inconsistency Argument” 
delineated in this dissertation. Along the way, there will be explicit responses to 
some of the more significant objections made by Battin in making what is 
essentially her equivalency argument as discussed in Chapter 4. Much of what is 
said below in reframing the discussion as well as aspects of the explicit responses 
to Battin serve as an implicit response to some of the ethical and practical 
challenges raised by Brock in his version of the Equivalency Argument also 
described in Chapter 4. 
 The chapter unfolds with the first section providing a more nuanced 
understanding of palliative sedation. From this frame of reference, I move into 
the next section to identify what are the distinct features of palliative sedation 
that distances it, ethically speaking, from PAD. These features in essence are to 
serve as a response to premise 2 of the “Inconsistency Argument” which says, 
“There are no morally relevant differences between palliative or terminal 
sedation and PAD,” thereby, blocking the conclusion that claims that if PAD is 
morally impermissible so is palliative sedation.  
  
181 
Reframing the Discussion 
 I develop this section in the following six ways. First, I claim that some of 
the key terms in this debate are ambiguous which leads to some confusion. 
Next, I highlight three types of palliative sedation. Third, I advocate for the 
second type, namely, proportionate palliative sedation, going forward in what 
remains of this work. The discussion then turns, in the final two sub-sections, to 
how this nuanced version of palliative sedation relates both to the three phases 
of dying, and to the withholding of life-sustaining treatment. The final sub-section 
brings all these facets together in order to properly reframe the conversation for 
developing a more defensible Wedge Argument.  
 
 Ambiguity of the Terms 
One of the primary reasons that contributes to the complexity of this topic 
is that terminal sedation suffers from a degree of ambiguity that makes it difficult 
to assess its moral equivalence or lack thereof with PAD. For example, does the 
word ‘terminal’ refer to sedating those patients with terminal illnesses since there 
remain no more curative options? Or does ‘terminal’ most likely refer to sedation 
for intractable symptoms at the end or terminus of the life of a dying patient? Or 
is it that the ‘terminal’ in “terminal sedation” refers to the fact that the sedation is 
done in a manner that actually terminates the patient’s life? 
  
182 
 Many lay people, patients, and those close to them are confused about 
what terminal sedation refers to, and so are some medical ethicists and health 
care professionals. This confusion results in much consternation on the part of 
people trying to evaluate various palliative care options at the end of life. Many 
working in the hospice and palliative care arenas prefer the term ‘palliative 
sedation’ instead of ‘terminal sedation’ in an attempt to minimize the confusion. 
This move emphasizes the goal of palliative sedation is in some way to provide 
comfort to the patient and to palliate certain symptoms at the end of life.  
Here again, while this is a much better choice of words, it would seem that 
it suffers, too, from some ambiguity. As “many clinicians argue that palliative 
sedation does not necessarily mandate sedation to total unconsciousness.”1 
Palliative sedation could refer to anything from taking Benadryl to address some 
symptom to palliative sedation with the aim to unconsciousness until the point of 
death while withholding artificial feeding nutrition and hydration. As Maltoni, et. 
al. have specified, the range of options 
can vary in terms of level (mild, intermediate, and deep), duration 
(intermittent or continuous), and pharmacological characteristics…. Other 
authors classify sedation as sudden or proportional on the basis of whether 
it is established rapidly. ‘Emergency sedation’ is made in immediately 
preterminal patients with overwhelming symptoms for catastrophic events 
such as massive bleeding, severe dyspnea, agitated delirium, or pain. A 
further, highly specific but potentially useful subtype of [palliative sedation 
                                                
1 M. Maltoni., et. al., “Palliative sedation therapy does not hasten death: results from a 
prospective multicenter study,” Annals of Oncology 20, (2009): 1163. 
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therapy] is ‘respite sedation’, a procedure involving temporary and time-
limited sedation. Finally, the possibility of using ‘routine’, ‘infrequent’ or 
‘extraordinary’ sedation has also been put forward.2  
 
Those who work in the areas of palliative, hospice, and end-of-life care are more 
interested in the procedures as they emerge in the latter stages of the dying 
process. 
  
Three Types of Palliative Sedation 
I identify three primary types of palliative sedation, which are helpful for 
our purposes going forward. The first is that of ordinary sedation. The goal of 
treatment is symptom relief “without reducing the patient’s level of 
consciousness.” It is often used to address disorders as, anxiety, agitation, or 
insomnia among others. This is considered standard medical practice and is not 
thought of as particularly controversial.3  
 The second type is proportionate palliative sedation. This is a monitored 
procedure where sedating medicines “are progressively increased alongside 
other symptom-relieving measures, resulting in increasing levels of sedation 
during both waking and sleeping hours to help relieve suffering.”4 It is most often 
                                                
2 Ibid. 
 
3 Timothy E. Quill, Bernard Lo, Dan W. Brock, and Alan Meisel, “Last-Resort Options 
for Palliative Sedation,” Annals of Internal Medicine, Volume 151, Number 6 (2009): 421. 
 
4 Ibid. 
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seen as a last resort begun as a response to otherwise intractable physical 
symptoms, such as agitated terminal delirium, in those patients where death is 
imminent. There are two important qualifications that often accompany 
proportionate palliative sedation. The first is that it uses the “minimum amount of 
sedation needed to achieve its goal” with the rate of sedation increase being 
contingent upon “the severity of physical symptoms, usually ranging from hourly 
to daily.” The second is that it sometimes requires that the patient be sedated to 
the point of unconsciousness, “which is considered a foreseen but unintended 
side effect when lesser degrees of sedation [are] ineffective.”5   
 The last type was introduced in Chapter 5 while critiquing Tännsjö’s 
wedge argument. It is palliative sedation to unconsciousness. In this last, and 
more controversial category, “unconsciousness is the intended goal of the 
sedation rather than a side effect.” If an imminently dying patient finds himself or 
herself in a situation where severe physical symptoms are intolerable “despite 
state-of-the-art palliative care, and continuing consciousness under the 
circumstances unacceptable,” then palliative sedation to unconsciousness can 
be initiated.6 Quill, Lo, Brock and Meisel describe this practice by noting that 
“sedation is rapidly increased over minutes to a few hours until the patient is 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Ibid., 421-422. 
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unresponsive, and then is left at that level until the patient dies. Except under 
very unusual circumstances, artificial hydration and nutrition are not provided.”7 
  
 Advocating Proportionate Palliative Care Going Forward 
For those who are opposed to PAD for the kinds of reasons presented in 
this work, I advocate that something like proportionate palliative sedation is 
more in keeping with suitable forms of aggressive comfort care. It is crucial to 
emphasize, at the outset, that the success criterion for proportionate palliative 
sedation is symptom relief. Whereas the success criterion for PAD just is the death 
of the patient, albeit, as proponents of PAD argue, for reasons of benevolence.  
Identifying the success criterion is important for it can assist with 
establishing parameters or potential safeguards on the amount of medications 
needed to attain the desired effect, which is in keeping with the minimalist 
approach to proportionate palliative sedation. This conception is consistent with 
the aggressive use of sedating and other kinds of medicines in order to palliate 
the symptoms. If higher and more frequent doses are needed and clinically 
indicated, then they should be used. Moreover, it would be morally permissible 
to do so, and in some situations one may even be morally obligated to do so.  
                                                
7 Ibid., 422. 
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It is important to note for the account being developed that in order for 
this to be a morally permissible procedure it needs to be: 1) carefully monitored, 
2) autonomous, and 3) initiated at an appropriate time in the dying process 
when it is clinically indicated. A brief line or two about each of these is in order. 
First, proportionate palliative sedation needs to be carefully monitored since the 
“level of sedation required to relieve symptoms varies from patient to patient.” 
Therefore, “clinical vigilance is needed to ensure continued relief of suffering 
and rapid adjustment of therapy if needed.” 8  Second, it needs to be 
autonomous such that the patient or person with durable power of attorney is 
aware of the goals of sedation, under what circumstances it would be 
performed, how it is to be performed if the patient and care team are unable to 
communicate at some point, and the patient or proxy must freely consent to 
the relevant course of action having understood all of this. This should include 
discussions of artificial nutrition and hydration. And last, it must not be initiated 
too soon in the dying process. There is more on this below. 
Above I used the phrase, “something like proportionate palliative 
sedation” is being supported in this context. The words “something like” are used 
to render a slight qualification to the way Quill, et. al. craft the intent of these 
                                                
8 Daniel P. Sulmasy and Nessa Coyle, “Palliative Sedation and the Rule of Double 
Effect,” End-of-Life Ethics: A Case Study Approach, edited by Kenneth J. Doka, Amy S. Tucci, 
Charles A. Corr, and Bruce Jennings (Washington D.C.: Hospice Foundation of America, 2012) 
109. 
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practices. They suggest that the intent of both proportionate palliative sedation 
and palliative sedation to unconsciousness is “to relieve suffering.” I highlight in 
Chapter 5 the philosophical concerns with having the relief of suffering as the 
aim of palliative sedation. The most relevant feature is that for the purposes of 
moral evaluation the aim of suffering relief is underspecified. Going forward, I 
slightly modify the wording given by them with respect to the form of 
proportionate palliative sedation that is promoted here.  
Those opposed to PAD should self-consciously identify the aim of 
proportionate palliative sedation as being the relief of intractable pain or other 
refractory symptoms that cause the patient to suffer. The reason for this narrower 
understanding is that while the terms ‘pain’ and ‘suffering’ are often mentioned 
together and sometimes used interchangeably, they should be distinguished 
even though they are related concepts. ‘Pain’ is a complex physical 
phenomenon understood as a subjective experience “caused by stimulation of 
specialized nerve endings.”9 ‘Suffering’ as understood in the context of palliative 
care often refers to a “highly personal experience that depends on the 
meaning of an event such as illness or loss has for an individual.” Insofar as this is 
                                                
9 Dorland’s Pocket Medical Dictionary, 25th Edition (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders 
Company, 1995), s.v. “Pain.” 
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correct, we can see, then, that “one can suffer without physical pain, and 
physical pain doesn’t necessarily involve suffering.”10  
Given that the nature of suffering is multifarious, sedation may not be 
proper for some, though by no means all, forms of it. If the goal of quality 
palliative care moves from excellent compassionate comfort care (i.e. suffering 
with) to “alleviating all patient suffering” this could lead to a skewed 
understanding of what practices should be permitted in order to achieve this 
goal. Also, by framing the goal of palliative care in terms of the relief of 
intractable pain or other refractory symptoms that cause suffering, it begins to 
put some conceptual safeguards in place to limit potential abuse. In short, this is 
because the success criterion of when the goal has been achieved is different 
from what it would be if the goal is to alleviate all patient suffering regardless of 
the type and whether or not death is imminent.11  
                                                
10 Joan T. Panke, “Difficulties in Managing Pain at the End of Life,” Journal of Hospice 
and Palliative Nursing, Vol. 5, No. 2, April–June, 2003, 84. Also see the standard works on this 
issue by a major proponent of this view: E. J. Cassell, “Life as a Work of Art,” Hastings Center 
Report 14, (1984): 35-37; E. J. Cassell, “Diagnosing Suffering: A Perspective,” Annals of 
Internal Medicine, Vol. 31 (1999): 531-534; and E. J. Cassell, The Nature of Suffering and the 
Goals of Medicine, Second Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
 
11 What I have in mind here includes, but is not limited to, a broad category sometimes 
termed “existential suffering.” There is some suffering that results from people having a difficult 
time coping with new irreversible realities for the remainder of their lives. Or there is some 
suffering that results from fear of future realities that have not yet obtained or may not obtain. 
Other kinds of suffering are the result of patients’ inability to receive forgiveness from someone 
whom they may have wronged. While it is debatable, there is some concern that if sufficient care 
is not taken, medicine may be called upon to extend beyond its traditional scope to address 
psychosocial issues such as the ones listed above (or as some literature suggests, “spiritual” 
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Proportionate Palliative Sedation and the Phases of Dying 
I noted above that proportionate palliative sedation is a “last resort begun 
as a response to otherwise intractable physical symptoms in those patients 
where death is imminent.” This brings the discussion to another important 
juncture to better see the appropriateness of this procedure in addressing 
suffering from intractable pain and otherwise refractory symptoms. There are 
universal signs and symptoms that clinicians can use to identify imminent death. 
For our purposes, we can stipulate three general categories that serve as a 
canvas in order to better grasp how clinicians make judgments concerning the 
imminence of death.  
First, the “stable” category refers to those who have a terminal or other life 
limiting chronic illness where death is near though not imminent. The decline in 
life expectancy is noticeable even if the time line for when death will actually 
take place is indefinite. The second category can be described as a pre-active 
or perhaps, a transitional phase. It is an admittedly subjective designation that 
involves clinical judgments of medical professionals identifying declining 
behavioral change in patients that are significant for predicting death within 
about 1 to 2 weeks. Now while this category is subjective it should not be 
thought necessarily as idiosyncratic. The third category is what is commonly 
                                                                                                                                                       
issues, which is not necessarily to be equated with religion) by using pharmacological means 
before other means have been attempted and when death is not imminent. 
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called the active phase of dying. In the active phase of dying, clinicians are 
able to identify objective changes in patients such as tachycardia (i.e. rapid 
heart rate), breathing problems, apnea (being without breath), cold and 
discolored extremities, no urine output, low blood pressure, etc. These are 
indications that usually death is within about 3 days. 
 
Proportionate Palliative Sedation and Life-Sustaining Treatment 
It must be acknowledged that in many, if not most, appropriate instances 
of proportionate palliative sedation artificial nutrition and hydration are usually 
withheld. One study “shows that when [proportionate] palliative sedation is 
being initiated, the oral intake of foods and/or fluids is reduced to a minimum.”12  
If it is carefully monitored, the patient has given prior consent, and the 
procedure is initiated at a point in the dying process where if food and water 
were provided it would be more burdensome to the patient than without it, then 
proportionate palliative sedation accompanied by the withholding of artificial 
nutrition and hydration should not be considered especially controversial. 
                                                
12 Patricia Claessens, et. al., “Palliative Sedation, Not Slow Euthanasia: A Prospective, 
Longitudinal Study of Sedation in Flemish Palliative Care Units,” Journal of Pain and Symptom 
Management, Volume 41, No. 1, (January 2011): 21. 
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Palliative care patients tend to eat and drink less the more they approach the 
ends of their lives.”13  
Proportionate palliative sedation while withholding artificial nutrition and 
hydration may seem problematic to some clinicians since they “might worry that 
while the actual practice of palliative sedation can be distinguished from 
euthanasia, coupling decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatments 
to the decision to sedate makes the whole package deal tantamount to 
euthanasia.”14 But this is not the case. In hospice and other end-of-life palliative 
care contexts, many patients have ceased eating and drinking at the end 
stages of the dying process as a direct result of the illness or disease. As some 
palliative care experts rightly have pointed out, “one should keep in mind that 
an average patient in that stage of his or her illness only takes little sips of fluid 
and, in most cases, no food whatsoever. Withholding little sips of water because 
of the decision to sedate (and to withhold artificial hydration) has no proven life-
shortening effect.”15  
Not only are there physical changes that have taken place in dying 
patients, that make it difficult to eat and digest food, but also there is oftentimes 
                                                
13 Ibid., 22. 
 
14 Sulmasy and Coyle, “Palliative Sedation and the Rule of Double Effect,” 118. This was 
also a concern that was expressed by Battin in Chapter 4. 
 
15 Patricia Claessens, et. al., “Palliative Sedation, Not Slow Euthanasia: A Prospective, 
Longitudinal Study of Sedation in Flemish Palliative Care Units,” 21-22. 
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a corresponding lack of desire for food and water as well. To continue feeding a 
patient at the point when he or she is no longer able to tolerate it would cause 
discomfort. This is, obviously, in conflict with the goals of palliative care. 
“Additionally, hydration can worsen distressing signs such as the ‘death rattle’ 
and make it difficult to handle the patient’s secretions.”16 The reality for patients 
and clinicians is that “administering artificial fluids to terminal patients has a 
rather baleful influence on patients’ conditions.” And this “suggests that starting 
artificial fluids during palliative sedation is futile” if not harmful.17 There is a point 
where artificial feeding and hydration are no longer beneficial to a dying 
patient given the physiological deterioration of the body as a result of disease 
progression. This is a common phenomenon at the end of life.  
However, in those circumstances where patients are capable of 
physiologically tolerating feeding and hydration and when they perhaps could 
be of some benefit to a patient, nutrition and hydration certainly can be 
continued after proportionate palliative sedation has commenced. “The 
withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration in a patient who is sedated at the 
end of life is [to be] justified independently, even though the decision must be 
                                                
16 Sulmasy and Coyle, “Palliative Sedation and the Rule of Double Effect,” 119. 
 
17 Patricia Claessens, et. al., “Palliative Sedation, Not Slow Euthanasia: A Prospective, 
Longitudinal Study of Sedation in Flemish Palliative Care Units,” 22. 
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made in light of the fact that sedation has been chosen as a treatment option 
for controlling intractable symptoms.”18  
It is not a necessary condition for proportionate palliative sedation to 
withhold artificial nutrition and hydration as a matter of due course. So we must 
keep in mind that in “deciding to withhold or withdraw artificial fluid (in cases of 
palliative sedation) is a totally different discussion from that of deciding to start 
palliative sedation.”19 These are withheld if it would be more burdensome than 
beneficial, but could be continued if not. Yet, these are usually withheld 
because in most instances they become unproductive or overly burdensome. In 
such circumstances, this should not be thought controversial but as a clinically 
indicated reason for ceasing these kinds of life-sustaining treatments. To be sure, 
contra the claims of Battin and Tännsjö (in Chapters 4 and 5), “withholding or 
withdrawing food and/or fluid is not an intrinsic part of palliative sedation and, 
therefore, should not be integrated in a definition of palliative sedation.”20 
 
 
 
                                                
18 Sulmasy and Coyle, “Palliative Sedation and the Rule of Double Effect,” 119. 
 
19 Patricia Claessens, et. al., “Palliative Sedation, Not Slow Euthanasia: A Prospective, 
Longitudinal Study of Sedation in Flemish Palliative Care Units,” 22. 
 
20 Ibid., 22. 
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Bringing it All Together 
We have reached another important juncture and must ask, “What is the 
relationship of proportionate palliative sedation and artificial nutrition and 
hydration to the various stages or phases of dying?” For each of the phases, if 
proportionate palliative sedation is done intermittently, there is little, if any, 
ethical controversy. “Intermittent” in this context describes the process where 
the level of sedation is adjusted or titrated up or down in order to determine 
whether or not the patient is able to tolerate their condition while simultaneously 
being aware of their surroundings at a given point in the process of dying.   
But what are we to think about proportionate palliative sedation that 
ends up being continuous until the point of death instead of intermittent? In 
what follows, I primarily have in view implications for those medical professionals 
who reject PAD while advocating proportionate palliative sedation. Let’s begin 
with the stable phase.  Proportionate palliative sedation done in this category, if 
it were deemed clinically indicated, would need to be intermittent. This should 
be the case whether artificial feeding and hydration are withheld or not for 
those who want to distance the practice from becoming a form of slow 
euthanasia. Since the time of death in the stable phase is indeterminate, it is 
much more likely that if a patient is continuously deeply sedated all at once 
while at the same time being denied artificial nutrition and hydration, then 
death is much more likely to occur by starvation or dehydration as opposed to 
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the underlying disease process. In such a scenario, proportionate palliative 
sedation was initiated too early in the dying process. This would typically be 
considered ethically impermissible, as it would appear to introduce a “lethal 
mix” into the existing pathology of the professional health care relationship.  
With respect to the pre-active transitional phase, while one perhaps is not 
morally obligated to withhold artificial nutrition and hydration when performing 
proportionate sedation here, it certainly is ethically permissible under the 
conditions described above if eating and drinking have ceased. For example, 
patients often stop eating due to many of the bodily changes that occur during 
the transitional phase of dying. Clinical judgments need to be made at the 
suitable time as to whether or not there are medical indications for what turns 
out to have been continuous proportionate palliative sedation until the point of 
death. For the most part, this should not be seen as controversial or ethically 
problematic, just a matter of professional judgment. Certainly, continuous 
proportionate palliative sedation while withholding life-sustaining treatment 
should not be thought of as morally problematic during the active phase of 
dying for intractable pain and refractory symptoms, all things being equal. To be 
sure, proportionate palliative sedation must not be done in a manner such that 
more sedating drugs are used than needed to attain the desired effect at this 
stage. To state the obvious, it would be, then, no longer proportionate. 
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And so by way of conclusion to this section, proportionate palliative 
sedation with its various conditions, qualifications, and applied contexts as 
discussed above is the nuanced understanding that is to be evaluated in 
relation to PAD. The peculiar features of proportionate palliative sedation, I 
suggest, serve in the development of a more defensible Wedge Argument. 
 
Two Distinctions that Make a Moral Difference 
For those who deem that PAD is ethically inappropriate in a health care 
context, the practice of proportionate palliative sedation differs morally from 
PAD in two related yet distinct ways. First, the purpose of proportionate palliative 
sedation is the relief of intractable pain or other refractory symptoms that cause 
suffering by using carefully monitored sedating drugs along with other clinically 
indicated medication in the imminently dying. 21  Thus, an agent performing 
proportionate palliative sedation should intend, in the narrow sense, as his or her 
aim to act in a way that is in keeping with the stated goal and purpose of this 
medical practice. This significantly distinguishes the moral meaning of 
                                                
21 Clinically speaking, “A variety of drugs can be used for palliative sedation, depending 
on the symptom being targeted; sometimes a combination of agents is selected. Commonly used 
agents include benzodiazepines, barbiturates, neuroleptics, and anesthetics. Frequently one or 
more of these drugs may be added to the patient’s background of around-the-clock opioids 
already prescribed for the management of pain and/or dyspnea.” Daniel P. Sulmasy and Nessa 
Coyle, “Palliative Sedation and the Rule of Double Effect,” End-of-Life Ethics: A Case Study 
Approach, edited by Kenneth J. Doka, Amy S. Tucci, Charles Corr, and Bruce Jennings 
(Washington, D.C.: Hospice Foundation of America, 2012) 109. 
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proportionate palliative sedation from PAD given the reasons why the latter 
practices are thought to be wrong.22   
The second distinction that makes a moral difference between these two 
practices is, when administered appropriately by skilled palliative care 
professionals, proportionate palliative sedation should not be thought of as the 
cause of death. There is evidence to suggest that it actually does not hasten the 
death of patients. The same cannot be said with respect to PAD regardless of 
whether one thinks it should be deemed morally permissible or not. Therefore, 
proportionate palliative sedation differs from instances of PAD in its moral 
meaning in a fundamental way. 
 
A Difference of Purpose and Clinical Intention 
This part of the chapter begins with general reflections on some of the 
theoretical issues involved in appealing to clinical intentions. I make use of an 
account of intention and the significant role it plays in moral assessment 
developed by T. M. Scanlon that in the end does not appeal to a form of 
double effect reasoning. Then, I underscore and respond to some of the 
concrete worries raised by the practical problems of the internal and external 
discernment of intentions. I conclude with an application of the details 
                                                
22 The distinction between the broad and narrow senses of “intention” along with the 
notion of the moral meaning of an action or event is discussed below. 
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developed in this section to Battin’s fear that terminal or palliative sedation 
obscures the true intention behind the practice such that genuine consent is not 
possible. 
 
Theoretical Issues Concerning Appeal to Clinical Intentions 
Clinical intentions play a central role in evaluating and understanding the 
meaning of particular moral events in a health care context. They also matter in 
judging the culpability of some human actions. But two questions emerge: How 
exactly should the notion of intention be understood? And moreover, how are 
intentions relevant in moral assessment of an action or event? I’ll take briefly 
each of these questions in turn. 
The difficulty of providing a full-orbed analysis and account of 
intentionality that responsibly incorporates relevant discussions in action and 
event theory, models of causation, their relations to propositional attitudes and 
so forth is well known in philosophical circles. All of this is notoriously difficult. It is 
not the central thrust of this project to work out a robust account of 
intentionality. The goal here simply is to say enough so one can conceive the 
notion of intention in a way that gets at its basic thrust and how it is relevant for 
moral assessment.  
Despite its vast complexity, one can, following T. M. Scanlon, make some 
distinctions that may prove helpful in understanding the basic notion of intention 
  
199 
and intuitive appeal of the centrality of intentions in moral assessment. To begin, 
“When we say that a person did something intentionally, one thing we may 
mean is simply that it was something that he or she was aware of doing or 
realized would be a consequence of his or her action.”23 This description of 
intentional action is contrasted with unintentional action in that the latter is 
something the agent did not realize he or she was doing. This is the wider or 
broader sense in which intentional and unintentional actions are portrayed and 
is the sense in which the terms often are used. The broader sense of ‘intention’ 
“is in the first instance a matter of what the agent understands herself to be 
doing rather than what her reasons were for doing it.” 24  However, there is 
another sense, a narrower one, in which ‘intention’ is commonly used that has 
more to do with the reasons for which one is acting. As Scanlon describes it: 
To ask a person what her intention was in doing a certain thing is to ask 
her what her aim was in doing it, and what plan guided her action—how 
she saw the action as promoting her objective. To ask this is in part to ask 
what her reasons were for acting in such a way—which of the various 
features of what she realized she was doing were features she took to 
count in favor of acting in this way. This narrower sense of intention is at 
least very close to the sense of intention involved in the distinction, central 
to the doctrine of double effect, between consequences of one’s action 
that are intended (as ends or chosen means) and those that are merely 
foreseen.25 
                                                
23 T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2008) 10. 
 
24 Ibid., 11. 
 
25 Ibid., 10-11. 
 
  
200 
This brings us to the second question raised above which is: “How are 
intentions relevant in moral assessment of an action or event?” Scanlon appeals 
to another distinction in unpacking the notion of intention for moral evaluation 
by differentiating moral permissibility and the moral meaning of an action. The 
permissibility of an action does in a sense depend upon the intentions of the 
agent. Yet Scanlon thinks that the “way in which intent can be relevant to the 
permissibility of an action is in an important sense derivative.”26  
Permissibility is primarily derived from the action’s meaning, which he 
understands to be “the significance, for the agent and others, of the agent’s 
willingness to perform that action for the reasons he or she does.”27 Scanlon 
explains how he sees moral permissibility and moral meaning relating to each 
other in the following way: 
If it is impermissible for me to treat you in a certain way, then my treating 
you in that way has a certain meaning: it indicates a failure on my part to 
give proper weight to those considerations that make such treatment 
impermissible. But the meaning of an action can vary independently of its 
permissibility. Injuring you intentionally and negligently inflicting the same 
injury are both impermissible but have different meanings: the former 
reflects outright hostility to your interests, the latter only a lack of sufficient 
care.28 
 
                                                
26 Ibid., 12-13. 
 
27 Ibid., 4. 
 
28 Ibid., 55. 
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As noted, Scanlon thinks that the narrow sense of intent is primarily about 
an agent’s reasons for acting. And so, while moral permissibility may not always 
be tied directly to an agent’s intent (as is the case with most formulations of 
double effect), the moral meaning clearly is. In those situations where it appears 
that moral permissibility or impermissibility depends on the intent of the agent (or 
an agent’s reasons for acting), they are really circumstances where moral 
permissibility or impermissibility depends on the moral meaning of the action.29 
The forgoingsummarily portrays how Scanlon sees intentions as being relevant 
for the moral assessment of some action or event. 
The plausibility of his points can be captured in our reflections on 
particular cases even if all of the difficult issues in action theory are not fully 
resolved. Of course, thought experiments can’t do all of the needed 
philosophical work. But they can prove helpful nonetheless. Take for example a 
case presented by an ethicist that asks us to consider two scenarios involving 
two dentists, the compassionate Dr. Fill and the nasty Dr. Drill.  
[D]r. Fill drills out decay in your tooth and fills the cavity, in accordance 
with good dental practice, even though both you and [D]r. Fill foresee 
that you will suffer from pain. The following week [D]r. Drill drills out decay 
in another of your teeth and fills the cavity. But whereas [D]r. Fill merely 
foresaw that you would inevitably suffer pain, [D]r. Drill intends you to 
suffer pain. Clearly, whereas [D]r.  Fill has done nothing morally 
questionable, [D]r. Drill has. And the reason is solely to be found in [D]r. 
Drill’s intending the bad consequence rather than simply foreseeing it as 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
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an inevitable side-effect of the good consequence, namely repairing 
your tooth. This is irrespective of the fact that the bad consequence, the 
pain, is precisely the same in both cases.30  
Regardless of identical outcomes, most would judge the scenarios as 
being morally dissimilar in that the meaning of the moral events are not ethically 
on par. It takes more than equivalent outcomes to have moral equivalence.31 It 
seems clear that the difference in the intentional states of mind or the internal 
dispositions toward their respective patients and the reasons why Dr. Fill and Dr. 
Drill acted in said cases conditions the moral meaning of their actions. And this is 
significant for evaluating the nature of the moral events in question.  
There is a challenge that this line of thinking must face: if one says that Dr. 
Drill’s action is morally wrong, then what should he have done instead? One 
could say, Dr. Drill should have done the same act (i.e. same movements with 
his hands using the same dental instruments in the mouth of the patient to drill 
out the decay) but from a different benign motive. Then one could say that we 
have a different action with a different moral meaning. This is where a distinction 
that W. D. Ross makes between an “act” and an “action” may be helpful. In 
addressing the confusion that sometimes emerges in ethics by using the phrase 
“right action,” he writes in response: 
                                                
30 John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An Argument Against Legislation 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 18-19. 
 
31 Fiona Randall and R. S. Downie, End of Life Choices: Consensus and Controversy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) 166. 
 
  
203 
[A]dditional clearness would be gained if we used ‘act’ of the things 
done, the initiation of change, and ‘action’ of the doing it, the initiating of 
change, from a certain motive. We should then talk of a right act but not 
of a right action, of a morally good action but not of a morally good act. 
And it may be added that the doing of a right act may be a morally bad 
action, and that the doing of a wrong act may be a morally good action; 
for ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ refer entirely to the thing done, ‘morally good’ and 
‘morally bad’ entirely to the motive from which it is done. A firm grasp of 
this distinction will do much to remove some of the perplexities of our 
moral thought.32  
 
If Ross’s thinking is in some way right-headed, then we could say that Dr. 
Drill performed the ‘”right act” but a “morally bad action.” So there is reason for 
people to avoid acting from bad motives and so reason for, say, Dr. Drill to 
avoid acting from the motives he has. Although his act is not wrong, because it 
benefits his patient while causing the least suffering possible, he has a moral 
reason to avoid doing what he does from the reason (motive) he acts upon. This 
could explain why many think that defenders of the Rule of Double Effect are 
mistaken about what makes acts right or wrong but correct in saying that the 
nature of the person’s motives bears on what moral reasons there are, or are 
not, for acting in certain ways from certain motives. This Rossian distinction gains 
further traction, it seems, when one recalls the components of a moral event as 
stipulated in Chapter 2. A moral event contains at least five elements, namely, 
                                                
32 W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good, edited by Philip Stratton-Lake (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) 7. (originally published in 1930) Stratton-Lake highlights in the 
editor’s notes on this section that Ross shifted in his Foundations of Ethics where he later 
thought that in reference to “the thing done” that “what we should do is not certain acts, but ‘set 
ourselves’ to do certain acts.” (Ibid. 175)  
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the agent, the act, the circumstances, the consequences, and the agent’s 
intentions for acting.33 Therefore, any moral event or action is morally complex.  
The thought experiment provided above does make appeal to the 
intended/foreseen distinction. While not all medical ethicists or clinicians accept 
this, nevertheless, many professional organizations do think that the 
intention/foreseen distinction is important given the nature and practice of 
medicine. As one medical ethicist and physician noted, “the distinction 
between the intended and the foreseen is of critical importance to any 
account of the practice of medicine.”34 One does not need to be an advocate 
of double effect reasoning to accept these claims on the role of intention and 
its various distinctions identified by Scanlon. In fact, the point that I am trying to 
make in this section just is that Scanlon is “intentionally,” on the narrow sense of 
the term, developing an account that identifies the relevance of intention for 
moral assessment differently than proponents of double effect reasoning do. 
And further Scanlon’s distinction can be used to differentiate the morality of the 
act from that of the action (in Ross’s terminology), or equivalently, the morality 
of the act from the moral assessment of the motive and the agent, which both 
are part of the action. In contrast, the defenders of the Rule of Double Effect try 
                                                
33 See page 31 in Chapter 2, “The Nature of Physician-Assisted Death in a Health Care 
Context.” 
 
34 Daniel P. Sulmasy, “‘Reinventing’ the Rule of Double Effect” Oxford Companion to 
Bioethics, edited by Bonnie Steinbock (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) 137. 
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to use the distinction to distinguish the morality of different acts, that is, the moral 
permissibility or impermissibility of those acts.  
So what does the preceding discussion mean for the topic under 
consideration? I want to say that the intentions of the agent in performing 
proportionate palliative sedation, when it is in keeping with the discrete 
purposes of the practice, has a different moral meaning than that of PAD. This is 
especially so, though not exclusively, for those medical professionals who 
generally are opposed to PAD. It does not violate the general prohibition of 
intentionally participating in causing the death of the patient. If physicians were 
to accede to the moral permissibility of PAD, it would “amount to a change in 
the meaning of their medical practice. It would alter the relations that exist 
between them and their patients. And the relationship that physicians have with 
their patients is a matter of obvious moral importance to them.”35  
But what if proportionate palliative sedation to address unmanageable 
pain was foreseen though not intended, narrowly speaking, to cause the death 
of a patient in some way? In these cases there is, of course, moral responsibility 
incurred, but the agent may not thereby be morally culpable, that is, if it was 
done within the parameters described above. This point is not justified 
necessarily by appeal to double effect reasoning. Instead, it is substantiated by 
                                                
35 Lynn A. Jansen, “Disambiguating Clinical Intentions: The Ethics of Palliative 
Sedation,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 35 (2010): 29. 
 
  
206 
making use of another important ethical consideration in the practice of 
medicine, namely the notion of proportionality. Consider the formulation by Dan 
Brock, who is not a proponent of double-effect reasoning, when he writes: 
Physicians have moral and professional obligations to promote their 
patients’ best interests or well-being and to avoid causing unnecessary 
harm. The concept of proportionality requires that risk of causing harm 
must bear a direct relationship to the danger and immediacy of the 
patient’s clinical situation and the expected benefit of the intervention. 
The greater the patient’s suffering, the greater risk the physician can take 
of potentially contributing to the patient’s death, as long as the patient 
understands and accepts that risk.36 
 
He goes on to say, “Although proportionality is an important element of 
the doctrine of double effect, it can be applied independently of this doctrine. 
All plausible moral theories accept that, other things being equal, the benefits 
from our actions should where possible exceed their harms.”37 It would appear 
that Brock would need to go a bit further. Bruce Russell rightly points out that 
Brock should be prepared to say, “the expected benefits should exceed the 
expected harms. Proportionality requires taking into account probabilities as 
well as the value/disvalue of possible outcomes.”38 And one would presume 
from an advocate of proportionality that the agent narrowly intends the benefits 
and not what is perceived to be the harms. Accordingly, if the agent were able 
                                                
36 Dan Brock, “Physician-Assisted Suicide as a Last-Resort Option,” Physician-Assisted 
Dying: The Case for Palliative Care and Patient Choice, edited by Timothy E. Quill and 
Margaret P. Battin (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2004) 140. 
 
37 Ibid. 
 
38 Bruce Russell in private correspondence. 
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to bring about the benefits without harm, he or she would do so. This does not 
appear at all to be unreasonable and generally speaking, seems right-headed.  
Of course, the language of intended/foreseen does not emerge in Brock’s 
explanation of proportionality but one can see the affinities that lie between the 
account given by him above and the broad and narrow senses of intention. The 
goal of medical professionals is to act in a manner in which the patient’s well 
being is accomplished. To be sure, moral and legal limits exist that determine 
exactly how this can and should be done. Regardless, even within what is 
deemed morally permissible parameters, there still remain numerous challenges 
in attempting to accomplish the goal of end-of-life palliative care.  
Situations arise in the context of end-of-life health care such that an 
action or course of conduct, say, may have some associated risks with them 
that are not ideal. (It must be kept in mind that the very context in which these 
practices are being considered is not ideal and the dying process can be quite 
muddled.) Yet these potential burdens associated with extraordinary palliative 
care may be outweighed by perceived corresponding benefits. It appears that 
various philosophical accounts seek to capture the basic intuitive notion that 
intentions do matter in some way in order to determine, at the very least, the 
moral meaning of actions or events if not the acts themselves.  
Of course, many of the dialogue partners in the discussions surrounding 
the ethics of various palliative care options reject the intention/foreseen 
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distinction associated with double effect reasoning. Even so, it would seem that 
most would be hard pressed to deny the role that intention plays in the moral 
meaning of human actions and the evaluation of states of affairs brought about 
by them. And so for many medical professionals the purpose of proportionate 
palliative sedation and its corresponding success criterion should be viewed as 
distinctions that make important moral differences in accepting proportionate 
palliative sedation while rejecting PAD for the reasons outlined in Chapter 3.  
 
Practical Problems of Internal and External Discernment of Intentions 
Apart from the difficult philosophical analysis of intentions as mentioned 
above there remain other issues. I will call these the practical problems of 
internal and external discernment of intentions. The first, the practical problem of 
internal discernment of intentions, is the difficulty of health care professionals 
discerning their own clinical intentions. Well-known advocate of physician-
assisted death, Dr. Timothy Quill, has forcefully made this point. In an article in 
the New England Journal of Medicine titled “The Ambiguity of Clinical 
Intentions,” he writes: 
Medical ethicists place great weight on the intentions of clinical 
actions….Giving high doses of narcotic analgesics to a dying patient to 
relieve pain and suffering is considered ethical even if it inadvertently 
hastens death, provided the clinician did not intend to help the patient 
die. Death may even be foreseen as a side effect of the intervention as 
long as it is not intended. On the other hand, should a clinician even 
remotely intend to help a patient die, even when death is desired by a 
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terminally ill patient with irreversible suffering, that same act would be 
considered unethical—a form of medical killing. 
 
From this idealized ethical perspective, intentions are clear and distinct. 
My training about intentions, however, comes from clinical medicine and 
psychodynamic psychiatry. When probing intention in these domains, one 
rapidly learns they may be complex, ambiguous, and often contradictory. 
Ethical discourse about intentions often appears idealized and superficial, 
reminiscent of early sessions in psychotherapy before intimacy is 
developed. Once trust is established, an exploration of true intentions 
often reflects the multilayered complexity of human life. If we explore the 
gap between idealized ethics and actual experience, we may uncover 
some of the complex reasons why many clinicians continue to undertreat 
pain and suffering even when they know a patient is dying.39 
Any of us who have been in contexts where difficult end-of-life decisions 
have had to be made can certainly affirm many of the points expressed by 
Quill.40 There just are many scenarios where our intentions for acting are clear 
even in light of the complexities often faced at the end of life in a health care 
context. Be this as it may, it is also just as obvious that applied ethics in this area 
can be extremely complicated when dealing with so many converging factors. 
                                                
39 Timothy E. Quill, “The Ambiguity of Clinical Intentions,” New England Journal of 
Medicine, Volume 329, Number 14, September 30, 1993, p. 1039. 
 
40 To address an important point Quill raises here even though not germane for the 
development of this section, I don’t think hospice and other palliative care professionals should 
ever undertreat pain, that is, unless the patient explicitly requests the contrary. When all else 
fails, palliative care professionals can and should employ proportionate palliative sedation when 
clinically indicated in as an aggressive manner as needed in order to attain the goal of relief of 
the suffering caused by intractable pain or other physiological induced refractory symptoms. 
This seems to many medical ethicists and health care professionals an ethical and professional 
obligation. 
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These waters often times are difficult to navigate, and so, for the most part, 
Quill’s points are well taken even if some of them are a bit overstated.  
Nevertheless, the emphasis on the importance of clinical intentions for 
judging moral events in a health care context is not to say that there will be no 
difficulties or ambiguities. The vexing existential issues involved in caring for dying 
patients creates tensions that we would all prefer to be without. But this neither 
absolves us from the responsibility of trying to discern intentions, nor does it 
somehow discount the fact that they remain a necessary, though not a 
sufficient, condition for assessing a moral event.  
So the question now is “Can intentions be disambiguated?” I think it is 
conceptually plausible to think that this can be done. This does not appear to 
be just a decent theory, but is also practically possible since many medical 
professionals have done it. How so? There are mental steps that a clinician can 
go through in order to discern better her intentions.  
This process of self-examination commences with an awareness of the 
broad and narrow senses of intentions and how they apply to these kinds of 
decisions. This is an important first step. Take a situation in which death is thought 
to be the result of a clinician performing some medical procedure. The 
confusion or ambiguity that some medical professionals may have regarding 
their true intentions could be a “function of the fact that the word ‘intention’ 
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can be used to refer to either of these two senses of the concept.”41 Consider 
the confusion that could result, for example, if a medical professional is asked, 
“What were your intentions for proceeding as you did?” If the physician has the 
wider sense of intention in mind, then she may be baffled about exactly what 
she was trying to accomplish. She was aware of the various consequences that 
could be potential outcomes from her actions. The two senses of ‘intention’ 
need to be clear and distinct in the minds of medical professionals engaging in 
extraordinary palliative care.  
At the next step in this process of self-examination, the clinician “could ask 
herself whether she intends, on the narrow sense of intention, to kill her patient. 
In asking this question, she would, in effect, be asking whether the death of the 
patient was part of her plan in acting.”42 In order to better come to terms with 
one’s intentions, further questions may be asked at this point. These questions 
are counter-factual ones designed to help her understand exactly what she is 
committing to when embarking on a particular course of conduct. “For 
example, she could ask whether bringing about the death of the patient was 
itself something that guides her action in the sense that she would be prepared 
to adjust her conduct if it became apparent that it would not bring about this 
                                                
41 Lynn A. Jansen, “Disambiguating Clinical Intentions: The Ethics of Palliative 
Sedation,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 35 (2010): 24. 
 
42 Ibid., 26. 
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event.”43 Or another way this may be put is to ask oneself, would I think that the 
medical procedure that I have embarked upon was unsuccessful if it did not 
bring about death but did relieve suffering?  
If the answer to either of these questions is “yes,” then she could conclude 
that the death of the patient was intended, narrowly speaking, by her actions. If 
the clinician can honestly answer the questions with a “no,” then one could 
affirm that the death of the patient was not the aim. This is true, even if, death 
may be foreseen given the complex nature of aggressive end of life palliative 
care. What if the answer to the counter-factual questions, genuinely, is “I don’t 
know”? In this situation, if medical professionals are still unsure after engaging in 
this kind of proposed self-examination, there still remain other courses of action.  
This is where I think a properly functioning ethics committee in a health 
care context can be of tremendous benefit in working through these issues, 
including aiding health care professionals in discerning their own intentions for 
acting. The importance of this function of an ethics committee should not be 
minimized given that for many medical professionals this is a matter of moral 
and professional integrity. “There is in intent,” on the account developed in this 
work, “a kind of union between the agent and the act which links the agent to 
                                                
43 Ibid. 
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the moral quality of the act.”44 If there is some question surrounding the moral 
quality of some acts, say, instances of PAD, then these clinicians may want to 
distance themselves from PAD if they take them to be morally questionable acts 
in the first place.  
These kinds of committees ideally should not be set up to be judge and 
jury whose primary responsibility is to second-guess the decisions and actions, 
and perhaps even the feelings, of clinicians. Instead, an interdisciplinary team 
approach, insofar as it is capable, should help health care professionals with 
their own concerns while promoting the best interests of patients. This may not 
be done flawlessly in every instance, but it may be the best we can do in some 
situations. 
The kind of self-examination that is required here is not exceedingly 
demanding. It does, however, require “posing well-formed questions to one’s 
self and it requires that one thinks clearly [and honestly] about them. There is no 
reason to think that physicians are incapable of this kind of activity.” 45 
Furthermore, it is ethically necessary to attempt to disambiguate ambiguous 
intentions as part of one’s professional duties when dealing with end of life 
medical decisions. As Lynn A. Jansen writes: “the physician may have a duty to 
                                                
44 Edmund D. Pellegrino, “The Place of Intention in the Moral Assessment of Assisted 
Suicide and Active Euthanasia,” Intending Death: The Ethics of Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia, edited by Tom L. Beauchamp (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996) 164. 
 
45 Jansen, “Disambiguating Clinical Intentions,” 26. 
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clarify her intentions or at least come to a better understanding of them. This 
seems particularly the case when the issues at stake are of great moral 
importance, such as the life and death issues that arise in the context of 
extraordinary palliative medicine.”46  
The second practical problem, the external discernment of intentions, 
deals with knowing exactly what someone else’s intentions actually are in some 
situation. Clinicians not only may be unclear about their own intentions, but also 
may be dishonest in order to accomplish what they think to be the more ethical 
action. Those medical professionals who fall into this category sometimes are 
drawn in this direction if they perceive it to be expedient or if it is thought to 
circumvent some rules or laws that seem unjust, arbitrary, or overly cumbersome. 
If so, then some may worry about the usefulness of the appeal to one’s 
intentions given that we cannot know for sure what they may be for any given 
individual. Can we really know what the true intentions of a person actually are? 
If not, then how can it play such a central role in moral assessment as many 
ethicists and medical professionals, perhaps naively, claim? 
John F. Kavanaugh points out the importance of the intended/foreseen 
consequences distinction in relation to one’s character when he writes, “This 
distinction is as crucial as it is a test of one’s honesty. It is crucial because we 
consistently choose courses of action that have unintended results. It is a test of 
                                                
46 Ibid. 
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one’s honesty because no one but ourselves can examine our intent.”47 His 
comments point out an important issue. Employing this kind of moral reasoning 
ought to take into account some aspect of virtue or character development.  
Nonetheless, we must tread carefully here. The claim Kavanaugh makes 
that “no one but ourselves can examine our intent” may not be wholly 
accurate. We expect jurors to discern the intent behind some actions of 
defendants in a court of law by examining evidence that suggests a defendant 
purposefully acted in some way with a particular aim in mind. To be sure, we 
may never know for certain, but perhaps it is not unreasonable to think to some 
degree we can discern others’ intentions.  
For our purposes, it may not be as difficult on proportionate palliative 
sedation for persons other than the agent to discern clinical intentions. On the 
description provided above, if a physician gives too much sedating medications 
resulting in the direct death of the patient, then there are several options or 
some combination of these that may explain what happened. These include: 
i. The clinician is intentionally trying to harm the patient. (a case of 
murder) 
 
ii. The clinician is intentionally trying to hasten the patient’s death 
because it is judged that he is “better off” dead than suffering as 
such. (a case of PAD) 
 
                                                
47 John F. Kavanaugh, S. J., Who Counts as Persons? Human Identity and the Ethics of 
Killing, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001, p. 123. 
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iii. The clinician is medically incompetent or negligent. (a case of 
medical malpractice) 
 
iv. The clinician made a mistake (a case of medical error) 
 
It very well may be possible to rule out several of these options given the 
specific details of a particular case. This can be done by identifying what the 
standard practices are in keeping with quality care, examining the past 
practices by a clinician in similar situations, looking back at charts to see if an 
order was entered incorrectly, and so on and so forth. This does not need to be 
done in every situation in which something has gone wrong. But primarily in 
those scenarios where there is some question as to whether or not some action 
was morally and professionally justified. Again, on the account of proportionate 
palliative sedation advocated here, it becomes just a little more difficult to 
abuse this practice. That is, if one carefully titrates up as needed in order to gain 
the desired effect. Of course, as is the case with this practice or any other, 
abuse remains possible, but it can be minimized. The degree of responsibility 
and culpability incurred would be determined by how egregiously or not the 
medical professional acted outside the clinically indicated standard practice for 
cases of a similar nature.  
It seems to me that what I have called the practical problems of internal 
and external discernment of intentions both suffer from a more fundamental 
issue. It may be confusing the categories of ontology and epistemology. In other 
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words, it is one discussion to say what something is (ontologically speaking) and 
another discussion to determine how we know something. We ought not 
confuse the claim that an agent’s intention is a necessary condition for moral 
assessment, generally speaking, with how we can discern it in some particular 
situation. This would be like questioning the existence of love as part of what 
counts in having meaningful human relationships because it can be difficult to 
know whether someone loves you or not in a particular instance.48  
It seems that Battin’s criticisms leveled against terminal sedation as 
discussed in Chapter 4 of this work do not really touch the account of 
proportionate palliative sedation argued for here. She seems to have a different 
view of the purpose of terminal or palliative sedation at work, which is the object 
of her analyses. The account of terminal sedation that Battin describes distracts 
us from a less controversial understanding of the practice that is more clearly 
distinguished from instances of PAD. 
Based on her essay, it appears that she takes terminal sedation as an act 
that medical professionals engage in that in effect actually terminates the 
patient. She further thinks the shift in nomenclature to “palliative” from “terminal” 
only adds to the confusion. One recalls a key concern for her is that of patient 
autonomy and consent being respected when she writes: 
                                                
48 Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy, 21. 
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The new euphemism, “palliative sedation,” now often used instead of the 
more distressing “terminal sedation,” only reinforces [the problem of 
patient consent being misdirected by focusing on avoiding pain and not 
on causing death which is where it should be]. By avoiding the word 
“terminal” and hence any suggestion that death may be coming, the 
most important feature of this practice is obscured and terminal sedation 
is confused with “palliative care.”49 
 
Her claims here are misconstrued. The linguistic shift is to bring into focus 
with a greater level of precision the purpose of palliative sedation and under 
what circumstances it is appropriate. “Contrary to Battin, the use of the term 
‘palliative sedation’ should not be understood as being a ‘new euphemism’ to 
take the edge off of a controversial practice nor as an illegitimate attempt to 
avoid the similarities with physician-assisted death.”50 
Instead, ‘palliative’ is used to reflect the goal and intent of sedation, 
which is to provide comfort to patients by alleviating otherwise unmanageable 
symptoms as opposed to terminating the patient. And ‘proportionate’ is used to 
indicate that it is the minimum amount of sedating drugs needed to achieve 
that goal. These are important features that contribute to a proper 
understanding of the procedure and its ethical permissibility.  
For all intents and purposes this linguistic shift to palliative sedation in 
general, and proportionate palliative sedation in particular, is similar to the one 
                                                
49 Margaret P. Battin, “Terminal Sedation: Pulling the Sheet over Our Eyes,” Hastings 
Center Report 38, no. 5 (2008): 28. 
 
50 Patrick T. Smith and James S. Boal, “Pulling the Sheet Back Down: A Response to 
Battin on the Practice of Terminal Sedation,” Ethics & Medicine: An International Journal of 
Bioethics, Volume 25:2, Summer 2009: 70.  
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many have advocated to “physician-assisted dying” from what is sometimes 
understood to be more unfavorable terminology like that of “physician-assisted 
suicide.” The use of ‘physician-assisted dying,’ it seems, is to indicate that 
engaging in voluntary active euthanasia and PAS is an exercise of compassion 
and honoring of patient autonomy. And so one wants to find and use language 
that circumvents negative connotations that can skew the important ethical 
discussions that need to take place. Battin is an example of one scholar who 
prefers this kind of shift. For she states in the editor’s introduction of another work 
on PAS: 
[W]e use the term physician-assisted dying because it is descriptively 
accurate and carries with it no misleading connotations….Although 
suicide can be considered heroic or rational depending on setting and 
philosophical orientation, in much American writing it is conflated with 
mental illness, and the term suggests the tragic self-destruction of a person 
who is not thinking clearly or acting rationally. Although distortion from 
depression and other forms of mental illness must always be considered 
when a patient requests a [PAD], patients who choose this option are not 
necessarily depressed but rather may be acting out of a need for self-
preservation, to avoid being destroyed physically and deprived of 
meaning existentially by their illness and impending death…[I]n general 
we use the more neutral term physician-assisted death for this reason….51 
 
So I do not think that it is inappropriate to stress the notion of “palliative 
sedation,” and, in particular, the account of “proportionate palliative sedation” 
being developed here, over against “terminal sedation.” This will be especially 
                                                
51 Margaret Battin, “False Dichotomy versus Genuine Choice: The Argument over 
Physician-Assisted Dying,” Physician-Assisted Dying: The Case for Palliative Care and Patient 
Choice, edited by Timothy E. Quill and Margaret P. Battin (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2004) 1-2. 
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true because a modification like this brings conceptual clarity to the discussion 
in the same way that Battin’s use of “physician-assisted dying” is preferable to 
“physician-assisted suicide” for reasons of conceptual clarity.  
This is not to be seen as taking a philosophical “cheap shot” at Battin. The 
attempt here is not to discredit Battin’s view by a charge of hypocrisy, say. It is 
instead an attempt to illustrate that the reasoning behind stressing the shift in 
language is the same in both cases. So I don’t think this observation makes me 
guilty of a tu quoque fallacy on this score. I do understand why she resists the 
shift from terminal sedation to palliative sedation. It is because, as noted in 
chapter 4, she thinks that the true nature of the intent of palliative sedation is 
obscured. And so, if language is clouding the issues instead of clarifying it, then 
such moves should be resisted. Perhaps the practice as she understands and 
describes it, would be the equivalent of taking a mustard label off of a mustard 
jar and then putting it on a ketchup bottle and then calling the contents 
contained therein mustard instead of ketchup. And so she would oppose, and I 
think rightly, such a blurring. But on the proportionate palliative sedation 
account developed in this chapter, this is not the case. Proportionate palliative 
sedation is not as easily identified with euthanasia or as potentially abused as, 
say, palliative sedation to unconsciousness might be. 
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Proportionate Palliative Sedation Does Not Hasten Death 
The second distinction that makes a morally relevant difference between 
PAD and proportionate palliative sedation is that when administered assiduously 
by skilled palliative care professionals, proportionate palliative sedation should 
not be thought of as the direct cause of death, and there is no evidence to 
suggest that it actually hastens the death of the patient. The growing consensus 
of empirical clinical evidence actually points in the other direction. 
Ethical controversy often surrounds the use, at times aggressive use, of the 
kinds of medications for palliation at the end of life. There is widespread 
“concern that any doses of drugs sufficient to control symptoms of terminal 
illness inevitably, or at least frequently, hasten the patient’s death.”52 Many have 
simply called it “slow euthanasia.”53 It is thought that there needs to be appeal 
to double effect reasoning in order to justify the use of palliative sedation 
therapies at the end of life.  
This is not only an assumption held by what might be thought as medically 
inexperienced lay people or clinically uninformed moral philosophers and 
ethicists, but also by many physicians. This is the case even for those physicians 
                                                
52 Nigel Sykes and Andrew Thorns, “Sedative Use in the Last Week of Life and the 
Implications for End-of-Life Decision Making,” Archives of Internal Medicine, Volume 163, 
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who want to disavow that palliative sedation therapies in principle are forms of 
euthanasia. They still sometimes fear that the practice “may hasten death and 
fall back on the doctrine of double effect to keep the two approaches 
separate and to justify the use of [palliative sedation therapy].”54 The assumption 
that death is hastened by the use of palliative sedation therapies and the 
subsequent appeal to double effect reasoning in order to justify morally 
palliative sedation therapy, acts “as a tacit admission that good symptom 
control is lethal.”55 
But is this line of thinking right-headed? Is it the case that “good symptom 
control” is in fact lethal such that double effect must be appealed to in order for 
the practices to be morally justified? In the section above it was argued that 
double effect reasoning was not essential in order to justify the form palliative 
sedation therapy described as proportionate palliative sedation. It was also 
noted above, that even if there is a risk of death being hastened, one could, 
following Dan Brock, appeal to the notion of proportionality for moral 
justification of proceeding with palliative sedation therapy in particular 
circumstances, that is, I want to add, when it is clinically indicated to do so. 
Further, and more important for this section of the chapter, is the assumption 
                                                
54 M. Maltoni., et. al., “Palliative sedation therapy does not hasten death: results from a 
prospective multicenter study,” 1167. 
 
55 Sykes and Thorns, “Sedative Use in the Last Week of Life and the Implications for 
End-of-Life Decision Making,” 344. 
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that death is hastened when using palliative sedation therapies, which primarily 
drives many criticisms and concerns of aggressive palliative care, correct? There 
is mounting empirical evidence to suggest that it is not.  
First let us consider the research study by Sykes and Thorns aimed to 
determine “how sedative doses change at the end of life and how often the 
doctrine of double effect might be relevant.”56 Their research yielded that there 
were only 2 cases out of 237 “where the doctrine of double effect may 
[emphasis added] have been implicated.” In the two cases they cited, it was 
not entirely clear that double effect necessarily needed to be appealed to at 
all.57 The overall conclusion of their data is that “Sedative dose increases in the 
last hours of life were not associated with shortened survival overall, suggesting 
                                                
56 Sykes and Thorns, “Sedative Use in the Last Week of Life and the Implications for 
End-of-Life Decision Making,” 341. 
 
57 After describing the two cases in some detail where double effect may have been 
invoked, they summarize their discussion of them by writing: “because of the severity of the 
patient’s delirium, the rate of increase of sedative dose was high enough to raise concern that life 
might have been shortened, and in one of these cases the attending physician clearly foresaw the 
risk. One of the patients had a history of mental illness, and in both of them their agitation had 
the severity described… [as]…‘terminal agitation.’ A characteristic of this clinical picture is that 
the patient usually dies within 24-72 hours. How much this outcome is shaped by the use of 
sedation is impracticable to investigate, as the severity of distress and the risk of harm to self and 
others do not permit an ethical option of refraining from sedative use.” (Ibid., 344) It seems that 
it would be just as legitimate to appeal to the notion of proportionality to justify the potential risk 
given the patients’ conditions. 
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that the doctrine of double effect rarely has to be invoked to excuse sedative 
prescribing in end-stage care.”58 
It is also important to point out that their findings are in keeping with the 
form of proportionate palliative sedation being advocated in this chapter. To be 
sure, as is the case with any medication, “it is possible to hasten death by heavy 
sedation. On the other hand, the aim for the patients studied [in their research] 
was not unconsciousness but relief of their symptoms, and the doses of 
medication used were proportionate to that aim.”59 So the aim or the purpose 
of proportionate palliative sedation is not the death of the patient but the relief 
of refractory symptoms.  
To further buttress this last claim here concerning the significance of the 
proportionate aspect in “proportionate palliative sedation,” consider the words 
of other researchers in another independent study on the same matter when 
they write: 
This study clearly shows that, in most of the patients, palliative sedation 
starts as a mild sedation and evolves over time to a deep and/or 
continuous form of sedation. This illustrates how important and present the 
principle of proportionality is in the decision-making process. The intensity 
and nature of the suffering determines which form of sedation, and more 
specifically, what dosage of sedatives will be administered to the patients. 
Thus, palliative sedation does not presuppose that a patient is sedated 
until unconsciousness. Palliative sedation means that sedative drugs are 
                                                
58 Ibid., 341. 
 
59 Ibid., 344. 
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administered in dosages and combinations required to reduce 
consciousness as much as necessary to adequately relieve one or more 
refractory symptoms. This notion of proportionality is crucial in 
distinguishing palliative sedation from euthanasia.60  
Moreover, the timing of when the sedation is commenced in the dying 
process is also important on proportionate palliative sedation. In the cases 
observed by Sykes and Thorns, “Most episodes of sedative use are brief, and 
there is no evidence that they precipitate death. Rather, they are a response to 
features of a dying process that has already begun.”61 As mentioned above, 
many palliative care professionals see it as their ethical obligation to be as 
aggressive as needed to treat otherwise unmanageable pain in patients at the 
end of life. What Sykes and Thorns have established in their study is that “For 
those who need such treatment, it is entirely possible to provide ongoing 
sedation at a level that is both therapeutically effective and safe.”62 
The findings of Sykes and Thorns should not be thought to be an isolated 
outcome. Many other independent studies have come to the same conclusions. 
Another example is one that focuses on those who are terminally ill due to 
                                                
60 Patricia Claessens, et. al., “Palliative Sedation, Not Slow Euthanasia: A Prospective, 
Longitudinal Study of Sedation in Flemish Palliative Care Units,” Journal of Pain and Symptom 
Management, Volume 41, No. 1, (January 2011): 21. The way “proportionality” is used in this 
quote is in relation to proportionate palliative sedation. It is not referring the notion of 
proportionality that Brock and I advocate with respect to weighing the risks with corresponding 
benefits of some action or other. 
  
61 Sykes and Thorns, “Sedative Use in the Last Week of Life and the Implications for 
End-of-Life Decision Making,” 344. 
 
62 Ibid. 
  
226 
cancer. This particular patient population is where both hospice and palliative 
care historically have been prevalent and have developed as a specialty. 
Palliative sedation therapy is often “indicated for and used to control refractory 
symptoms in cancer patients undergoing palliative care.”63  
The study by Maltoni, et. al. sought to evaluate whether palliative 
sedation therapy had a detrimental effect on survival of terminally ill cancer 
patients. A unique feature of their research, is that it is, perhaps, the “first study to 
prospectively match sedated patients (cohort A) with nonsedated patients 
(cohort B) in such a way that the two arms differ only in terms of one 
characteristic, i.e. sedation.”64 This approach by Maltoni, et. al. is in contrast to 
the retrospective designed studies of Sykes and Thorns and others. Their overall 
conclusion is consistent with other research programs. It was found that 
palliative sedation therapy, especially what is being described as proportionate 
palliative sedation, “does not shorten life when used to relieve refractory 
symptoms and does not need the doctrine of double effect to justify its use from 
an ethical point of view.”65 
                                                
63 M. Maltoni, et. al., “Palliative sedation therapy does not hasten death: results from a 
prospective multicenter study,” Annals of Oncology 20, 2009: 1163. 
 
64 Ibid., 1164. 
 
65 Ibid., 1163. 
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These points are reinforced yet again and some new ones made in a 
recent edition of the Journal of Pain and Symptom Management. An article 
recorded the findings of a research study that aimed “to assess the need and 
effectiveness of sedation in dying patients with intractable symptoms, and the 
thoughts of relatives regarding sedation.”66 It was found that:  
Although the principle of double effect provides moral reassurance, its 
ambiguity may induce the suspicion that death is hastened and that may 
act as a deterrent to the provision of good symptom control. Opposing 
this concern, the majority of studies of interventions with potent drugs, 
including high dosage opioids and sedatives to treat suffering in the last 
days of life, did not demonstrate that the treatment hastened death, if 
carefully administered by skilled professionals. The relatively short period of 
time between start of sedation and death is consistently reported in the 
range of 24-72 hours, indicating that the need for sedation is an indicator 
of impending death rather than a cause of premature death. The results 
of the present study are consistent with this observation. Median sedation-
death time was about one day, with only one patient sedated for more 
than four days. Patients who were sedated had a longer survival when 
compared with patients who were not sedated. Moreover, most patients 
had already stopped eating, were unable to swallow or cough, and had 
severe fatigue. In these conditions, sedation cannot be said to hasten 
death through dehydration and starvation.67 
These conclusions appear to diverge in a significant way from the kinds of 
claims Battin makes with respect to palliative or terminal sedation. She thinks 
that “Patients who are sedated to the degree involved in terminal sedation 
cannot eat or drink, and without ‘artificial’ nutrition and hydration will necessarily 
                                                
66 Mercadante, et. al., “Controlled Sedation for Refractory Symptoms in Dying Patients” 
Journal of Pain and Symptom Management, May 2009, p. 771. 
 
67 Ibid., 775. 
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die, virtually always before they would have died otherwise.”68 Based on what 
has been claimed up to this point about the timing of proportionate palliative 
sedation and why artificial nutrition and hydration often are withheld (though 
not always), I am not sure if she takes as a genuine option that the patient is 
more likely to die of the underlying disease before getting to the point of 
dehydration. 
However, to be charitable to Battin’s claim, perhaps what she has in mind 
concerning palliative sedation is something different. Perhaps she is envisioning 
as a common practice a medical procedure where patients are sedated until 
they are comatose before the active or transitional phases of dying. They are 
then maintained in this condition until they die, “in order to relieve them of the 
experience of conditions found to be unacceptable, at the same 
time…ensuring that they are deprived of food and fluids in order to hasten their 
deaths.”69 If so, then this is problematic. It is quite reasonable that some involved 
in palliative care have not performed this procedure properly. I do 
acknowledge, along with others, that “The use of sedation for relief of symptoms 
is…open to abuse and it cannot be denied that some physicians ostensibly 
administer medication to relieve symptoms, but with a covert intention of 
                                                
68 Battin, “Terminal Sedation: Pulling the Sheet over Our Eyes,” 28. 
 
69 Luke Gormally, “Terminal Sedation and the Doctrine of the Sanctity of Life,” 81. 
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hastening the patient’s death.”70 It must be acknowledged that any medical 
procedure, that otherwise is unproblematic from an ethical perspective, can be 
subject to abuse and misuse. 
Based on why PAD is considered morally problematic in this work, the role 
of intention in determining moral meaning, and the criteria as to the timing of 
proportionate palliative sedation, the potential state of affairs described in the 
previous paragraph very well may be considered an instance of PAD. To be 
sure, there are cases where things are not so straightforward when it comes to 
medical practices that are often referred to as terminal/palliative sedation. And 
so I am in full agreement with Battin that in these situations, there very well may 
not be any ethically relevant distinguishing features between the moral 
meanings of these two states of affairs. This is especially so for those who reject 
PAD. But the account of proportionate palliative sedation developed and 
advocated in this chapter is very different and does seem to resist easy 
identification with instances of PAD and its corresponding wrong-making 
properties as claimed by PAD’s opponents. 
All of the empirical conclusions presented in this section suggest that the 
data points to the fact that properly administered proportionate palliative 
sedation does not result in a hastened death. If death is not hastened by these 
                                                
70 Maltoni, et. al., “Palliative sedation therapy does not hasten death: results from a 
prospective multicenter study,” 1164. See my comments on this in the section on the “Practical 
Problems of Internal and External Discernment of Intentions” on pages 208-220 of this chapter. 
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practices, then the base assumption that grounds many of the other criticisms 
leveled by Battin and Brock in chapter 4 is undermined. It also redirects the kind 
of indefensible “Wedge Argument” that Tännsjö seeks to develop since he, too, 
embraces this fundamental assumption. But again, if death is not hastened by 
proportionate palliative sedation, there is no need to appeal to double effect 
reasoning. Further, in appropriate circumstances patients do not die from 
dehydration or starvation as a result of proportionate palliative sedation. Thus, 
the withholding of life-sustaining treatment along with proportionate palliative 
sedation should not be understood to constitute a “lethal mix.”  
 
Summary Conclusion 
If medical professionals practice proportionate palliative sedation 
appropriately, it does not violate the moral principles that were said to undergird 
the arguments given against the moral permissibility of PAD in a health care 
context. One recalls that there are two basic arguments given in Chapter 3. The 
first is the Argument from the Prohibition of Killing Innocents and second, the 
Argument from the Integrity of the Medical Profession.  
The former argument had as its moral principles: 
MP2:  It is morally wrong intentionally to kill innocent human beings. 
MP3:   It is morally wrong intentionally to kill innocent human beings  
without sufficient moral justification. 
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The corresponding wrong-making properties of the morally complex actions of 
killing innocents are: first, it disregards the inviolability of life and stifles genuine 
human flourishing of human communities, which nurture the inalienable right to 
life. And moreover, in most cases, it is thought to harm human beings and the 
status of our collective life together.  
The Argument from the Integrity of the Medical Profession has as its 
professional moral principle: 
PMP:  It is always wrong in a health care context for a health care  
provider to intentionally cause, or bring about, the death of another 
person.  
 
The wrong-making property with respect to the Argument from the Integrity of 
the Medical Profession, rightly or wrongly, is said to be that PAD violates an 
ethical obligation inherent to the medical profession and professionals to care 
for patients and not participate in killing them intentionally. 
Both of the distinguishing factors between PAD and proportionate 
palliative sedation as specified above do not, as such, violate MP2, MP3, or PMP. 
First it is to be observed that proportionate palliative sedation does not have as 
its aim the death of the patient. And second, it is not an act of killing. Further, 
when it is done appropriately, it does not introduce a lethal agent into the 
professional-patient relationship. So for those who think PAD is morally 
impermissible on the bases outlined in Chapter 3, they can affirm consistently 
that proportionate palliative sedation is not subject to the same criticisms. 
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Hence, the two practices are rendered as morally distinct in the purview of 
those who are opposed to PAD. If so, then medical professionals are not being 
inconsistent if they embrace proportionate palliative sedation while rejecting 
PAD. 
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Professionals engaged in palliative care have a responsibility to treat their 
patients by aggressively managing pain and certain kinds of suffering within 
legal and professional ethical boundaries. Many medical professionals and 
ethicists, rightly or wrongly, have considered the practices of euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide, which can be categorized as instances of physician-
assisted death (PAD), to be beyond the scope of ethically appropriate health 
care. Many of these same individuals who oppose PAD, and the professional 
organizations they sometimes represent, often embrace, at the same time, the 
practice of palliative/terminal sedation at the end of life. Palliative sedation is 
thought to be an advance in palliative care that has alleviated the need for 
PAD when managing otherwise intractable pain in dying patients. However, 
  
248 
there is some question as to whether this procedure is sufficiently distinct, 
ethically speaking, from instances of various forms of PAD and that it actually 
constitutes a compromise. It may be argued that if there is no legitimate moral 
distinction between the two sets of practices, then instances of PAD should be 
legal and morally legitimate end-of-life treatment options for patients along with 
palliative sedation. If this view is correct, then those who support the use of 
sedation in end-of-life palliative care should have no problem with the practice 
of PAD. If they were to think or act otherwise would be ethically and 
professionally inconsistent.  
The primary question of this dissertation is to determine whether or not 
medical professionals and others invested in this area are ethically consistent if 
they reject PAD while embracing the practice of palliative/terminal sedation. So 
this project is to be considered a work in applied analytic bioethics. I argue that 
there are both conceptual and empirical reasons for maintaining that there are 
morally relevant differences between PAD and palliative/terminal sedation for 
those who have some reasons to think the former is ethically problematic. 
Therefore, those who are morally and professionally opposed to PAD for certain 
reasons are not necessarily being inconsistent in their support of 
palliative/terminal sedation as a legitimate treatment at the end-of-life when 
the latter is carefully defined, understood, and practiced. 
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